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ABSTRACT
Histories of philosophy that cover the rise of natural religion in England will
inevitably move from John Locke to John Toland. The typical account portrays Locke as
sincerely Christian and trying to balance the demands of faith and reason. His
rationalistic epistemology in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay) even
defends doctrines that are “above reason.” Toland is portrayed as a disciple of Locke
whose modified Lockean epistemology in Christianity Not Mysterious (CNM) results in a
subordination of revelation to reason and a dismissal of doctrines that are above reason.
More detailed treatments note that CNM is the catalyst of the Locke-Stillingfleet debate,
which begins when Bishop Stillingfleet observes CNM’s dependence on the Essay and
then accuses Locke of paving the way for heresy.
This dissertation argues that the differences between Locke and Toland with
respect to their epistemologies are not based upon or evidenced by their respective
categorizations of propositions, but rather on Toland’s attempt at working out the
implications of Locke’s epistemological principles in conjunction with Toland’s
interpretations of certain biblical passages and certain theological preferences and
presuppositions. Had Locke ordered propositions according to his preferred consideration
of reason, his categorization of propositions would be the same as Toland’s. The
resultant, substantial differences between Locke and Toland in their understandings of
epistemology are connected with Toland’s definite or likely rejections of theological and
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philosophical positions that Locke does not dismiss: non-materialism of the soul, postNew Testament original revelation and miracles, and prior-to-the-close-of-the-NewTestament divine revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed faculty and private
miracles for believers.
This thesis is demonstrated through three main chapters. The first concentrates on
the Locke-Stillingfleet debate. It explains certain foundational concepts of Locke’s and
Toland’s epistemologies, Stillingfleet’s misunderstandings, and how the controversy and
its reception leaves little resolved regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s
respective epistemologies. The next chapter builds on the previous one and explains
reason, faith, revelation, and their relationships in Locke. The last of the main chapters
explores the same questions as the preceding one but with regard to Toland. It also
delivers a point-for-point comparison with Locke.

x

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

A Reasonable Narrative from Mysterious Premises
Any history of philosophy that covers the rise of deism or the rise of natural
religion in England will inevitably juxtapose John Locke (1632-1704) and John Toland
(1670-1722). John Locke was perhaps the great mind of his time and his magnum opus,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay), still piques the interest and draws
the scrutiny of historians, philosophers, and theologians alike. Because Locke looms so
large and draws the focus of so many, those who became attached to him in one way or
another were effectively saved from the indefinite limbo of historical obscurity. This is
the case with John Toland. His work Christianity Not Mysterious (CNM) is best known
for its use of Lockean principles with a few modifications in a scathing critique of the
then-current religious establishments. While Locke cultivated religious mysteries with his
epistemological ploughshare, Toland beats it into a sword and lops away the mysterious
fruits of revelation growing above the soil of reason. Thus Toland is the first of a
generation of so-called deists who use and modify Locke’s epistemology to promulgate
natural religion and critique Christianity, or so the story goes.
It is likely not just the philosophical differences between Locke and Toland that
make an exploration of Toland enticing, but also the personal characteristics attributed to
him in the histories of philosophy. In these accounts we are often introduced to Locke the
Reputable and Toland the Disreputable. Whatever other adjectives one might apply to
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Locke, such as heretical or orthodox, he is consistently portrayed as brilliant and honest.
He is the venerable gentleman at Oates earnestly trying to make sense of religion and
reason come what may. Portrayals of Toland, while various, are rarely complimentary.
For instance, Leslie Stephen introduces Toland with the following description:
From his earliest days Toland was a mere waif and stray, hanging loose upon
society, retiring at intervals into the profoundest recesses of Grub Street,
emerging again by fits to scandalise the whole respectable world, and then once
more sinking back into tenfold obscurity. His career is made more pathetic by his
incessant efforts to clutch at various supports, which always gave way as he
grasped at them.
And subsequently, where Stephen discusses CNM as being the root cause of the
embittered Locke-Stillingfleet debate, he calculates, “we may fancy Toland chuckling
with all the vanity of gratified mischief.” 1
With such descriptions of Toland circulating in important historical works such as
Stephen’s, it is easy to imagine in CNM the significant and cleverly subtle
epistemological deviations from the Essay that are alluded to in Toland scholarship. The
converse is true as well. But before adopting the contours of this narrative a few basic
questions are in order. How, exactly, do Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies differ?
Tiresome quick descriptions, such as that Locke accepts religious mysteries and Toland
does not, simply lack definitive boundaries and create more questions. Locke can be a
large, quick, and elusive quarry. And if Toland is tethered to him, perhaps being dragged,
Locke must be caught before trying to measure the distance between the two.

1

Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol.1, 3rd ed. (New York:
Peter Smith, 1949), 101-102, 111.
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Thesis Statement
This dissertation will compare the epistemologies of John Locke and John Toland
based upon Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Toland’s
Christianity Not Mysterious and their related works. This dissertation will argue that the
differences between Locke and Toland with respect to their epistemologies are not based
upon or evidenced by their respective categorizations of propositions, but rather on
Toland’s attempt at working out the implications of Locke’s epistemological principles in
conjunction with Toland’s interpretations of certain biblical passages and certain
theological preferences and presuppositions. Had Locke ordered propositions according
to his preferred consideration of reason, his categorization of propositions would be the
same as Toland’s. The resultant, substantial differences between Locke and Toland in
their understandings of epistemology are connected with Toland’s definite or likely
rejections of theological and philosophical positions that Locke does not dismiss: nonmaterialism of the soul, post-New Testament original revelation and miracles, and priorto-the-close-of-the-New-Testament divine revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed
faculty and private miracles for believers.2

The State of the Problem
John Toland penned numerous books on a variety of topics in his two and a half
decades of writing, but the book that brought him the most notoriety was his very first,

2

Toland would reject any claim of a private miracle that occurred in the presence of a biblical
unbeliever that was not to have been done by God and for the purpose of helping the unbeliever with her
unbelief (CNM 151). John Locke does not specifically discuss the claims of believers in non-biblical
religions regarding miracles done in favor of their religion.
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Christianity Not Mysterious.3 In it he borrows heavily from John Locke’s An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, a book that by then had made a considerable and
largely favorable impression on the educated.4 Bishop Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699),
who was in a heated debate with the Unitarians at the time, spied in Toland’s CNM what
he thought was a defense of the Unitarians against him on certain points and an attack on
the doctrine of the Trinity. Stillingfleet also noticed the numerous Lockean appropriations
in CNM. In A Discourse In Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (Discourse),
Stillingfleet fixes his guns on CNM and parts of Locke’s Essay from which he sees
Toland building his case for the notion that we can only have certainty of clear and
distinct ideas and only reason about them. While Locke himself was not charged with
heresy, Stillingfleet accuses Locke of paving the way—albeit unwittingly—for it. That is,
Stillingfleet believed that Toland had shown the unorthodox conclusions of the
foundational, epistemological principles of the Essay, to which Locke, its very author,
only loosely adhered. Locke felt he and his Essay were under fire, and despite advice to
the contrary, two of the great theological and philosophical minds of their generation
3

John Toland, Christianity not Mysterious: OR, A TREATISE Shewing, That there is nothing in
the GOSPEL Contrary to REASON, Nor ABOVE it: And that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d
A MYSTERY, 2nd ed. (London: printed for Sam Buckley, 1696). This is a slightly enlarged version of the
original and anonymously published 1st edition (London: 1696). From here onward, the page numbers of
CNM (2nd ed.) will be referenced parenthetically. The 1st edition of the work will be referenced in the
footnotes when needed. John Toland, An Apology for Mr. Toland, In a Letter from Himself to a Member of
the House of Commons in Ireland, etc. (London: 1697); John Toland, A Defence of Mr. Toland in a Letter
to Himself (London: printed for E. Whitlock, 1697); John Toland, Vindicius Liberius: or, M. Toland’s
Defence of himself, Against the late Lower House of Convocation, etc. (London: printed for Bernard
Lintott, 1702). The 2nd edition version of CNM is printed with the Apology in 1702 (London).
4

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, 3rd ed. (London: printed for
Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship, 1695). The 1695 edition is essentially a page for page
reprint of the 1694 edition (London: printed for Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship). Both
have been consulted and there are no important differences that are of concern here. Also, the 1695 edition
is the latest edition that John Toland would have been able to consult prior to the publication of Christianity
Not Mysterious. Also consulted is the critical edition of the Essay: John Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, ed. by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). From here onward the
book number, chapter, and section of the 1695 edition will be referenced parenthetically.
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became embroiled in a rigorous debate. John Toland essentially became a bystander in
this particular controversy, allowing Locke to clarify grossly misinterpreted parts of CNM
for Stillingfleet.5
Despite the glaring mistakes Locke points out in Stillingfleet’s understanding of
the notions of ideas, certainty, and knowledge found in the Essay and Toland’s CNM,
Toland is still to this day portrayed somewhat as Stillingfleet paints him. While originally
portrayed by Stillingfleet as having brought the Essay’s foundational principles to their
true unorthodox end, namely that certainty can only be had by and reasoning could only
be done with clear and distinct ideas, Toland is now portrayed as having largely
borrowed from the Essay and having adapted it to his own heretical ends. This altered
picture stands because most are skeptical of or deny the accuracy of Stillingfleet’s
reading of Locke and the Essay in light of Locke’s defense, but for some reason assume
that the bishop’s reading of Toland’s CNM is correct.6
5

Edward Stillingfleet, A Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity with an Answer to the Late
Socinian Objections Against It from Scripture, Antiquity and Reason, 2nd ed. (London: printed by J.H. for
Henry Mortlock, 1697). The 1st edition has the same bibliographic information. There are no pertinent
differences between the editions that concern this chapter. The subsequent works in or referencing the
debate are, in order of dissemination: John Locke, A Letter to Edward Ld Bishop of Worcester, Concerning
Some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke’s Essay of Humane Understanding: In a Late Discourse of his
Lordships, In Vindication of the Trinity (London: printed for A. and J. Churchill, 1697); Edward
Stillingfleet, The Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Letter, Concerning Some Passages Relating
to His Essay of Humane Understanding, Mention’d in the late Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity
(London: Printed by J.H. for Henry Mortlock, 1697); John Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend
the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to His Letter, Concerning Some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke’s
Essay of Humane Understanding: In a Late Discourse of His Lordships, In Vindication of the Trinity
(London: printed by H. Clark for A. and J. Churchill, and E. Castle, 1697); Edward Stillingfleet, The
Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Second Letter; Wherein His Notion of Ideas is Prov’d to be
Inconsistent with It Self, and with the Articles of the Christian Faith (London: printed by J.H. for Henry
Mortlock, 1698); John Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s
Answer to his Second Letter (London: printed by H.C. for A. and J. Churchill and E. Castle, 1699).
6

If these scholars are not simply assuming Stillingfleet is correct in his reading of Toland—that he
claimed certainty can only be had with clear and distinct ideas--there is no compelling evidence that they
have investigated the matter. In fact, most do not even grasp what clear and distinct ideas means. Robert E.
Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 76-77. The
following quote of Sullivan demonstrates a lack of understanding of Locke’s notion of ideas and certainty
central to the Locke-Stillingfleet debate’s launch: “Toland was faithful to Locke in insisting that, in order to

6
Scholarly assessments of Toland tend to abound with a few major, intertwined
problems related to this prevailing view that Stillingfleet read CNM correctly and that
Toland did greatly diverge from Locke despite the fact that both built on similar
foundations. Supporting or resulting from this view are three common assertions often
made regarding the juxtaposition of Locke and Toland: 1) Toland appropriates the
foundational principles of Locke’s Essay to a significant degree, 2) Locke accepts
propositions above reason, while Toland does not, and 3) Locke accepts divine revelation
and Toland rejects, or essentially rejects, divine revelation by subordinating it to reason.7
acknowledge anything, one must have first a clear and distinct idea of it” (76). On the next page, Sullivan
makes it clear he thinks Stillingfleet’s reading of Toland on clear and distinct ideas is correct (77).
Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Beiser oddly finds Locke’s explanation of
ideas “more peculiar and obscure” than Toland’s. The only thing that I can think of that can account for
that is that he thinks Stillingfleet has read Toland correctly and not read Locke correctly. His explanation of
Toland’s use of clear, distinct, and adequate ideas is clearly flawed (250FN77). He later states that certainty
can only be had with clear and distinct ideas. There he describes clear and distinct ideas as being ideas that
can be described in “clear and simple terms,” an imprecise and unhelpful definition (251). Paul Helm,
“Locke on Faith and Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly 23, no. 90 (Jan., 1973), 52-66. Helm
operates with the understanding that Stillingfleet has read Toland correctly (58-59). Oddly, Helm is one of
the few scholars who think Stillingfleet could be correct about Locke (59). John C. Biddle, “Locke’s
Critique of Innate Principles and Toland’s Deism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep.,
1976), 411-422. It appears as though Biddle agrees with Stillingfleet’s assessment in his portrayal of
Toland’s CNM (419-420). While citing Toland’s CNM for support, that which he brings out is not
explained in context but rather pieced together to comport with Stillingfleet’s reading of CNM (419-420).
7

Toland scholarship supporting the three assertions: Sullivan, John Toland; Beiser, The
Sovereignty of Reason, 220-265; Ian Leask, “Personation and immanent undermining: On Toland’s
Appearing Lockean,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 18, no. 2 (2010): 231-256; James C.
Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed.
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 18-21 Daniel C. Fouke, Philosophy and Theology in a Burlesque
Mode: John Toland and “The Way of Paradox” (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2007), especially 23, 81-86,
221-240. 237-238. Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason, 1648-1789, rev. ed. (New York:
Penguin Groups Ltd, 1990), 78, 160; Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 67, 78, 83; Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the
Nineteenth Century, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 36-38; Philip McGuinness,
“Christianity Not Mysterious and the Enlightenment” in John Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious: Text,
Associated Works and Critical Essays, ed. by Philip McGuiness, et al. (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, Ltd,
1997), 231-242; Stephen, History of English Thought, vol. 1, 94-118; James Turner, Without God, Without
Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 51ff.;
Biddle, “Locke’s Critique of Innate Principles,” 411-422; John C. Higgins-Biddle, “Introduction,” The
Reasonableness of Christianity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), xv-cxv; John Herman Randall, Jr., The
Making of the Modern Mind: A Survey of the Intellectual Background of the Present Age (New York:
Columbia, 1926; reprinted with a forward, 1976), 285-289; Diego Lucci, Scripture and Deism: The Biblical
Criticism of the Eighteenth-Century British Deists (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 72-73, 81-82.
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These three assertions, which are related to the prevailing view of CNM, are
teeming with problems. Assertion one—that Toland appropriates the foundational
principles of Locke’s Essay to a significant degree or that Toland is dependent on
Locke—is vague but widely held.
Assertion two—that Locke accepts propositions above reason, while Toland does
not—is the most widely known. There is seemingly clear textual evidence that Locke
accepts things “above reason” and Toland rejects them. On the one hand, Locke discusses
propositions above reason in multiple places (IV.xvii.23; IV.xviii.7-8) and affirms them.
On the other hand, the full title of Toland’s CNM is Christianity not Mysterious: OR, A
TREATISE Shewing, That there is nothing in the GOSPEL Contrary to REASON, Nor
ABOVE it: And that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d A MYSTERY. In fact, it
seems as though this textual evidence clearly supports the prevailing view that Toland,
the disciple, attacked his master. But, due to the lack of specificity of assertion one, an
imposing assumption actually undergirds assertion two. The assumption is that Locke and
Toland are operating with the same notion of reason in Locke’s acceptance of things
above reason and Toland’s rejection of things above reason. Yet, Locke operates with
two rather distinct understandings of reason in the chapters of the Essay that are most
often juxtaposed with CNM. What is more, no one has attempted an in depth explanation
of Toland’s understanding of reason, which is needed to be able to compare it to Locke’s.
To operate as if it is the same as Locke’s is not only presumptuous but problematic since
Locke’s understanding of reason is one of the most contested topics in Locke scholarship.
In addition, in Locke scholarship there is general confusion precisely as to what
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propositions above reason are.8 To even begin to get a handle on Toland’s understanding
of reason, the center of his epistemology, one would have to seriously explore the more
fundamental aspects of his epistemology such as ideas and certainty, which few have
attempted.9
Furthermore, due to the lack of comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s foundational,
epistemological principles and their respective views of reason, assertion three is made—
Locke accepts divine revelation and Toland rejects, or essentially rejects, divine
revelation by subordinating it to reason. In fact, some incorrectly identify above reason
propositions and revelation making assertions two and three identical.10 But of those that
understand propositions above reason to be a subset of revelation or think the two to be
8

The complex categorization of scholars into various groups based on the similarities of their
treatments of Locke that is undertaken in chapter 3 will not be rehearsed here. Most of the explorations of
Locke’s reason are more specifically about the relationship between reason and faith or reason and
revelation. James C. Livingston, Christian Thought, 18-21; Welch, Protestant Thought, 35-36; Sullivan,
John Toland, 79; Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason, 13; Frederick Copleston, A History
of Philosophy, vol. v (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1964), 69-70. Randall, Jr. The Making of the
Modern, 285-9; James O’Higgins, Anthony Collins: The Man and His Works (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1970), 52; William Uzgalis, “Anthony Collins,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first
published Mon Aug 25, 2003 with substantive revisions Mon Feb 23, 2009 (accessed on March 13, 2009)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collins; Biddle, “Locke’s Critique of Innate Principles”; Leask,
“Personation and immanent undermining”; Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s
Philosophy,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. by John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), 194-223; Alan P.F. Sell, John Locke and the Eighteenth-Century Divines (Cardiff:
University of Wales Press, 1997), 97; Wioletta Polinska, “Faith and Reason in John Locke,” Philosophy
and Theology 11, no. 2 (1999): 287-309; Helm, “Locke on Faith and Knowledge”; David C. Snyder, “Faith
and Reason in Locke’s Essay,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1986): 197-213; R. S.
Woolhouse, Locke (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 140-143; Nicholas Jolley, “Locke
on Faith and Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human
Understanding,’ edited by Lex Newman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 436-455;
Michael Ayers, Locke Volume 1: Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 1991), 121; Nicholas Wolterstorff,
John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: University Press, 1996); Nicholas Wolterstorff, “John
Locke’s Epistemological Piety: Reason is the Candle of the Lord,” Faith and Philosophy 11, no. 4 (Oct.
1994): 572-591.
9

As said above, most assume Stillingfleet has a correct read on Toland, but not on Locke. Ian
Leask is one scholar who has attempted a more in depth comparison of Locke and Toland on ideas, among
other topics. Leask, “Personation and Immanent Undermining.”
10

A possible example of this is: Leask, “Personation and Immanent Undermining,” 243-244. This
dissertation attempts to give Leask the most charitable reading possible and will thus give the alternative to
this reading of his article.
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overlapping somehow, they appear to think assertions two and three are mutually
supportive for one reason or another.
Together the three assertions are coherent and they give a slightly more detailed
explanation of the prevailing view’s claim that Toland did greatly diverge from Locke.
But while Locke scholarship is fraught with detailed analyses that work toward
answering important questions that bear on the relationship between Locke and Toland,
this is clearly not the case in Toland scholarship. It is riddled with reliance on secondhand information on and readings of Toland, which is likely due to the prolixity of the
Locke-Stillingfleet debate and CNM’s hard-to-follow style. The potentially fatal
assumptions that CNM claims that certainty can only be had with clear and distinct ideas
and that Toland and Locke have the same notion in mind when using the term reason are
only two of several. Another significant assumption that is made that reinforces one of
the assumptions named above is that when Toland says that faith is knowledge, by
knowledge he means the Lockean knowledge that only comes about by intuition and
demonstration.11 This is incorrect and just reinforces the popular, but incorrect
Stillingfleet reading of Toland that he teaches that only certainty can be had by clear and
distinct ideas. It also reduces Christianity to a natural religion of morality since morality
is demonstrable according to Locke’s Essay.12 Two other very important terms used by

11

Leask, “Personation and Immanent Undermining,” 245; Sullivan, John Toland, 126; Lucci,
Scripture and Deism, 81-82; Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 251-252. Beiser is possibly tripped up by
Toland’s calling faith knowledge. Justin Champion, Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of
Christian Culture, 1696-1722 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 79-80. Champion portrays
Toland as not being so concerned with theology: “Toland, as we will see, was concerned with
epistemological certainty too, but the context for the performance of that certainty was not theological but a
broader social community” (79). Champion’s work is appreciated as it is a very interesting historical
account of Toland, but it does not say much about the philosophical and theological points made by CNM.
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Locke, Essay IV.iii.18. There he explicitly notes that he thinks “Morality amongst the Sciences
capable of Demonstration.”
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Toland that are not investigated thoroughly enough are experience and evidence. When
Toland says that experience is the means of information which serves as the common
stock of all of our knowledge some incorrectly understand him to mean experiences in
the contemporary, modern-day vernacular. In other words, they think that Toland is
advocating a verifiability criterion such that if one cannot verify something it cannot be
believed.13 On a related issue, evidence, an extremely important term in CNM, is taken
wrongly to mean empirical proof, which greatly distorts what Toland is attempting to
convey.14 In short, there are numerous problems in Locke and especially Toland
scholarship, some named above, which have caused Locke and Toland to be viewed as
very similar in some respects but greatly different in others.
This dissertation also will interact with two historical scenarios found in Locke
and Toland scholarship, one involving Toland and the other involving Locke and Toland,
which quickly and undeservedly became matters of “fact.” The first is that Toland was
actually a pantheistic materialist his entire life and thus CNM and its related works are a
cover of sorts to his true religious, or irreligious, views. Variations of this view have been
commonplace since its first mature promulgation in Robert E. Sullivan’s John Toland
and the Deist Controversy.15 Despite the fact that Rhoda Rappaport clearly shows how
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Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 250-2; Leask, “Personation and Immanent Undermining,”
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Beiser.
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of Unbelief, ed. by Tom Flynn (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2007), 749-751; Cf. David Berman, A History

11
Sullivan’s greatest piece of evidence for his view is based on circular reasoning, few
seem to care.16 It fits too well with Toland’s mischievous persona.
The other historical scenario, which is accepted as a matter of fact though based
upon a mere suggestion without any further investigation, originated from the pen of John
C. Higgins-Biddle. He thinks it possible that Locke had a copy of CNM prior to its
publication. If so, Higgins-Biddle reasons, Locke’s seeing its epistemological
connections to his Essay and its deistic conclusions might have caused him to write ROC,
in part, to show his Essay does not end up in deism, but on the contrary is against it.17
The conjectured motivations for Locke’s writing of ROC pertaining to Toland lose their
force when it is seen that the gulf between the Essay and CNM is not as wide as once
thought.

Methodology and Outline
The aim of this dissertation is to understand the religious epistemologies
promulgated in the Essay and CNM and grasp in what respects they differ.18 Thus, this
dissertation will focus primarily on the Essay, CNM, their respective defenses, and The
Reasonableness of Christianity (ROC), which Toland was likely able to read prior to the
of Atheism in Britain: From Hobbes to Russell (New York: Croom Helm, 1988); Fouke, Philosophy and
Theology, 12, 187.
16

Rhoda Rappaport, “Questions of Evidence: An Anonymous Tract Attributed to John Toland,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 2 (Apr. 1997): 339-348. Rappaport cites Giancarlo Carabelli as
making a possible connection between Toland and the Two Essays. Giancarlo Carabelli, Tolandiana:
materiali bibliografici per lo studio dell’opera e della fortuna di John Toland (1670-1722) (Florence,
1975), 20-21; L.P. Master of Arts, Two Essays in a Letter from Oxford to a Nobleman in London (London:
R. Baldwin, 1695).
17
18

Higgins-Biddle, “Introduction,” xxvii-xxxvii; Biddle, “Locke’s Critique of Innate Principles.”

While the evidence points to these works being indicative of Locke’s and Toland’s personal
epistemological and religious opinions, the merits of this dissertation do not hinge on it. It will be primarily
shown that Locke’s Essay and Toland’s CNM are much more individually coherent and comparatively
consistent than anyone has previously thought or demonstrated.
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publication of his two 1696 editions of CNM, and ROC’s two vindications. While all
editions have been consulted, the 3rd edition of the Essay (1695), the 2nd edition of ROC
(1696), and the 2nd edition (enlarged) of CNM (1696) are the editions of choice. Caution
will be exercised by checking earlier editions against the choice versions in case a
particular thinker actually had only an earlier edition of another’s work. While both
thinkers have numerous other works apart from those with a historical link to the uproar
caused by CNM for both Toland and Locke, these are the ones of interest. While each
thinker was likely changing his opinion on points throughout his writing career, the
defenses and vindications of their religious works written in 1695-1696 will be
approached as conveying honest commentary on their thoughts, at least, as they stood
during this two-year window, when ROC, CNM, and the third edition of the Essay were
published.
Another important figure’s works that come into play in this dissertation are those
of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet pertaining to his debate with Locke, especially his A
Discourse In Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (Discourse). The fact that
Stillingfleet only had the 1694 2nd edition of Locke’s Essay is not important as there is
little difference between the 2nd and 3rd editions. Regardless, as stated before, all editions
will be consulted. There will also be works and letters from those beyond the focus
figures of Locke and Toland, such as John Tillotson, Anthony Collins, William
Molyneux, and Matthew Tindal, but Stillingfleet is the most important figure outside of
Locke and Toland. It was his Discourse that forever associated the two in the histories of
philosophy.
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There will be substantial interaction with secondary scholarship that investigates
the epistemologies of Locke and Toland. There are several sources that investigate both
figures on key elements and there are other resources that concentrate primarily on one or
the other. Some of the more significant figures who will be interacted with are Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Nicholas Jolley, Alan P. F. Sell, Violetta Polinska, John C. Higgins-Biddle,
Richard Ashcraft, Paul Helm, Robert E. Sullivan, Ian Leask, and Frederick Beiser. There
are numerous others, but those named prove to be especially helpful dialogue partners.
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The next chapter investigates the
Locke-Stillingfleet debate. The lack of investigation into this important debate seems odd
and is probably the biggest source of confusion regarding the interpretation of CNM and
the Essay. Until one understands what both Locke and Toland are saying about ideas and
certainty, one cannot expect to make the right connections when investigating their
notions of reason, faith, and revelation. The key questions that will be asked in this
chapter are the following: 1) Is Stillingfleet correct in connecting Locke and Toland and
does he get them right?; 2) How and why do Locke and Toland respond the way they
do?; 3) What are the salient points of this debate’s historical reception? Chapter 2 argues
that Stillingfleet is correct in asserting agreement between Locke’s and Toland’s notions
of ideas and certainty but misinterprets what both thinkers are conveying about these
notions when he treats them in the Discourse. While Locke’s clarifications on ideas and
certainty made in the course of the debate are helpful, the controversy as a whole and its
reception leaves little resolved regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s
respective epistemologies.
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Chapter 3 focuses solely on the religious epistemology of John Locke. It builds
upon the epistemological investigation of Locke started in chapter 2 and is necessary for
allowing a point-for-point comparison with Toland’s epistemology in chapter 4. The
primary questions being asked in chapter 3 are: 1) According to Locke, what is reason?;
2) What is its relationship to faith?; and 3) What is its relationship to revelation? This
chapter argues that to understand Locke’s description of reason, and thus the
relationships between reason and faith and reason and revelation, one must acknowledge
that in the Essay Locke primarily conceives of the mind employing the faculty of reason
working in reason’s proper office or scope, which entails the considerations of natural as
well as supernatural sources of information (the propositions of the latter trumping the
probable propositions of the former) and a corresponding proper faith that pertains to
probable (uncertain) propositions from the same sources. In Essay IV.xviii, however, he
conceives of the mind employing reason in a diminished office, or concerning only
natural sources, and a corresponding vulgar faith, concerned with only supernatural
sources; but he does this partly, at least, to show that such an antithetical framing of the
two fails to maintain definitive boundaries. As a result, faith in or assent to a proposition
from any source and the determination of divine revelation as such morally ought to be
the result of the mind employing its power of reason in its full scope or office.
Chapter 4 aims at exploring the same questions asked in chapter 3, but in regards
to Toland, and an additional point-for-point comparison with Locke started in chapter 2
and made possible by the epistemological investigation of Locke done in chapter 3.
Chapter 4 argues that the differences between Locke and Toland with respect to their
understandings of reason, its related faculties, faith, and revelation are not based upon or
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evidenced by their respective categorizations of propositions, but are based upon
Toland’s attempt at working out the implications of Locke’s epistemological principles in
conjunction with Toland’s interpretations of certain biblical passages and certain
theological preferences and presuppositions. Had Locke ordered propositions according
to his preferred consideration of reason, his categorization of propositions would be the
same as Toland’s. The resultant, substantial differences between Locke and Toland in
their understandings of epistemology are connected with Toland’s definite or likely
rejections of theological and philosophical positions that Locke does not dismiss: nonmaterialism of the soul, post-New Testament original revelation and miracles, and priorto-the-close-of-the-New-Testament divine revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed
faculty and private miracles for believers.19
Chapter 5 concentrates on conclusions and implications. It reiterates the main
argument of the dissertation in the first part. The second part focuses on a number of
historical implications. In that regard a series of sifting questions for categorizing
thinkers in the narrative of the rise of natural religion in England will be suggested,
corresponding suggestions for the study of certain figures will follow, and implications
for the well-accepted Biddle hypothesis regarding the writing of ROC will be articulated.
Part III focuses on the implications of Locke’s and Toland’s hermeneutics regarding the
influences of biblical criticism and the natural sciences. Comments related to Toland’s
alleged mischievous persona and corresponding claims that he employed a covert style of
writing will be made in Part IV. Finally, Part V will make suggestions for a study that
19

Toland would reject any claim of a private miracle that occurred in the presence of a biblical
unbeliever that was not to have been done by God and for the purpose of helping the unbeliever with her
unbelief (CNM 151). John Locke does not specifically discuss the claims of believers in non-biblical
religions regarding miracles done in favor of their religion.
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will build upon this dissertation to give a fuller sense of Locke’s and Toland’s
prolegomena.

CHAPTER 2: THE LOCKE-STILLINGFLEET CONTROVERSY: FROM FALSE
START TO FOOTING FOR EXPLORING LOCKE’S AND TOLAND’S
EPISTEMOLOGIES

Introduction
As stated in the last chapter, the juxtaposition of John Locke (1632-1704) and
John Toland (1670-1722) is a common feature of many histories of philosophy. John
Locke is fashioned as the more orthodox of the two, defending revelation’s authority and
doctrines above reason, while Toland, himself a Lockean, dismisses anything above
reason and subordinates revelation to reason. This juxtaposition finds its roots in Bishop
Stillingfleet’s assertion, in A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity
(Discourse), of a connection between Locke’s and Toland’s respective treatments of
ideas and certainty. Not only did Stillingfleet’s observation spark a lengthy, multi-volume
debate with Locke, but he forever tethered him with Toland in the annals.
This chapter will explore the Locke-Stillingfleet debate in its historical context
and perform the comparative, epistemological spadework necessary for analyzing and
comparing Locke’s and Toland’s understandings of reason and its relationship to faith
and revelation that will be done in chapters 3 and 4. Thus a few overarching questions
will be asked. First, is Stillingfleet correct in connecting Locke and Toland and does he
get them right? Second, how and why do Locke and Toland respond the way they do?
And, finally, what are the salient points of this debate’s historical reception?
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18
This chapter will suggest that Stillingfleet is correct in asserting agreement
between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty but misinterprets what both
thinkers are conveying about these notions when he treats them in the Discourse. While
the clarifications on ideas and certainty Locke makes in the course of the debate are
helpful, the controversy as a whole and its reception leaves little resolved regarding a
comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s respective epistemologies.
This chapter will be comprised of four parts in addition to a conclusion. Part I will
rehearse a brief narrative of the Locke-Stillingfleet debate to give us historical grounding
and to position the primary literature. Part II will serve as the state of the question
regarding the secondary literature. Part III will focus on ideas, knowledge, and certainty.
There the chapter will give an analysis and exposition of Locke’s Essay on ideas,
knowledge, and certainty followed by a demonstration that Toland’s CNM comports with
the Essay on the same issues.1 The part will conclude with Stillingfleet’s interpretation of
Toland’s CNM and comments on that. The goal of Part III is to demonstrate the first part
of the chapter’s thesis: Stillingfleet is correct in asserting agreement between Locke’s and
Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty but misinterprets what both thinkers are
conveying about them when he comments on them in the Discourse. Part IV will focus
on responses and receptions: Locke’s responses to Stillingfleet on said issues and CNM,
Toland’s response, and contemporary receptions of the controversy. The goal of Part IV
is to demonstrate the need for further exploration and a comparison of Locke’s and
Toland’s epistemologies, and thus the second part of this chapter’s thesis: While the

1

Some comments from the following work will be helpful for this chapter’s discussion on Locke’s
treatment of knowledge: Michael Ayers, Locke, Volume I: Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 1991).
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clarifications on ideas and certainty Locke makes in the course of the debate are helpful,
the controversy as a whole and its reception leaves little resolved regarding a comparison
of Locke’s and Toland’s respective epistemologies.
Part I: A Brief History of the Controversy’s Inception and the Ensuing Debate
John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding received notoriety and
fair sales in its first three editions, the first of which was published in 1690.2 It found its
way, with the help of friends and admirers, into Dublin University and Oxford University
in abridged form as a textbook3; and in a 1694 letter, written to Philip van Limborch,
Locke notes: “The second edition of my book on the Human Understanding is selling
faster than I could have believed, nor, however heterodox it may be, has that dissertation
as yet found an assailant.”4 Locke’s denial of innate ideas drew significant attention with
its first publication, being censured in print by John Norris in 1690 and James Lowde in
1694.5 Unless memory failed Locke in his letter to Limborch, these censures were not of
2

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, 3rd ed. (London: printed for
Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship, 1695). G.A.J. Rogers, “Introduction,” in The
Philosophy of Edward Stillingfleet, vol. 1, ed. by G.A.J. Rogers (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2000), vii-x.
According to G.A.J. Rogers Stillingfleet only owned the 1694 2 nd ed. of the Essay. But the 1695 edition is
essentially a page for page reprint of the 1694 edition (London: printed for Awnsham and John Churchil
and Samuel Manship). Both have been consulted and there are no important differences that are of concern
here. Also, the 1695 edition is the latest edition that John Toland would have been able to consult prior to
the publication of Christianity Not Mysterious. Also consulted is the critical edition of the Essay: John
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979). From here onward, the Essay (3rd ed.) will be referenced parenthetically indicating the book,
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sufficient gravity in guile or content to mark their penmen as “assailants.” Locke’s tenor
is markedly different, however, just over two years later as seen in a letter dated February
22nd, 1697, to William Molyneux:
My book crept into the world about six or seven years ago, without any
opposition, and has since passed amongst some for useful, and, the least
favourable, for innocent. But, as it seems to me, it is agreed by some men that it
should no longer do so. Something, I know not what, is at last spyed out in it, that
is like to be troublesome, and therefore it must be an ill book, and be treated
accordingly. ‘Tis not that I know any thing in particular, but some things that have
hapned [sic] at the same time together, seem to suggest this: what it will produce,
time will shew.6
By this time, Edward Stillingfleet, Lord Bishop of Worcester, had published his A
Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity.7 Although in this book he never
charges Locke with heresy, he does claim Locke’s Essay paved the way for the allegedly
heterodox book entitled Christianity Not Mysterious, a book that is now mentioned
alongside the Essay in nearly every history of philosophy text up to the present-day.8
The designs of John Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious as perceived by
Stillingfleet were to undermine the doctrine of the holy Trinity, among other doctrines.9
6

John Locke, “L2202: Locke to William Molyneux, 22 February 1697,” The Correspondence of
John Locke, vol. 6, ed. by E.S. De Beer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 4-9 [citation p. 6]; Cf.
Woolhouse, Locke: A Bibliography, 371.
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Stillingfleet understands Toland to claim that certainty and reason only concern clear and
distinct ideas. Furthermore, clear and distinct ideas find their origin only in sensation and
reflection. The bishop reasons that these claims amount to the denial of the “certainty of
Faith” in matters where clear and distinct ideas cannot be had.10 What is more,
Stillingfleet remarks that one cannot form a clear and distinct idea of the notion of
substance from the ideas we have from sensation or reflection; rather the notion of
substance is an implication of the “Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things, that
Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves.”11 This means that one cannot be
certain of or reason about substance according to CNM. Therefore, and here is the rub,
according to Stillingfleet, if we are to follow the reasoning promulgated in CNM, we can
have no certainty of the doctrine of the Trinity as that doctrine “depends upon our
Knowledge of the Nature of Substance, and Person and the Distinction between them.”12
It is within this delineation of the problems above that the Essay is brought into
juxtaposition with CNM. Stillingfleet explicitly lumps together Locke and Toland and
unites them under one noxious designation: “And therefore I do not wonder, that the
Gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, have almost discarded Substance out of the
reasonable part of the World” [emphasis mine].13 His subsequent citations from the Essay
concerning the origin of ideas and the way they bear on notions of substances are
intended to show from whence Toland received the notions that troubled Stillingfleet and
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that now find themselves under the bishop’s scrutiny.14 Although the premises from
which the author of CNM works are from the Essay, he is more consistent with them in
his conclusions, according to Stillingfleet, than Locke is. The bishop believes the upshot
of Locke’s discourse on spiritual and corporeal substances is that we can be certain that
there are spiritual and bodily substances, albeit without clear and distinct ideas.15 Therein
lies Locke’s inconsistency (and evidence of no heretical intent):
But if our Reason depend upon clear and distinct Idea’s; how is this possible? We
cannot reason without clear Idea’s, and yet we may be certain without them: Can
we be certain without Reason? Or doth our Reason give us true Notions of things
without these Idea’s? If it be so, this new Hypothesis about Reason must appear to
be very unreasonable.16
Although Stillingfleet teases out further problematic implications from the Essay and
assails CNM in the remainder of the chapter, all of it stems from what has already been
stated: according to Stillingfleet, the Essay can only have certainty of and reason about
clear and distinct ideas, and while Locke does not see the irreligious implications of his
claims, the author of CNM does and employs them as weapons against the doctrine of the
Trinity.
That was the beginning of a fascinating philosophical debate. Even though
Stillingfleet’s Discourse could not have been in print for more than a few months, Locke
quickly responded with A Letter to Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester, etc. (L1), dated
January 7th, 1696/7.17 Stillingfleet responds rapidly in kind with The Bishop of
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Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Letter, etc., dated April 26, 1697. Locke volleys back
Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his
Letter, etc. (L2), dated June 29th, 1697. Attached to its end is a brief work entitled An
Answer to Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (L3) that does
reference the debate but is directed at another Lockean opponent. Stillingfleet’s next and
final riposte, dated September 22nd, 1697, is entitled, The Bishop of Worcester’s Answer
to Mr. Locke’s Second Letter, etc. The final work in the debate, which comes from
Locke, is dated as May of 1698: Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend Lord Bishop of
Worcester’s Answer to his Second Letter, etc. (L4). If it were not for Edward
Stillingfleet’s death in March of 1699, the debate might have continued.18
One voice that is virtually absent in the proceedings is that of John Toland.
Toland, moreover, makes little mention of Stillingfleet’s charges in the three works that
serve as vindications of his CNM: An Apology for Mr. Toland, etc. (Apology), A Defence
of Mr. Toland in a Letter to Himself (Defence), and Vindicius Liberius: Or, M. Toland’s
Defence of himself, etc. (Vindicius). He does incorporate an excerpt from The Agreement
of the Unitarians with the Catholick Church, written by Stephen Nye, one of
E.S. De Beer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 766-767. The editor of Locke’s correspondences notes that
Stillingfleet’s Discourse was being advertised in November 1696 and both editions are dated as 1697 (766767 FN 2). Cf. Woolhouse, Locke: A Bibliography, 370.
18
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Stillingfleet’s opponents, in the Apology and Defence. The excerpt indicates, among other
things, Stillingfleet’s distortion of what CNM teaches. Even when he briefly mentions the
debate over 20 years later, he presents some quotes from Locke, with approval, that
simply demonstrate Locke thinks Toland was sorely handled by Stillingfleet. 19

Part II: State of the Question
There are precious few who have done work on the Locke-Stillingfleet debate or
the thought of Bishop Stillingfleet for that matter. On the one hand this is somewhat
surprising considering how often it is mentioned in the histories of philosophy. On the
other hand, it is not so shocking considering the characteristics of the debate: this debate
is truncated, it consists of over 1200 pages not including CNM and the Essay, and its
alternation from one of the many issues to another likely appears desultory to the unwary
reader. Thankfully some luminaries such as Alan P. F. Sell, Roger Woolhouse, Paul
Schuurman, and Gerard Reedy have made strides in setting the debate into its intellectual
milieu and the trajectories leading in and out of it. 20 A smaller contingent that is worthy
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Letter to Himself (London: printed for E. Whitlock, 1697); John Toland, Vindicius Liberius: or M. Toland’s
Defence of Himself, Against the late Lower House of Convocation, and Others (London: printed for
Bernard Lintott, 1702); John Toland, A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Toland, 2 vols. (London:
printed for J. Peele, 1726), lxxiii-lxxvi (Vol. 1). These pages show Toland’s positive appraisal of his
handling by Locke. These pages reference pp. 438, 440, & 443 of the 1714 Works of John Locke: John
Locke, The Works of John Locke Esq; In Three Volumes, vol. 1 (London: printed for John Churchil and
Sam. Manship, 1714); Fr. Hare, Church Authority Vindicated in a Sermon Preach’d at Putney, May 5,
1719, etc, 4th ed. corrected (London: printed and sold by J. Roberts, 1720). Justin Champion, Republican
Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696-1722 (New York: Manchester University
Press, 2009). Champion interacts with pp. lxxiii-lxxvi of A Collection of Several Pieces, vol. 1 (79);
Stephen Nye, The Agreement of the Unitarians with the Catholick Church, part I (London: 1697).
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of distinction, consisting of M. A. Stewart, Richard Popkin, and G. A. J. Rogers, has done
important work in gaining traction in the mind of the oft-mentioned but often understudied Edward Stillingfleet.21
There are a few worrisome characteristics found in other scholarly literature,
which concentrates on Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies, pertinent to the debate. In
light of the little attention Stillingfleet’s works actually receive, it is peculiar to see the
frequency of the secondary literature’s agreement with Stillingfleet’s assessment of
CNM: that we can only be certain about clear and distinct ideas. This is actually suspect
because in the course of the lengthy debate not only does Locke express perplexity at
Stillingfleet’s reading that the Essay claims certainty can only be had about that which
one has clear and distinct ideas, but he expresses perplexity how Stillingfleet attributes
the same description to CNM. In short, if Locke and Toland scholars are thoroughly
investigating the debate to assess Locke as misinterpreting Toland and Stillingfleet as
interpreting him correctly, one would think that a defense of Stillingfleet’s reading on the
matter would be existent and referenced. Also, few Toland scholars have even done what
can be considered a fair examination of what Toland says on certainty and ideas. An
examination done by Ian Leask argues that Toland teaches that some ideas are innate—a
point that will be argued against in this chapter—but that does not necessarily go against

Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy, ed. by Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2008), 177-193; Gerard Reedy, “Socinians, John Toland, and the Anglican Rationalists,” The
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Stillingfleet’s reading of Toland.22 The most likely conclusion is that scholars have been
assuming Stillingfleet read Toland correctly. Likely suspects are Robert E. Sullivan,
author of Toland’s noted biography, Paul Helm, Frederick C. Beiser, and John C.
Biddle.23
Another point of concern in scholarship is the universal claim that Toland
subordinates revelation to reason in one way or another. It is likely that most take it as a
matter of fact because no one has investigated precisely what Toland means by reason;
and those that comment on Toland in relation to Locke assume both thinkers operate with
the same conception of reason. Some who strive to offer their reasoning for the notion
that Toland subordinates revelation to reason build on the assumption that Stillingfleet
read Toland correctly. For instance, the notion that revelation is subordinate to reason, for
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those like Sullivan, has a direct link, at least, to Stillingfleet’s reading of Toland: we can
only have certainty of and reason about clear and distinct ideas. He writes:
. . . his epistemological assumptions were irreconcilable with allowing divine
inspiration a role in the creation of humanity’s religious opinions. His
conviction—that, should God use this means of information, the intelligence He
conveyed would have to conform to the canons of human reason by presenting
clear and distinct ideas, rather than mysteries—precluded any discoveries.24
In other words, because of reason’s need for clear and distinct ideas revelation cannot
provide us with novelty or mystery if it is to be considered as such. Again, this reading of
Toland is likely, for Sullivan at least, based on the assumption that Stillingfleet read
Toland correctly. Others, like Roger Woolhouse, find other or additional support for the
notion that Toland subordinates revelation to reason from another place. In his important
biography on Locke, Woolhouse assumes that Locke’s charge (leveled at Stillingfleet in
the course of the debate) that Stillingfleet’s arguments involving the immortality of the
soul actually undercut revelation, “a position diametrically opposed to his starting point,”
is Toland’s position.25 More specifically, Woolhouse understands that Locke charges
Stillingfleet with subordinating revelation to natural reason at one point in the debate, a
notion that Stillingfleet condemns in others, and Woolhouse believes these “others”
include Toland. The problem is, even if the others did include Toland, Locke is not
stating that Stillingfleet is accusing Toland rightly. For the vast majority of scholars who
comment on Toland’s subordination of revelation to reason without any evident
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consideration, but who did not take it as a matter of fact in their research, likely follow
Woolhouse’s or Sullivan’s reasoning on the points above, or both.
There is another very important reading of Toland that has an association with the
assumption that Stillingfleet reads Toland correctly that is worth mentioning. A
significant assumption that is made that reinforces one of the assumptions named above
is that when Toland says that faith is knowledge, by knowledge, in that context, he means
the Lockean knowledge that only comes about by intuition and demonstration.26 This is
incorrect and just reinforces the popular, but incorrect Stillingfleet reading of Toland that
he teaches that only certainty can be had with clear and distinct ideas; that is, both
assumptions greatly limit certainty in matters of the faith. It is also for some an
explanation of the way by which Toland subordinates revelation to reason or evidence of
it.27 In fact, it will be shown that Toland is appropriating one of Locke’s uses of the term
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knowledge when he says faith is knowledge, but not the use that Beiser, Sullivan, and Ian
Leask think.
The approaches of the scholars who actually are investigating Toland, discussed
above, are often the same. It is assumed that Stillingfleet read Toland correctly. Evidence
is then looked for supporting these views and found. The evidence as construed, however,
cannot be supported by the context from which it was pulled. Possibly sensing this Ian
Leask’s recent article comparing the epistemologies of John Locke and John Toland
makes a commendable effort in exegeting the works of the respective thinkers.
Investigating and comparing Locke’s and Toland’s ideas and their notions of
reason, not to mention the other heavily intertwined issues, and their connections, is too
cumbersome for one chapter. Therefore ideas and certainty and the related issue of
knowledge will be investigated here. It is important to mention that this chapter will not
critique Locke or Toland, nor will it focus on the contemporary discussions over Locke’s
so-called representative theory of perception.28 The exploration of Locke and Toland on
the issue of reason and its relationship to faith and revelation, as said earlier, will be
treated in later chapters. The implication of this is that this chapter can only index the
beginning of the aforementioned problematic, scholarly assessments of Toland’s

that Leask reads Toland’s identification of faith and knowledge: “Toland, as we have just seen, has no such
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verifiability criterion has the same results as Sullivan’s novelty restriction. On a related issue, evidence, an
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epistemology and the difficulties that plague Locke scholarship on the issues of reason,
faith, and revelation.

Part III: Ideas, Knowledge, and Certainty
Part III of this chapter gives a careful and detailed expository explanation of
Locke’s and Toland’s respective views of ideas, knowledge, certainty, and the concepts’
relationships, as well as an explanation of Stillingfleet’s readings of both thinkers on said
topics. An answer to what Locke thinks about ideas, knowledge, certainty, and their
relationships will be suggested in the first section, entitled “Locke’s Essay on Ideas,
Knowledge, and Certainty.” The second section, “Toland’s CNM on Ideas, Knowledge,
and Certainty,” will offer suggestions of answers to the same questions asked about
Locke. It will also include a point-for-point comparison with Locke’s treatment of ideas,
knowledge, and certainty. These two sections together will be the beginning of the
comparison of the Essay’s and CNM’s respective epistemologies, the main focus of the
entire dissertation. The third section, “Stillingfleet’s Interpretation of CNM’s and the
Essay’s Treatments of Ideas, Knowledge, Certainty, and Reason from the Discourse” will
focus on Stillingfleet’s interpretations of the Essay and CNM and will show how he
misreads them both. This is important because it seems as though most, if not all,
scholars think Stillingfleet has read Toland correctly. All three sections of Part III
together advance the first half of this chapter’s thesis: Stillingfleet is correct in asserting
agreement between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty but misinterprets
what both thinkers are conveying about these notions when he comments on them in the
Discourse.
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Locke’s Essay on Ideas, Knowledge, and Certainty
Ideas are foundational to the Essay. They are what the mind utilizes in thinking;
they are mental representations (II.i.1). They are all ultimately derived from our
experience or observation, no ideas being innate: “Our observation employ’d either about
external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and
reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the
materials of thinking” (II.i.2). On the one hand, from our senses we obtain simple ideas
from external objects such as colors, taste, etc. In fact, most of our simple ideas come
from sensation (II.i.3). On the other hand, some fundamental or simple ideas come about
by reflection, “that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of
them, by reason whereof, there come to be Ideas of these Operations in the
Understanding.” Examples of these ideas that come from observing ourselves from
within are: perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, and willing.
Locke also includes passions, such as satisfaction and uneasiness that might arise from
any thought, in these operations (II.i.4).
Ideas can be divided into two primary categories: simple ideas and complex ideas.
Simple ideas are the ones outlined above that come only from sensation and reflection.
Humans can no more invent a new simple idea than they can picture a color that has not
been before seen. Complex ideas are combinations of simple ideas. They find their
construction in the mind as it observes an object or situation or when it thinks about
something that is not simple while not under the present influence of an external object
(II.ii). In addition, while the mind is wholly passive in the reception of simple ideas, this
is not the case in forming complex ideas, where we “use some kind of Liberty.” If not,
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what else would explain the differences among people regarding their ideas of gold or
justice (II.xxxx.3)?
There are a number of non-mutually-exclusive, helpful ways that ideas, namely
complex ideas, can be further categorized: clear versus obscure, distinct versus confused,
real versus fantastical, adequate versus inadequate, and true versus false. The first two
categorization pairs are closely interconnected: clear versus obscure and distinct versus
confused. Of clear and obscure ideas, Locke says that they are the same in the mind as
they are in the sight (II.xxix.2). Simple ideas, the foundation of our complex ideas, are
clear. “Complex Ideas, as they are made up of Simple ones: so they are clear, when the
Ideas, that go to their Composition, are clear; and the Number and Order of those Simple
Ideas, that are Ingredients of any Complex one, is determinate and certain” (II.xxix.2).
Also, “As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has a full and evident perception, so a
distinct idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a
confused Idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from
which it ought to be different” (II.xxix.4). So, in short, a clear complex idea is clear by
virtue of the certainty of order and permanency of its simple idea ingredients (simple
ideas are always clear). Otherwise the complex idea is obscure. It is distinct depending on
whether or not it can be distinguished from similar ideas from which it ought to be
different (typically alerted by virtue of their different names) (II.xxix.5-6). Otherwise it is
confused (with another idea from which it ought to be distinct). Thus, one might have a
clear idea of something but the complex idea does not have enough elements to
distinguish it from another particular idea. The clear idea will be confused with that other
idea from which it ought to be distinct and at the same time be distinct from all other
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ideas. In short, when it is said that two ideas are confused, the situation is really such that
two words that are supposed to indicate two distinct ideas are anchored to the same idea.
Obscure ideas deserve additional comment. Again, a clear complex idea is clear
by virtue of the order and permanency of its simple idea ingredients. Locke does not
explain this thoroughly. Some guess can be made at what he would say. When a complex
idea is said to be obscure, in truth the situation involves a number of ideas that are
intended by the mind to be the same but are not due to one or a combination of the
following: spatial distance, environment (such as lighting color, consistency, and
brightness), memory capacity, and sensory capacity. Also, an obscure idea’s obscurity
most assuredly, in many situations, has something to do with our mind’s typical
procedure of filling-in-the-gaps, so to speak, with what we would expect to preside in the
object focused on by the mind from similar ideas we retain in our memories. While in the
case of “confused ideas” there is really one idea with two names, in the case of an
“obscure idea” the scenario truly involves different ideas that the mind intends to be
identical.
The issue is more interesting, however, when concentrating on the fact that some
complex ideas can be clear and distinct in part and obscure and confused in another.
Locke uses different examples to illustrate this. For instance a 1000-sided polygon is
distinct from a 999-sided polygon in number of sides but not in its figure. Or, in other
words, we could know we are looking at a polygon but could not distinguish the two
aforementioned polygons from one another simply by looking at them. We would have to
count their sides. Their figures in comparison by sight become confused. Likewise, we
have clear ideas about certain lengths, comparison of lengths, duration, etc. But the idea
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of boundlessness or parts so small we cannot see with the naked eye, although clear in
part—such as the consideration of certain lengths, addition, and subtraction—are obscure
and confused in another—such as how they appear to the mind or the eye (II.xxix.13-16).
Moreover, clear and distinct often are coupled together while obscure and
confused often go hand-in-hand. A clear idea has better potential to be distinct from
another idea that is like it. On the other hand and as said above, obscurity is simply the
lack of certainty of order and permanency of its simple ingredients. This can be due to the
environment, one’s memory, or both. With regard to the environment, the lighting might
be such that the details keep changing as one looks at something far off. With regard to
the memory, obscure ideas are the product of the memory’s inability to reframe an
intended idea consistently with the same permanency and order, making the intended idea
mutable; and thus in actuality the intended idea is represented by multiple ideas. This
often results in producing confused ideas because two somewhat obscure intended ideas
that ought to be distinct, and sometimes are in the mind, will at times be perceived to be
the same.
Next, Locke looks at three other categorizations of ideas that evolve from
considerations of the ideas “in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which
they may be supposed to represent,” namely real versus fantastical ideas, adequate versus
inadequate, and true versus false ideas (II.xxx.1). Locke explains real and fantastical
ideas first. Real ideas have conformity to the archetype, which is or can be found in
nature; whereas fantastical ideas have no foundation in nature (II.xxx.1). Simple ideas are
always real as they agree to the power of the things which produce them in our minds—
our minds being in a passive state of reception. Complex ideas, called mixed modes, like
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courage, or an idea of a square, and complex ideas of relations between two ideas, have a
possibility of existing in reality so they are real. Substance is not so easy to categorize.
The ideas of substances are real because “they are such Combinations of simple Ideas, as
are really united, and co-exist in Things without us” (II.xxx.5).
Locke then makes a distinction within real ideas: adequate and inadequate ideas.
“Those I call Adequate, which perfectly represent those Archetypes, which the Mind
supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for; and to which it refers them.
Inadequate Ideas are such, which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those
Archetypes to which they are referred” (II.xxxi.1). Simple ideas are adequate as they
cannot be produced at will and answer exactly (as intended by God) to the power of
things (II.xxxi.2). Our complex ideas of modes that are created from the human mind
itself cannot be but adequate because they can only reference what they are intended to
reference, itself. They can be inadequate only in the sense that they are intended to
correspond to the adequate ideas held by another but do not (II.xxxi.3-5).
Substances are included in the adequate-inadequate discussion as well. They can
refer to a supposed real essence of a species of things or they are intended only to be
representations of things that exist via the “Ideas of those qualities that are discoverable
in them.” Both instances only ever result in imperfect and inadequate ideas. The complex
ideas of the substance cannot be the real essence of any substance, for the properties we
discover in that body would be deducible from those ideas and the necessary connections
between the properties would be known if they were. This can be contrasted with the
complex idea of a triangle: “as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and, as far as they
are discoverable, are deducible from the complex Idea of three Lines, including a Space.”
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In natural objects we do not have the ability to discover the essence from which all
properties flow. Thus when we think about their real essences we have no distinct idea
(II.xxxi.6). It follows that the “Ideas of Substances must be all inadequate in that respect,
as not containing in them that real Essence, which the Mind intends they should”
(II.xxxi.7). Secondly, even the ideas of substance as an acknowledged mere
representation of things that exist, which come closer to what the mind intends them to be
than substances considered as essences of species, are inadequate because we cannot
know all of the thing’s powers and qualities; thus they do not fully conform to their
archetype. For instance the qualities of gold continue to be discovered today and we do
not have an indubitable connection between the properties (II.xxxi.8-9). In short,
whatever is intended by our complex ideas of substances will always be inadequate
(II.xxxi.11) and simply be a so-called nominal essence (II.xxxi.12-14). This would be the
same for mathematical figures if we simply collected their properties. But, we do know
the essence of these figures. One can know the geometric formula of an ellipse and how
all of a given ellipse’s measurements cohere: “Whereas having in our plain Idea, the
whole Essence of that Figure, we from thence discover those Properties, and
demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it” (II.xxxi.11).
The final distinction Locke makes within real ideas is: true versus false ideas.
Since ideas are but bare appearances they cannot be properly true and false (II.xxxii.1).
They can, however, be considered true or false when the mind passes judgment on them,
affirming or denying something about them. In other words, when they become the
subject of propositions they can be true or false (II.xxxii.3). In short, “Whenever the mind
refers any of its Ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called

37
true or false” (II.xxxii.4). For instance, an idea one holds in one’s mind may be true or
false if it is supposed to be conformable to that found in the mind of another person.
Also, if the mind supposes the idea to be conformable to something in real existence it
can be true or false. An example is: the idea of a centaur thought actually to be roaming
the woods or, at least having once existed, is false. A third source of falsity deals with the
ideas of substances generally: “When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real
Constitution, and Essence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the
greatest part, if not all our Ideas of Substances, are false” (II.xxxii.5). The complex idea
of a substance is false when it is supposed to be the mental representation of the unknown
essence. When “substance” is considered as a collection of simple ideas that refer to
patterns in things, this “substance” can be false if it includes a property that does not
actually coexist with the others. If it negates a property that is constantly found in the
thing, it is not false but ought to simply be called imperfect and inadequate (II.xxxii.18).
In short Locke uses various categories for ideas. Simple ideas are always clear,
distinct, real, adequate, and true. The situation with complex ideas is more complicated.
First, complex ideas can be described as clear or obscure in part. If there is as little as one
clear simple idea that is certain and permanent within a complex idea such that that
complex idea is distinct from a similar complex idea, the ideas are then distinct, at least in
relation to each other. Otherwise the two ideas are in the mind identical and therefore
confused. Ideas can be put in the remaining categories in considering them in reference to
something. So thirdly, complex ideas can be real or fantastical, and fourthly, real ideas
can be categorized as adequate or inadequate. Finally, complex ideas can be true or false
when the mind is affirming or denying something about them.
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Knowledge is the next important term that Locke uses. The first sense of the word
that he uses (he uses it also to refer to the faculty called knowledge) is explained by the
following definition: “Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of
the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas
(IV.i.2).” Regarding this agreement and disagreement he lists four sorts: identity and
diversity, relation in general, co-existence or necessary connection, and real existence
(IV.i.3). Locke notes that the first act of the mind is to perceive its ideas, know each one,
and perceive their difference. While Locke could divide these related actions up further,
he does not. This—the identity and diversity sort of knowledge—is the fundamental
sense of knowledge and that without which we could have no knowledge in any sense.
We have no need of maxims but the mind immediately perceives identity and diversity as
soon as two ideas are perceived clearly (IV.i.4).
Locke explains the other sorts of knowledge briefly. Relation is nothing more
than the perception of the relationship between two ideas (IV.i.5). It is the agreement the
mind sees between two different ideas in various respects (IV.i.5). Co-existence (or Nonco-existence) is simply the mind’s seeing the presence (or absence) of ideas within larger
ideas. This sort of knowledge “belongs particularly to Substances.” For instance, the idea
of yellow co-exists with the idea of gold (IV.i.6). Identity and co-existence knowledge
are nothing more than relation knowledge but Locke believes that they deserve their own
distinct head. Knowledge of real existence simply regards whether something exists or
not. He gives the following examples of the four sorts: “Thus Blue is not Yellow, is of
Identity. Two Triangles upon equal Basis, between two Parallels are equal, is of
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Relation. Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impressions, is of Co-existence, God is, is of
real Existence” (IV.i.7).
The other topic that is of importance to consider here is certainty. But certainty is
only given by knowledge, of which there are three degrees or methods—intuition,
demonstration, and sensation—by which we arrive at one of the four sorts of knowledge.
If knowledge is immediate it is called intuitive (IV.ii.1). One simply “sees” the truth
without mental discourse, and does so by the faculty of distinct perception (IV.ii.5).
Intuition is the clearest degree of knowledge and gives the most certainty of which the
human faculties are capable (IV.ii.1). The next degree of knowledge is demonstration and
it builds on intuition. It is not immediate but requires reasoning and indubitable proofs
(IV.ii.2).29 “Those intervening Ideas, which serve to shew the agreement of any two
others, are called Proofs; and where the agreement, or disagreement, is by this means
plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demonstration, it being shewn to the
Understanding, and the Mind made see that it is so.” The quickness of the mind to find
these intermediate ideas and apply them rightly is called sagacity (IV.ii.3).
Demonstrative knowledge is not as bright and clear and is without the full assurance that
always accompanies intuition. This is because demonstrative knowledge requires hard
work, involves initial doubt, and requires more memory the longer the indubitable proof
is—this last characteristic being culpable for causing many to embrace falsehoods
(IV.ii.6-7). It is important here to note Michael Ayers’s description of Locke’s degrees of
knowledge:
The notion of degrees of knowledge does not imply that the ‘perception’ involved
in demonstration and sensitive knowledge is fallible. What Locke supposed to
29
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vary in degree, since it is not probability, seems to be security from a certain sort
of error: not the error of perceiving what is false, for that is impossible, but the
error of taking ourselves to perceive (or have perceived) what is not (or was not)
really perceived. We may mistake ‘falsehood for demonstration.’
Ayers continues and explains that it is not the faculty of knowledge that assents wrongly
but the faculty of judgment that believes falsehoods.30
Then there is sensitive Knowledge, “which going beyond her probability, and yet
not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty” (IV.ii.14), gives us
“an assurance that deserves the name of Knowledge” (IV.xi.3). The existence of the
observed external objects are doubted by some, but that doubt should be dissipated
because of the qualitative difference between the ideas generated, for instance, by a hot
stove that one perceives her hand to be on presently versus thinking back to that painful
experience. The certainty of things without “is not only as great as our frame can attain
to, but as our Condition needs,” as ordained by God (IV.xi.8). Locke notes that it is by
intuition that we have knowledge of ourselves, by demonstration that we can have
knowledge of God, and it is through sensation that we have knowledge of other things
(IV.ix-xi).
In sum, in this section this explored a number of interrelated topics. First, it
investigated Locke’s treatment of ideas, including his various categorizations of them.
The categories are as follows: simple versus complex, clear versus obscure, distinct
versus confused, real versus fantastical, adequate versus inadequate, and true versus false.
Next, it explored the various senses of the term knowledge employed in the Essay, the
notion of certainty, and how knowledge and certainty relate. While Locke has four sorts
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of knowledge, there are three methods by which it comes about. Certainty is only
produced by and supervenes upon knowledge.
Toland’s CNM on Ideas, Knowledge, and Certainty
Having reviewed Locke’s position on ideas, knowledge, and certainty, we will
now turn to John Toland’s CNM and explore his treatment of the same topics. The
question that will be asked is: How does Toland’s treatment of ideas, knowledge, and
certainty compare to Locke’s in the Essay? The answer will be shown to be: CNM’s
treatment of those topics is not as detailed as the Essay’s nor does it always use the same
terminology, but CNM definitely comports with the Essay on these topics. This is in
opposition to important Toland scholarship most of which claims that Toland collapses
faith into Lockean knowledge and a lone voice that believes Toland incorporates innate
ideas into CNM. These scholars will be responded to in the course of the explanation of
Toland’s notions of ideas, knowledge, and certainty.
As Stillingfleet noticed, John Toland’s discourse on ideas seems in many respects
Lockean. By ideas Toland means “the immediate Object of the Mind when it thinks, or
any Thought that the Mind imploys about any thing” (11). Toland’s ideas, like Locke’s,
are mental representations or “Representative Beings” (19; Cf. 11). What is more, these
ideas, like Locke’s, can be deemed simple or complex. Toland notes that simple and
distinct ideas—what Locke would merely call simple, distinct being understood—“are
the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning” (11-12). These simple ideas are
derived from the same two sources Locke notes, sensation and reflection, although the
former thinker does not use the term reflection; Toland writes:
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But the bare Act of receiving Ideas into the Mind, whether by the Intromission of
the Senses, as Colours, Figures, Sounds, Smells, etc. or whether those Ideas be the
simple Operations of the Soul about what it thus gets from without, as meer
Consciousness for Example, Knowing, Affirming, or Denying, without any farther
Considerations: This bare Act, I say, of receiving such Ideas into the Mind, is not
strictly Reason, because the soul herein is purely passive (9-10).
And, as Toland says above, these simple ideas are received passively, just as Locke had
said before him. There is no liberty there. Toland goes on to expand his explanation
slightly by clarifying that we receive these ideas from external objects that bear on the
human senses and from the consciousness or awareness of the operations of our minds
that we notice from being confronted with external objects: “Knowing, Perceiving,
Affirming, Denying, Considering, Willing, Desiring, and the Ideas of all the other
Operations of the Mind, which are thus occasion’d by the Antecedent Impressions of
sensible Objects” (9-10).
At one point, Toland talks about “Means of Information” or “those Ways whereby
anything comes barely to our Knowledg, without necessarily commanding our Assent.”
He notes two main types, experience and authority. He goes on to make a distinction
between external and internal experience, which is important here: “Experience is either
external, which furnished us with the Ideas of sensible Objects; or internal, which helps
us to the Ideas of the Operations of our own minds. This is the common Stock of all our
Knowledg; nor can we possibly have Ideas any other way without Organs or Faculties”
(16-17).31 Thus, it is clear that we are limited to the simple ideas that are produced by our
present organs and faculties.

31
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Toland’s explanation of complex ideas is very brief but also comports with
Locke’s explanation of them. When Toland notes that simple and distinct ideas are stored
up in the “great Repository of the Understanding” and are the sole matter and foundation
of reasoning also, he follows with: “For the Mind does upon occasion compare them
together, compound them into complex ideas, and enlarge, contract, or separate them, as
it discovers their Circumstances capable or not” (12-13). Moreover, Toland explains that
these complex ideas are not just of complex objects we see or with which we come into
direct contact with, but others such as God, created spirits, arguing, suspension, and so
on. That is, they also include “merely intellectual or abstracted Thought” (11).
The further explanations of ideas are peppered throughout CNM and Toland never
comes close to the depth and detail of coverage that Locke affords them. Whereas Locke
discusses a number of not-mutually-exclusive ways that ideas can be categorized—clear
versus obscure, distinct versus confused, real versus fantastical, adequate versus
inadequate, and true versus false—Toland simply employs the categories he needs and
any explanations given are either brief or inferred from how he is using them.
Apparently, Toland intended his explanations of ideas and other terms to be just detailed
enough to allow his philosophically untrained readers to understand what he is saying
without burdening them with details impertinent to the discussions at hand. Hence, in the
preface of CNM, Toland remarks, “I have in many Places made explanatory Repetitions
of difficult Words, by synonymous Terms of a more general and known Use. This
Labour, I grant, is of no Benefit to Philosophers, but it is of considerable Advantage to
the Vulgar, which I’m far from neglecting” (xvii). This quote speaks to his desire to be
readable to the common public; and this chapter’s treatments (and those of the other
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chapters as well) of his categories of ideas, knowledge, and other notions will hopefully
convey something of the brevity of his attention to and explanation of the various
concepts.
Toland employs the categories of clear versus obscure and distinct versus
confused. The way in which he couples them even comports with Locke’s coupling.
Regarding clear and distinct ideas, Toland does juxtapose clear and obscure ideas or
conceptions explicitly (60). Toland’s understanding of clear agrees with Locke’s. It
means they are conceivable or imaginable. Toland writes:
For Perspicuity and Obscurity are relative Terms, and what is either to me may be
the quite contrary to another. If Things be deliver’d in Words not understood by
the Hearer, nor demonstrated to agree with other Truths already very clear, or
now so made to him, he cannot conceive ‘em” (23-24).
Put another way, the words attached to various ideas must be understood for the larger
idea proposed to be conceivable. Furthermore, the ideas combined to form it must not be
inherently contradictory (25-29). Moreover, Toland understands some ideas to be clear in
part and obscure in others. In fact he uses the idea of eternity, just as Locke does, as an
example. There are certain aspects that are clear, like subtraction of bounds, but the thing
is not perfectly imaginable (80-81). Whatever is the case, the little he conveys about clear
versus obscure ideas does not disagree with what Locke teaches.
While Toland does not use the word “confused” with ideas, he does use the term
“distinct” on occasion. He talks of our God-given design including our inability to be
deceived by “distinct Conceptions.” He also uses “clear and distinct” with no comment
on what he means (25, 85-86). The one place where he uses it and gives an example
demonstrates that his use of “clear and distinct” comports with Locke’s use. There he
writes, “The Idea of the Soul then is every whit as clear and distinct as that of the Body”
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(85). If Toland differs in the ways he uses or conceives of what he calls clear, obscure,
and distinct ideas compared to Locke, it is not apparent in CNM.
The categories of inadequate versus adequate ideas are the only other category
pair Toland explicitly employs in CNM and it comports with Locke’s notions and
treatments of the same pair. Toland includes the associated categories into a chapter
entitled, “That nothing ought to be call’d a Mystery, because we have not an adequate
Idea of all its Properties, nor any at all of its Essence” (74). His argument in this chapter
is explicit: “nothing can be said to be a Mystery, because we have not an adequate Idea
of it, or a distinct View of all its Properties at once; for then every thing would be a
mystery” (74). There are no mysteries in nature or religion for lack of an adequate idea
(Cf. 87). Although Toland does not give a definition of adequate and inadequate ideas,
his description of it is akin to Locke’s as Toland calls an adequate idea a complete one:
“because we have not an adequate or compleat Idea of whatever belongs to it” (79).
Toland notes that God’s attributes, namely his Eternity, are not mysterious for lack of an
adequate or complete notion (80-81). Furthermore, and again, like Locke, Toland focuses
a significant portion of his incorporation of adequate and inadequate ideas on substance.
Toland argues that the fact that we cannot know all of the properties of any substance nor
know any real essences of a substance (that which from all properties naturally flow or
result), two assertions pointed out by Locke, ought not to mean things are to be called
mysteries. Toland forces the reader to ask the question: If not having an adequate idea of
things were grounds for calling them mysteries, what would not be a mystery (Cf. 79)?
Toland explains further why we ought not call bodies mysteries: “The Reason is, because
knowing nothing of Bodies but their Properties, God has wisely provided we should
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understand no more of these than are useful and necessary for us; which is all our present
Condition needs” (76). (Even this reasoning is strikingly similar to Locke’s, who,
although not arguing against calling things mysteries, does point out that what we are
capable of sensing is all for our well-being [IV.xi.8]). God should not be called a mystery
for lack of knowing his real essence either. Again, the same explanation is given: “I
remark’d in the Beginning of this Chapter, that we know nothing of things, but such of
the Properties as were necessary and useful. We may say the same of God; for every Act
of our Religion is directed by the Consideration of some of his Attributes, without ever
thinking of his Essence” (86).32 There is a final point that is worth noting that connects
Toland and Locke in the discussion of adequate and inadequate ideas. When discussing
nominal and real essences, he notes that he distinguishes nominal essences from real
essences “after an excellent modern Philosopher” (82). All commentators acknowledge
this to be a reference to Locke.
There are a few conclusions we can draw so far regarding Toland’s and Locke’s
respective treatments of ideas. First, Toland employs clear versus obscure, distinct versus
confused, and adequate versus inadequate distinctions that agree with Locke’s categorical
distinctions that go by the same names. Second, he, it is widely thought, points to Locke
as being important to his distinction of real and nominal essences. Third, that Toland does
not explicitly use the true versus false nor the real versus fantastical ideas is no reason to
think he rejects those distinctions. It is more likely that there was no reason to bring them
up or to complicate matters with such pedestrian distinctions.
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The pages that follow will continue an exploration of Toland’s fundamental
epistemological notions, concentrating on knowledge and certainty, and interact with
scholars on what this section suggests are serious misreadings on Toland’s various uses
of the term knowledge. Scholarly readings of Toland’s teachings on knowledge are
highly problematic. As noted in Part II, many significant scholars understand Toland to
be using the term knowledge in the Lockean sense that refers to the knowledge that
comes by the method of intuition and demonstration when Toland claims that faith can be
called knowledge. For some, their misreading of Toland on this point fuels the notion that
Toland rejects any revelation as such that asserts novelty, an effective subordination of
revelation to reason. Another aforementioned misreading pertaining to Toland’s notion of
immediate knowledge has been recently promulgated. This scholar believes there is
evidence that CNM’s treatment of immediate knowledge conflates innate and intuitive
ideas in opposition to Locke. In short, the pages that follow will contain exposition of
Toland as well as interactions with scholarship.
Toland’s discussion of knowledge falls within the bounds of what Locke
discusses, but Toland’s treatment, like his treatment of ideas, although conformable, is
much less detailed. Toland’s definition of knowledge is: “nothing else but the Perception
of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in a greater or lesser Number,
whereinsoever this Agreement or Disagreement may consist” (12). This is conceptually
the same as Locke’s given in the Essay IV.i.2: “Knowledge then seems to me to be
nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnancy of any of our ideas.” Whereas Locke goes on to define four sorts of
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knowledge—identity and diversity, relation, co-existence or necessary connection, and
real existence—Toland does not.
The connotation of knowledge Toland employs often and which causes much
mischief for interpreters is, however, akin to Locke’s description of knowledge in the
identity and diversity sense. In the Essay, Locke writes: “As to the first sort of Agreement
or Disagreement, viz. Identity, or Diversity. ‘Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any
Sentiments or Ideas at all, to perceive its Ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know
each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another”
(IV.i.4). Thus simply to perceive or understand or frame an idea is to know that idea in a
qualified sense. Likewise one could know a false proposition in that sense as well. It is in
this manner of speaking that Toland often employs knowledge, even for things such as
particular religious doctrines of which we can have no certainty but only probability. It is
this manner of speaking about probable things that misdirects Toland scholars.
Two scholars who misinterpret what Toland intends by using the term knowledge
with regard to that which is only subject to belief are Leask and Sullivan. Referencing a
particular passage of CNM, Leask writes: “Toland, as we have just seen, has no such
qualms about maintaining the priority of reason—to the extent that he will even declare
an identity of faith and knowledge.” Leask says this to drive home his argument that
Toland’s epistemology runs counter to Locke’s, which argues for the “the need for a
supra-rational, gratuitous, Biblical, morality.” 33 Sullivan similarly believes Toland rejects
the novelty of Scripture by his construal of faith as knowledge and points to the exact
same passage as does Leask as evidence. Sullivan concludes, “There were no exceptions
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to Toland’s notion of faith as a form of knowledge.”34 Both Sullivan and Leask reference
the said passage as backing up their claims but do not quote from it or demonstrate any
attempt at its exposition. The passage they reference is as follows:
From all these Observations, and what went before, it evidently follows that Faith
is so far from being an implicite Assent to any thing above Reason, that this
Notion directly contradicts the Ends of Religion, the Nature of Man, and the
Goodness and Wisdom of God. But at this rate, some will be apt to say, Faith is
no longer Faith but Knowledg. I answer, that if Knowledg be taken for a present
and immediate View of things, I have no where affirm’d any thing like it, but the
contrary in many Places. But if by Knowledg be meant understanding what is
believ’d, then I stand by it that Faith is Knowledg: I have all along maintain’d it,
and the very Words are promiscuously us’d for one another in the Gospel (139).35
Toland is saying that right assent or faith concerns only that that which we comprehend,
understand, or perceive. This does not make faith a species of knowledge, as Sullivan
claims, nor does it entail a rejection of things without an evidentiary basis founded upon
our own life experience, as Leask claims.36 Toland has argued against that. But faith is
knowledge in the sense that one comprehends, or “knows,” the idea that one believes.
This agrees with what Toland says throughout CNM. For instance, earlier he writes:
“Rightly speaking then, we are accounted to comprehend any thing when its chief
Properties and their Several Uses are known to us: for to comprehend in all correct
Authors is nothing else but to know; and as of what is not knowable we can have no Idea,
so it is nothing to us” (76-77).
Beiser is the other scholar that misunderstands what Toland is intending when
Toland allows matters of faith to be referred to as knowledge. Beiser asserts that Toland
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gives two criteria for belief: propositions must be clear and distinct and they must be
empirically verifiable.37 Referencing the last quote above from Toland, Beiser remarks:
“It is unclear, however, whether Toland was always so strict as to demand clarity and
distinctness as a condition of belief. In some passages he appears to change his tune and
to insist upon it only as a condition of knowledge.”38 In a prior part of his treatment of
CNM, Beiser insists, “Toland employs the traditional distinction between clear, distinct,
and adequate ideas.”39 So, Beiser interprets Toland as saying, in the last CNM excerpt
given above, that we can know things without adequate ideas, and that we only need clear
and distinct ideas for knowledge. If that is true then clear and distinct ideas would seem,
according to Beiser, to be too strict of a requirement for belief. Thus he thinks Toland
changes his position part way through CNM as evidenced by the second to last quote
given by CNM, thus jettisoning the first criterion.40 In said passage, however, and as
already stated, Toland is actually saying that comprehending an idea or proposition can
be in a sense knowing that idea or proposition. That one must know or comprehend the
proposition in the described sense in order to be believed is talked about throughout
CNM, even toward the beginning. Early on, Toland writes, “But God . . . has also endu’d
us with the Power of suspending our Judgments about whatever is uncertain, and of
never assenting but to clear Perceptions” (22). That is, one cannot rightly assent to
something one cannot comprehend. In other words, Toland does not feign or think that all
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theological doctrines must be clear and distinct, or even empirically verifiable, but rather
if they are to be considered they must be comprehensible. Again, this is a message
throughout CNM.
Moreover, there are other aspects of Toland’s teachings on knowledge, namely
degrees of knowledge, that comport with Locke’s. First, what Locke calls intuition,
Toland calls immediate knowledge. Toland defines immediate knowledge as the
following: “When the Mind, without the Assistance of any other Idea, immediately
perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two or more Ideas” (12). He notes that it
cannot be called reason even though it is the highest degree of evidence. This knowledge
is self-evident. Furthermore this knowledge automatically creates axioms and maxims:
“Propositions so clear of themselves as to want no Proofs, their Terms being once
understood, are commonly known by the Names of Axioms and Maxims” (12).
Leask believes that Toland, in his description of immediate knowledge, is
diverging greatly from Locke by conflating innate ideas and intuitive ideas. He argues
that Toland’s mention of maxims and axioms, which Locke attacks in his argument
against innate ideas, and the use of an “innate idea” example—the whole is great than any
part—shows a subtle yet profound divergence from Locke. Leask is mistaken in thinking
Toland is incorporating innate ideas with this scanty evidence. The passage where Leask
believes Toland adopts innate ideas includes Toland’s definition of immediate
knowledge:
First [degree of knowledge], When the Mind, without the Assistance of any other
Idea, immediately perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two or more
Ideas, as that Two and Two is Four, that Red is not Blew; it cannot be call’d
Reason, tho it be the highest Degree of Evidence: For here’s no need of Discourse
or Probation, Self-evidence excluding all manner of Doubt and Darkness.
Propositions so clear of themselves as to want no Proofs, their Terms being once
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understood, are commonly known by the Names of Axioms and Maxims. And it is
visible that their Number is indefinite, and not confin’d only to two or three
abstracted Propositions made (as all Axioms are) from the Observation of
particular Instances; as, that the Whole is greater than any Part, that Nothing can
have no Properties (12-13).
Toland is saying that self-evident propositions could be called maxims or axioms.
Axioms and maxims, therefore, ought not to be limited to the small number they
otherwise would be if they were limited to those abstractions from particular propositions
and instances, such as “the Whole is greater than any Part.” Toland is doing nothing more
than offering an abridged form of Locke’s argument in Essay IV.vii. There, Locke argues
that some consider maxims or axioms innate because self-evident (IV.vii.1); but there is
immediate knowledge that is self-evident that does not require the intervention of other
ideas (IV.vii.2). Locke then considers whether self-evidence is peculiar to these so-called
Maxims and answers “that several other Truths, not allow’d to be Axioms, partake
equally with them in this Self-evidence” (IV.vii.3). Many so-called Maxims are selfevident but so are “even an almost infinite number of other Propositions” (IV.vii.3);
every idea we have from knowledge of identity gives self-evident propositions (IV.vii.4)
as do some from the co-existence sort of knowledge (IV.vii.5) and from modes (IV.vii.6).
He argues that the mind proceeds from particular propositions to associated general and
abstracted propositions or maxims (IV.vii.9-11). Toland has not conflated innate and
intuitive ideas as Leask thinks, but in fact goes so far, perhaps in a sense farther than
Locke, as to appropriate the terminology of those who believe in innate ideas.
Turning to Toland’s other degree of knowledge, it is clear that what he calls
mediate knowledge is what Locke calls demonstration. Toland gives the definition of
mediate knowledge and illustrates it as follows:
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when the Mind cannot immediately perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of
any Ideas, because they cannot be brought near enough together, and so
compar’d, it applies one or more intermediate Ideas to discover it: as, when by
the successive Application of a Line to two distant Houses, I find how far they
agree or disagree, which I could not effect with my Eye” (13).
This is akin to Locke’s general description of ratiocination: “Yet the principle Act of
Ratiocination is the finding Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas one with another,
by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houses to be of the same
length, which could not be brought together to measure their Equality by juxta-position”
(IV.xvii.18). Such is Toland’s dependence on Locke that he even uses Locke’s analogy of
comparing the length of two houses with a measuring stick (13). What is more, Toland,
like Locke, specifies more particularly in what ways his definition above can yield for us
knowledge. He writes, “This Method of Knowledg is properly call’d Reason or
Demonstration, (as the former Self-evidence or Intuition); and it may be defin’d, That
Faculty of the Soul which discovers the Certainty of any thing dubious or obscure, by
comparing it with something evidently known” (14). Locke also calls demonstration
reason. Moreover, Toland continues on in the next section saying that the parts of the
demonstration must be indubitable: “So tho Self-evidence excludes Reason, yet all
Demonstration becomes at length self-evident” (14).
It is in the context of his discussion of immediate and mediate knowledge that he
distinguishes between certainty and probability: “It is yet plainer, that when we have no
Notions or Ideas of a thing, we cannot reason about it at all; and where we have Ideas, if
intermediate ones, to shew their constant and necessary Agreement or Disagreement, fail
us, we can never go beyond Probability (14-15).” In other words, immediate knowledge
and mediate knowledge have certainty. All else is simply probable. Again, this is akin to
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Locke. Toland adds: “When I have arriv’d at Knowledg, I enjoy all the Satisfaction that
attends it; where I have only Probability, there I suspend my Judgment, or, if it be worth
the Pains, I search after Certainty” (15). He tempers this slight overstatement of never
admitting things probable by conceding shortly afterwards that they must be admitted
(21).
Moreover, while Toland talks of two-fold knowledge, Locke talks about a threefold knowledge. Locke says that the assurance of the existence of the external objects we
are observing deserves the name knowledge (IV.ii.14). Regarding the idea of a rose that
appears in his mind, Toland says:
And I cannot doubt of this, because the Properties must belong to the exemplary
Cause, or to Nothing, or be the Figments of my own Brain; But Nothing can have
no Properties, and I cannot make one single Idea at my Pleasure, nor avoid
receiving Ideas when Objects work on my Senses: Therefore, I conclude the
Properties of the Rose are not the Creatures of my Fancy, but belong to the
exemplary Cause, that is the Object (20).
Toland thus reasons that the only conclusion to make when something appears to be
working on one’s senses is that the thing actually exists and is working on one’s senses.
So while he doesn’t call the conclusion of the existence of external objects sensitive
knowledge as does Locke, the conceptual and functional results are equivalent.
In sum, this chapter has so far shown that CNM’s teaching on ideas, knowledge,
and certainty are less detailed than the Essay’s corresponding treatments but they agree
with them. It is evident that Toland, at times, is applying categories or concepts found in
the Essay without explanation or simply rewording some Lockean concepts. Our focus
will turn in the next section to Stillingfleet’s reading of the Essay and CNM regarding the
topics discussed in the last two sections.
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Stillingfleet’s Interpretation of CNM’s and the Essay’s Treatments of Ideas, Knowledge,
Certainty, and Reason from the Discourse
The goals of Stillingfleet’s final chapter in the Discourse and the reasons he
draws in CNM are explicit in the opening pages. There are two objections that he wants
to tend to, only the first of which concerns us here: “1. That this Doctrine [of the Trinity]
is said to be a Mystery, and therefore above Reason, and we cannot in reason be obliged
to believe any such thing.” There are obvious verbal similarities between this statement
and the full title of Toland’s CNM: Christianity not Mysterious: OR, A TREATISE
Shewing, That there is nothing in the GOSPEL Contrary to REASON, Nor ABOVE it:
And that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d A MYSTERY. It ought to be said
from the beginning that Toland mentions the doctrine of the Trinity only once and does
so with an indeterminate air, but Stillingfleet believes the work is an attack on the
doctrine (27).41 Nevertheless, Stillingfleet begins the chapter rightly explaining that one
must understand what reason is and what ground in reason there is to reject any doctrine
that is “above it.”42 He feels that the so-called Unitarians have not explained reason
adequately: “I do not find the Unitarians have explained the Nature and Bounds of
Reason in such a manner, as those ought to have done, who make it the Rule and
Standard of what they are to believe. But sometimes they speak of clear and distinct
Perceptions, sometimes of natural Ideas, sometimes of congenit Notions, etc.” But, he
41
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believes Toland has tried to clarify the Unitarian position: “But a late Author hath
endeavour’d to make amends for this, and takes upon him to make this matter clear.”43
Although this portion of the chapter focuses on Stillingfleet’s interpretations of
Toland and Locke on ideas, knowledge, certainty, and reason, laying out his attack on
CNM will likely prove helpful as it gives an argumentative framework that shows the
logic and reveals what, in Stillingfleet’s view, is at stake. The first part of his argument
against CNM’s teachings, and in defense of the doctrine of the Trinity, attempts to
establish a sound basis for accepting substance, nature, and person as concepts with
which the reason can work and make distinctions. In doing this he articulates his
understanding of Toland’s definition of reason, shows that it deals only in certainties and
works only with clear and distinct ideas, points out where in Locke’s Essay Toland bases
his reasoning for this last point, and argues that the defended terms—substance, nature,
and person—are truly reasonable, according to his sense of the term. The second part of
his argument against Toland is built upon Toland’s alleged inconsistencies. Toland
clearly names one mystery: real essence. If Toland will allow mysteries from nature, why
not religion? Also, Toland is ready to accept God’s eternity, of which one cannot have a
clear and distinct idea. If he rejects the doctrine of the Trinity on grounds of
incomprehensibility he must also reject the doctrine of God’s eternity as it is
incomprehensible as well, neither being a clear and distinct idea, at least according to
CNM.
Stillingfleet thus begins his critique of CNM by exploring what it has to say about
reason. He starts at the opening of CNM’s section I, chapter one, “What REASON is not.”
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He proceeds as if he is taking notes, offering brief comments along the way. He thus
indicates a few things that Toland claims should not be considered reason and that which
might be labeled reason. He then runs together a number of quotes from CNM. He thinks
he is summarizing CNM’s explanation of reason but rather he is horribly distorting it. He
begins this distortion by quoting, with liberties, from CNM’s attempted clarification of
what reason44 is: “Every one experiences in himself a Power, or Faculty of forming
various Ideas, or Perceptions of things: of affirming, or denying according as he sees
them to agree or disagree, and this is Reason in General.”45 This is, however, not all that
Toland writes. The full quote is:
Every one experiences in himself a Power or Faculty of forming various Ideas or
Perceptions of Things: Of affirming or denying, according as he sees them to
agree or disagree: And so of loving and desiring what seems good unto him; and
of hating and avoiding what he thinks evil. The right use of all these Faculties is
what we call Common Sense, or Reason in general (9).46
Stillingfleet has pulled out two faculties or powers—of forming ideas or perceptions and
of affirming and denying what one sees to agree or disagree—and made those alone the
powers of reason in general.
This is not the end of Stillingfleet’s problems. He continues the quote, this time
giving CNM’s definition of knowledge—knowledge in the sense of a result of a power—
as an extended definition of reason—the faculty or power: “It is not the bare receiving
Ideas into the Mind, that is strictly Reason, (whoever thought it was) but the Perception
of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas in a greater or lesser Number, wherein
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so ever this Agreement or Disagreement may consist.”47 His mistake in cutting short the
first definition of reason, or reason in general, apparently makes him think that
“knowledge” and “reason” are interchangeable in CNM. He also apparently fails to
distinguish between the powers or faculties, the results of those powers, and the
associated methods. Whatever the case, once he limits reason to knowledge, reason then
will only consist of immediate and intermediate knowledge in some sense (the methods
or associated powers or the result), which is precisely what Stillingfleet does in the tail
end of his lengthy quote of run-together CNM snippets:
. . . If the Perception be immediate without the Assistance of any other Idea, this
is not call’d Reason, but Self-Evidence: but when the mind makes use of
intermediate Idea’s to discover that Agreement or Disagreement, this method of
Knowledge is properly call’d Reason or Demonstration. And so Reason is defined
to be that Faculty of the Soul, which discovers the certainty of any thing dubious
or obscure, by comparing it with something evidently known.48
In short Stillingfleet does not follow CNM’s punctuation and sees reason as being
knowledge, apparently in a not too repugnant way, but reason, “properly” speaking, being
limited to demonstration. This is reinforced by Toland’s calling demonstration “reason,”
just as Locke does (Cf. IV.ii.2; IV.iii.2). But Toland, like Locke, goes on to incorporate
assent to probable things or things not known as being within the compass of reason (1624). Regardless, it is evident how Stillingfleet concludes that reason deals only with
certainty according to CNM: from Stillingfleet’s erroneous reading the faculty of reason,
properly speaking, is the faculty of demonstration!
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Stillingfleet reveals something of his train of thought why he believes CNM
teaches that certainty can only be had with clear and distinct ideas, too. Directly after the
lengthy, piecemeal quoting from CNM, Stillingfleet writes:
This is offer’d to the World, as an Account of Reason; but to shew how very
loose, and unsatisfactory it is, I desire it may be consider’d that this Doctrine
supposes, that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to
any certainty of in our Minds, and that the only Way to attain certainty, is by
comparing these Ideas together. Which excludes all certainty of Faith or Reason,
where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas.49
He argues that since reason involves comparing ideas, they must be clear and distinct so
that they can be compared. In other words, and if Stillingfleet follows what Toland is
saying about demonstration, since reason is demonstration (according to Stillingfleet’s
reading of CNM) one must be able to make the necessary connections and to do that one
must have clear and distinct ideas.
He then reveals what the ultimate origin of clear and distinct ideas is according to
CNM: sensation and reflection. But he does not mean this in the same sense that Toland
(and Locke) mean it. Stillingfleet mistakes “simple and distinct ideas,” which Toland
notes are the matter and foundation of reasoning, as being identical to clear and distinct
ideas that are complex. And when Toland says that simple and distinct ideas come only
from sensation and the simple operations of the mind (reflection), Stillingfleet concludes
that clear and distinct ideas come initially from sensation and reflection. Thus, following
Stillingfleet’s line of reasoning, clear and distinct ideas originally come by sensation and
reflection and subsequently by one’s reasoning (or demonstration if Stillingfleet is
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consistent with his earlier errors) about those original complex ideas that results in other
clear and distinct ideas.50
It becomes apparent that his understanding of the creation of clear and distinct
ideas significantly narrows what can be subject to reason. Again, Stillingfleet thinks that
Toland’s foundations of reasoning are clear and distinct ideas that are sensed or in some
way depend on reflections on the operations of the mind. He writes, “Then it follows,
That we can have no Foundation of Reasoning, where there can be no such Ideas from
Sensation, or Reflection.”51 He continues: “Now this is the case of Substance; it is not
intromitted by the Senses, nor depends upon the Operations of the Mind; and so it cannot
be within the compass of our Reason. And therefore I do not wonder that the Gentlemen
of this new way of reasoning, have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part
of the World.”52 What he is saying is more lucid a few paragraphs later where he argues
that although we cannot have a clear idea of substance,53 we can reason about it without
deriving the idea of it from sensation or reflection, despite what CNM says.54 After
making that assertion, he continues: “we find that we can have no true Conceptions of
any Modes or Accidents (no matter which) but we must conceive a Substratum, or
Subject wherein they are, Since it is a Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things, that
Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves.”55 In short, Stillingfleet thinks that
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CNM promotes the notion that although we can have clear and distinct ideas of the
accidents of a substance, we can have no idea of the substance itself or at least no clear
and distinct idea because we cannot sense it beyond its accidents. Once he notes that
Toland thinks we can have no clear idea and at another that we can have no idea.56 (Even
though the former argument would make more sense because Toland talks about nominal
essences and inadequate ideas of substance, Locke also thinks that Stillingfleet can be
read on a few occasions as conceiving of reason as being able to operate without ideas57).
Either because we have no idea or because we have no clear and distinct idea, substance
cannot be certain or the subject of reasoning according to CNM. Whichever way he
thinks Toland is arguing, they both give the same results. Stillingfleet argues that this is
foolhardy because it is reasonable and certain, according to his sense of the terms, to
conclude a substratum despite the fact that one cannot have a mental representation of it
at all, or at least one that cannot be subject to further thought. Part of his confusion, as
will be pointed out later, is based on the fact that he misses that ideas can be clear and
distinct in part.
It is in the discussion of sensation and reflection being the sole matter of
reasoning that Locke is implicated. Immediately after Stillingfleet includes Toland and
Locke in a group designtated the “Gentlemen of this new way of reasoning,” he starts
paraphrasing from the Essay: “For they not only tell us, That we can have no Idea of it by
Sensation or Reflection; but that nothing is signified by it, only an uncertain Supposition
of we know not what.”58 In the paraphrased passage of the Essay, Locke does say that
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sensation and reflection cannot give us an idea of substance and since ideas of substance
do not come in through our own faculties, “We have no such clear Idea at all, and
therefore signifie nothing by the word Substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we
know not what; i.e. of something whereof we have no Idea, which we take to be the
Substratum, or support, of those Ideas we do know” (I.iv.18). Locke’s alteration of his
statement of our inability to have any idea of Substance—or “no Idea”—in the 1695 3rd
edition to our inability to have any “particular distinct positive Idea” in the 1700 4th
edition is perhaps an acknowledgement that this section has the potential to be misleading
in some way.59 Stillingfleet apparently believes that Toland and Locke are working with
the same notion of reason within the same parameters. After again paraphrasing from the
Essay, Stillingfleet responds: “If it be grounded on plain and evident Reason, then we
must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection; and so
we may be certain of some things which we have not by those Ideas.”60
Stillingfleet mollifies his censure of Locke, however, in pointing out that while
the Essay does promulgate what amounts to a rejection of substance from reasoning,
Locke did not intend it to do so. He points out that Locke admits in the Essay I.xxiii.5
“that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit, as we have of a Body . . . And that it is as
rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we cannot know its Essence, as ‘tis called,
or have not Idea of the Substance of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we
know not its Essence, or have no Idea of a Spiritual Substance.”61 Stillingfleet takes
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Locke’s statement as Locke’s admission that we can have certainty of spiritual and
corporeal substances. But, for Stillingfleet, therein lies Locke’s inconsistency:
From hence it follows, That we may be certain, that there are both Spiritual and
Bodily Substances, although we can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them. But,
if our Reason depend upon our clear and distinct Idea’s; how is this possible? We
cannot reason without clear Idea’s and yet we may be certain without them: Can
we be certain without Reason? Or doth our Reason give us true Notions of things,
without these Ideas? If it be so, this new Hypothesis about Reason must appear to
be very unreasonable.62
In short, Stillingfleet believes Locke thinks we can only reason about and thus be certain
about clear and distinct ideas. However, he thinks Locke elsewhere in the Essay says that
we can be certain about things that have no clear and distinct ideas.
Stillingfleet thinks that Toland, however, has sinister intent in using the Essay’s
foundational principles. This becomes increasingly apparent in the second part of
Stillingfleet’s argument against CNM, after which Stillingfleet has made his case for the
reasonableness of substance, nature, and person in defense of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Prior to indexing Toland’s inconsistencies, Stillingfleet comments on a few passages
from CNM to show, no doubt, the outrageousness of CNM. Stillingfleet notes that
anything about which we have no clear and distinct idea is “above our Reason” according
to Toland. Although he doesn’t mention Locke in this context it is important to realize
that Locke is likely not brought in at this point as Stillingfleet is probably aware that
Locke affirms things “above reason” in the Essay, even though, again, that is inconsistent
with the Essay’s foundational principles. Besides, Stillingfleet thinks Locke admits
certainty of material and immaterial substances. Moreover, on the same page of the
Discourse, referencing a passage from CNM where Toland is simply following Locke in
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noting that we cannot receive new ideas without new organs or powers, Stillingfleet
wrongly understands Toland to claim that we would need supernatural mental or sensory
organs to reason about mysteries of the faith.63 As a case in point, he offers Toland’s two
definitions of things above reason: 1) something unintelligible because veiled with
figurative words, and 2) “For a thing in its own Nature inconceivable, and not to be
judged by our Faculties, tho’ it be never so clearly revealed.” Stillingfleet incorrectly
takes “and not to be judged by our Faculties” as a prescriptive interjection from Toland
amidst CNM’s description of the second sense of “above reason.”64 Based on
Stillingfleet’s reading of Toland’s notions of ideas, knowledge, certainty, and reason, for
Christianity to dismiss anything that is “above reason,” or, equally, not clear and distinct,
would be a dismissal of many important doctrines.65
Stillingfleet then proceeds to show the inconsistencies within CNM. Stillingfleet
lays out a few propositions he has gleaned from CNM, shows their logical conclusion
when tied together, and points out a present inconsistency in CNM. Regarding the said
propositions, Stillingfleet brings the reader to the same passage that has given presentday scholars trouble, the passage that states that faith is not an implicit assent but
knowledge in one sense of the word (139-140).66 Stillingfleet quotes Toland: “That Faith
is so far from being an implicit Assent to any thing above Reason, that this Notion
directly contradicts the end of Religion, the Nature of Man, and the Goodness and
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Wisdom of God.”67 Stillingfleet then reminds the reader of his reading of CNM, which
asserts that reason is only concerned with clear and distinct ideas. He then reiterates that
CNM calls its “simple” ideas (by which he means clear and distinct ideas) from sensation
adequate but all ideas of substances inadequate.68 He then gives a conclusion, where it is
important to note that he wrongly identifies the categories of clear and distinct ideas with
adequate ideas. He writes: “But let us lay these things together. Whatever we can have no
adequate Idea of is above our Knowledge, and consequently above our Reason; and so
all Substances are above our Reason.”69 Stillingfleet notes that Toland, however, tries to
brush this natural mystery aside by claiming something is not mysterious for lack of an
adequate idea, but then slips up in noting that we are completely ignorant of real
essences. Thus, according to Stillingfleet, Toland is truly allowing what Toland considers
mysteries from nature but not from religion.70 It is in this context that Stillingfleet
mentions in passing that CNM is attacking the Trinity as being absurd and
contradictory.71 He explains that there is a difference between gross contradictions and
not having a distinct conception of the nature of a thing or equally something “barely”
being above reason (reason in Toland’s sense). The bishop then points out a similar
inconsistency in Toland’s assertion that eternity is not mysterious even though we have
no adequate, or clear and distinct, idea of it: Toland thinks that the Trinity is mysterious
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and above our reason and thus is to be rejected from the Christian faith for lack of a clear
and distinct idea.72
It is within the context of the discussion over CNM’s alleged inconsistencies that
Stillingfleet reveals more of his interpretation of Toland’s and presumably Locke’s ideas.
Stillingfleet comments on what he thinks is an inconsistent acceptance of eternity by
Toland based on CNM’s premises:
But can you have a clear and distinct Idea of what you cannot comprehend? A
clear Idea, is that whereof the mind hath a full and evident Perception. A distinct
Idea, is that whereby the mind perceives the difference of it from all others. Is this
right? Yes. But can you have a full evident Perception of a thing, so as to
difference it from all others, when you grant it to be Incomprehensible? If you
have a full Perception of it, you comprehend its Nature, and especially if you can
difference it from all other things; but when you say, its Nature is
Incomprehensible, and yet believe it, you must deny it to be necessary to Faith, to
have a clear and distinct Idea of the thing proposed.73
As already mentioned he thinks adequate ideas are clear and distinct and inadequate ideas
are not so. Also, he apparently thinks that certainty and reason do not concern ideas that
are not in every part clear and distinct. This is a major misreading of Locke and Toland
who is parroting him.
Regarding Locke’s denial of the necessity of clear and distinct ideas for
knowledge and certainty, a few things can be said. Locke asks the following question in
the Essay: “But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employ’d about our Ideas only,
Will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our Ideas; and that where our
Ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our Knowledge will be so too?” His
answer is: “No: For our Knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement, or
72
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disagreement of any two Ideas, its clearness, or obscurity, consists in the clearness or
obscurity of that Perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the Idea themselves”
(IV.ii.15). Hence, one can understand and know, by virtue of the number of sides that one
counts or according to the mathematical formulae, that a 1000-sided polygon differs from
a 999-sided polygon of a similar size, even though it is not evident by looking at their
figures side by side.
If there is any doubt that Toland follows Locke in dismissing clear and distinct
ideas as necessary to certainty all that must be done is, again, to juxtapose their
definitions of knowledge. Locke’s definition of knowledge is: “Knowledge then seems to
me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement
and repugnancy of any of our Ideas” (IV.i.2). Toland defines knowledge as: “nothing else
but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in a greater or lesser
Number, whereinsoever this Agreement or Disagreement may consist” (12). Like Locke,
nothing is said about clear and distinct ideas. In both, knowledge is the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of any ideas. And, for both Locke and Toland, certainty
supervenes only and necessarily with knowledge.
Taking into consideration all that has been explored in the Discourse, a few things
might be said about it in conclusion. Stillingfleet misunderstands what Toland and Locke
teach about ideas and reason. Most importantly, he thinks that according to the
foundational premises of CNM and the Essay reason contemplates only clear and distinct
ideas and thus ideas that are clear and distinct in every aspect, and reason is
demonstration and thus gives certainty. As between Toland and Locke, Toland is the one
who is more consistent in the application of these principles, according to the Discourse.
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Doctrines that are not clear and distinct in every part, since they cannot be the subject of
reason, are above reason and therefore must be rejected as being unreasonable. And,
when one considers the sheer number of doctrines that would have to be rejected,
Stillingfleet is understandably perturbed. In the end, he makes some interesting counterarguments against arguments that neither Toland nor Locke employ.
Regarding the entirety of Part III of this chapter, it can be said that Stillingfleet is
correct in asserting agreement between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and
certainty, but misinterprets what both thinkers are conveying about these notions when he
treats them in the Discourse, which is the first part of this chapter’s thesis. Those who
find Stillingfleet correct in his notion that Toland requires clear and distinct ideas for
certainty cannot be right. This casts a shadow of doubt on their understandings of reason,
as well, simply by the fact that ideas are a concept foundational to reason. The
exploration of reason in Toland must wait until chapter four.

Part IV: Responses and Receptions
While Part III concentrated on the Essay, CNM, and the Discourse in arguing for
the first part of this chapter’s thesis, the remainder of this chapter will concentrate on
responses and receptions of the Locke-Stillingfleet debate and argue for the second part
of this chapter’s thesis: While the clarifications on ideas and certainty Locke makes in the
course of the debate are helpful, the controversy as a whole and its reception leaves little
resolved regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s respective epistemologies. This
part will thus consist of four subsections: “Responses from Locke on Ideas,” “Locke’s
Regard for Stillingfleet’s Treatment of CNM,” “Toland’s Responses,” and “Receptions.”
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Responses from Locke on Ideas
The exploration of these responses will be limited even though Locke’s responses
to Stillingfleet are lengthy and important. This section of Part IV is only concerned with
Locke’s corrections of Stillingfleet’s interpretations of the Essay’s ideas as they relate to
certainty, knowledge, and reason. What he relays in the debate in these regards are
essentially clarifications and reinforcements of what he teaches in the Essay. Little is
new, but it is helpful. All of what is said could be reasoned out of the Essay, but with no
little expenditure of time and energy.
First, Locke corrects Stillingfleet on a few points concerning ideas and reason. He
notes that it is simple ideas that originate in sensation and reflection. Also, he points out
that it appears that Stillingfleet is charging him with conceiving of reason as only
operating rightly with ideas of things that are sensed and the simple operations of the
mind. This is a ridiculous conclusion, for then Locke would then have rejected “the Ideas
of simple and mix’d Modes and Relations, and the complex Ideas of the Species of
Substances, about which he has spent so many Chapters.” If Stillingfleet were right,
Locke would also be denying that these complex ideas are “the Objects of Mens
Thoughts or Reasonings, which he is far enough from.”74 The simple ideas, on the other
hand, are the raw materials with which the reason and other faculties of the mind work
and they are the ideas that come from only sensation and reflection.75
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Perhaps the most important clarification Locke makes pertains to his correction of
Stillingfleet’s confusion arising from what clear and distinct ideas are and their
connections with knowledge and certainty. In L1, Locke points out a few places in the
Essay, as this chapter has already done above, where certainty of knowledge is found in
the “clear and visible connections” or perceptions of agreement or disagreement between
ideas in a proposition.76 In short, Locke does “not limit Certainty to clear and distinct
Ideas only, since there may be Certainty from Ideas that are not in all their parts perfectly
clear and distinct.”77 He is adamant about this point and reiterates it a number of times in
L1, L2, and L4.78 In L4, he explains that any obscure and confused idea is not wholly
indistinguishable from all other ideas.79 “There is no object which the Eye sees, that can
be said to be perfectly obscure, for then it would not be seen at all; nor perfectly
confused; for then it could not be distinguished from any other, no not from a clearer.”80
“For every Idea in the Mind, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, is but that one Idea,
that it is, and not another Idea, that it is not; and the Mind perceives it to be the Idea, that
it is, and not another Idea that it is different from.”81 Thus, every idea that is not perfectly
clear in all its parts still has parts that are clear; it is these clear parts that may be
perceived to agree or disagree with the clear parts of another idea and thus be known to
be distinct: “an Idea which cannot be well compared with some Ideas, from which it is
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not clearly and sufficiently distinguishable, is yet capable of having its agreement or
disagreement perceived with some other Idea, with which it is not so confounded, but that
it may be compared.”82 And therein lies the ability to have knowledge and certainty in
putting these obscure and confused ideas in propositions:
. . . because an Idea that is not in all its parts perfectly clear and distinct, and is
therefore an obscure and confused Idea; may yet with those Ideas, with which, by
any obscurity it has, it is not confounded, be capable to produce Knowledge by
the perception of its agreement or disagreement with them. And yet it will hold
true, that in that part wherein it is imperfect, obscure and confused, we cannot
expect to have certain, perfect or clear knowledge.83
So, although some ideas are not perfectly clear they will be distinct from others and thus
can be placed in a proposition that is certain. Reflecting on this point, it should be noted
that many ideas are thus assumed to be clear and distinct until a desired comparison
brings ones attention to points of obscurity and reveals confusion.
Locke uses several helpful examples to illustrate his point that knowledge and
certainty does not require clear and distinct ideas or, equally, ideas that are clear and
distinct in all parts. The first example involves the observation of “two Things standing
upright, near the size and shape of an ordinary Man; but in so dim a Light, or at such a
distance, that they appeared very much alike.” They are thus obscure and also confused
relative to one another. Yet one could be certain about a proposition about either of them,
such as they are something and they do exist. Locke explains that this is similar to our
situation with an idea of a substratum. It is obscure and confused, but some things may be
said about it with certainty and it is very much within the compass of reason.84 The
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second example that will be given here builds upon the first one. Locke presents a
scenario where one observes something in a dim light that is similar in size and shape to a
man. He cannot determine whether it is a man or a statue. But he can say with certainty,
and thus knows, it is not a steeple or a star.85
Another very important point that Locke clarifies several times in this debate is
what an idea is. Locke appears perplexed by Stillingfleet’s description of the Essay as
Locke’s “new way by ideas.” Locke writes:
My new way by Ideas, or my way by Ideas, which often occurs in your Lordships
Letter, is, I confess, a very large and doubtful Expression; and may, in the full
Latitude, comprehend my whole Essay; because treating in it of the
Understanding, which is nothing but the Faculty of Thinking, I could not well
treat of that Faculty of the Mind, which consists in Thinking, without considering
the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call Ideas: And therefore
in treating of the Understanding, I guess it will not be thought strange, that the
greatest part of my Book has been taken up, in considering what these Objects of
the Mind, in Thinking are . . . And this, in short, is my way by Ideas, that which
your Lordship calls my new way by Ideas: Which, my Lord, if it be new, it is but a
new History of an old Thing, For I think it will not be doubted, that Men always
perform’d the Actions of Thinking, Reasoning, Believing, and Knowing, just after
the same way they do now . . .86
Two important things can be gleaned here. First, ideas are the immediate objects of the
mind when thinking. That is, there is always something present in the mind.87 So when
someone attempts to envision a particular substance or substratum distinct from its
accidents something is pictured. The mind cannot suspend itself from picturing
something. That something might be revised by the mind, but there will always be
something envisioned. This is also an important response to Stillingfleet who might be
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read, according to Locke, as taking Locke’s claim how we have no idea of substance
literally.88 Second, Locke believes he is simply describing the process of understanding
that we all attempt to use rightly. He does not pretend to be conveying anything new.
There are definitely prescriptive elements in the proper description but the main point of
the Essay is the description.
It is important to note, again, that what this debate has to say more pointedly
about reason will be dealt with in the next two chapters. The debate began, however, with
a misunderstanding of reason, certainty, and ideas, but certainty and ideas were more
often the focus in the course of the debate. As will be evident in the next two chapters,
the treatments of reason and its interrelated topics in the Essay and CNM are far more
complex than what little is said of the same in the Locke-Stillingfleet debate.
Locke’s Regard for Stillingfleet’s Treatment of CNM
As mentioned before, Toland’s notoriety comes from the fact that he somehow
employs Locke’s foundational principles of the Essay and yet greatly deviates from
Locke as is apparent in his rejection of things above reason. The question that will
concern us here is: What does Locke, himself, actually say about Stillingfleet’s treatment
and interpretation of CNM?
Locke appears frustrated and amazed how Stillingfleet pulled him into the ongoing Trinitarian debates in which Stillingfleet was involved. It is clear to Locke that
Stillingfleet’s line of reasoning for doing so is apparent but contorted:
To take now a right View of this Matter, it is fit to consider, the beginning and
progress of it: Your Lordship had a Controversie with the Unitarians; they, in
88
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their Answer to your Lordships Sermons, and elsewhere, talk of Ideas; the Author
of Christianity not Mysterious, whether a Unitarian or no, your Lordship says not,
neither do I enquire, gives an account of Reason, which, as your Lordship says,
supposes Certainty to consist only in clear and distinct Ideas; and because he
expresses himself in some other Things, conformable to what I had said in my
Book, my Book is brought into the Controversie, though there be no such Opinion
in it, as your Lordship opposed.89
And already, this chapter has explored how neither Toland nor Locke place certainty in
only clear and distinct ideas.
While Locke defends himself from erroneous charges, he makes numerous
comments on Stillingfleet’s treatment of CNM. Locke notes throughout his responses that
Stillingfleet attacks CNM’s account of reason because it makes clear and distinct ideas
necessary for certainty. But, the biggest problem Locke notices in this regard is that
Stillingfleet has not proven that CNM’s account of reason or any other part of the work
confines certainty to clear and distinct ideas.90 Locke goes even so far as to defend
Toland and the Unitarians from Stillingfleet’s charges:
My Lord, when I writ my Book, I could not design to distinguish my self from the
Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, who were not then in being, nor are, that
I see, yet: Since I find nothing produced out of the Unitarians, nor the Author of
Christianity not Mysterious, to shew, That they make clear and distinct Ideas
necessary to Certainty.91
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He even pleads with Stillingfleet throughout the discourse to show how the author of
CNM built upon Locke.92
Another important point is that at no time in the debate does Locke distance his
Essay from CNM or say that CNM does not agree with his Essay on the issue of ideas.93
Every single time he could appear at first glance to be writing against CNM on this issue,
with a more careful look it becomes apparent that he is writing against Stillingfleet’s
reading of the author of CNM and not the author of CNM.94 Besides, if he were arguing
against the author of CNM what was discussed directly above would not make sense,
especially his defense of CNM. This is contrary to Toland’s celebrated biography by
Sullivan that claims: “He [Locke] had one aim, to dissociate himself from them [Toland
and the Socinians], and he pursued it doggedly.”95
There is one passage in particular from L1 that might constitute an objection to
what has just been argued. Locke writes to Stillingfleet: “For how can my using an
Argument, whose Certainty is not placed upon clear and distinct Ideas, prove any thing
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against another Man who says, That clear and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and
Foundation of all our Reasoning? This proves only against him that uses the
Argument.”96 To many this might sound like an implicit acceptance of Stillingfleet’s
reading of Toland. Toland, however, said simple and distinct ideas are the foundation of
all our reasoning (11-12), which Stillingfleet somehow misses.97 Locke likely realizes
this which explains the rest of the quote which many have apparently missed: “. . . and
therefore either I must be supposed here to hold, that clear and distinct Ideas are the sole
Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning, (which I do not remember that I ever said)
or else that your Lordship here proves against no body.”98

Responses from Toland
John Toland’s published responses to Stillingfleet about his mishandling of the
CNM are shorter than Locke’s on the same issue! Toland has three works that serve as
vindications of CNM: the Apology, the Defence, and Vindicius. In two places he merely
lists “Worcester” among those that have attacked him, once in the Defence and once in
Vindicius.99 Both times where he offers more space to the attack he does not attempt to
personally respond to Stillingfleet but merely gives a lengthy quote from The Agreement
of the Unitarians with the Catholick Church, a work that was penned by celebrated
Unitarian and Worcester opponent Stephen Nye. A fair share of that book is an attack on
Stillingfleet’s Discourse. While Toland’s Vindicius prints a quote from page 55 of the
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Unitarian work that takes up the final three pages of that vindication, the Apology
incorporates a longer version of the quote, adding on a few lines from the previous page:
I know not what it was to his Lordship’s Purpose, to fall upon Mr. Toland’s Book.
But if he needs attack the Book; he should have dealt fairly; he should have dealt
with the main Argument in it; and not carpt only at a few Passages, and those too,
so mangled and deformed by his Representation of them, that I dare to affirm, Mr.
Toland does not know his own Book in the Bishop’s Representation. I do not
perceive, to speak truly, but that the Book still stands in its full Strength; if it hath
not also acquired a farther Reputation, by occasion of this (so) unsuccessful
nibling at it. But suppose the Bishop had disarmed the Gentleman; what is that to
us? Do we offer this Book, against the Trinity of the Realists; was it written with
intention to serve us; doth it contain any of our Allegations from Reason, against
the Trinity of Philoponus, Joachim, and Gentils? We desire him to answer to the
Reasons in our Books, against the Trinity of the Tritheists; but to these, he said
not a Word, but only falls upon Mr. Toland’s Book: in which, or for which, we
are not in the least concerned; nor do I think the (Learned and Ingenious) Author
will hold himself to be interested to defend that Christianity not Mysterious,
which his Lordship presents with us.100
In the Apology, he explicitly uses the quote as evidence that even the Unitarians do not
consider it Unitarian. There are other points made in the quote by Nye, however, that are
obviously advantageous to Toland. Stillingfleet is said to mishandle CNM, mangle it, and
treat Toland unfairly.
The most obvious possible reason that Toland said little in his own defense
against Stillingfleet’s charges, taking into consideration what has already been said in this
chapter, is the involvement of more prominent thinkers who were attacking Stillingfleet’s
Discourse. Both Nye and Locke point out Stillingfleet’s distortion of CNM. And, Locke
even goes so far as to say Stillingfleet’s reading of CNM on ideas and reason is incorrect.
Toland perhaps thought he would be doing Locke, at least, a discourtesy in responding to
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Stillingfleet when Locke wants the bishop’s full attention and has already dealt with
Toland fairly.
Written admission from Toland that Locke managed Toland and the CNM fairly
does come about, but not until 1720, some twenty years after the debate. In response to a
scholar, Dr. Hare, who mentions in passing that CNM misconstrues Locke’s Essay with
quotes from it, Toland quotes from Locke’s L4 three times to show that Locke admits that
Toland never quotes the Essay and to show that Stillingfleet misrepresented both himself
and Locke in the debate. Toland first quotes, in a compressed form, Locke’s synopsis of
Stillingfleet’s contorted line of reasoning where he moves from interpreting CNM as
requiring clear and distinct ideas for certainty to arguing against the Essay. Toland then
includes a quote where Locke chides Stillingfleet for not quoting one sentence of Toland
where “certainty by Ideas” is mentioned. He then recounts Locke’s witty rehearsal of
Stillingfleet’s change of mind where he admits Locke went upon different grounds than
certainty by ideas, but then to Locke’s surprise says he prefers the view that he originally
thought Locke held! Toland concludes by saying, in sum, that Locke shows that they
were both misrepresented by Stillingfleet and that Stillingfleet never actually produced
parallel places between himself and Locke, thereby showing Toland never quoted from
the Essay. The upshot for Toland was that Dr. Hare changed his assertion that Toland
misconstrues the Essay with quotes from it to the assertion that he “makes great use of
Mr. Locke’s Principles.” The upshot for the history of the debate is that Toland affirms
that Locke gives him a fair reading.101
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Another reason that possibly accounts for his brief response is that Toland had to
direct his attention elsewhere. His book created such a stir with numerous respondents
that he had problems with various governments. The full title of his Apology reveals his
more pressing needs: An Apology for Mr. Toland, In a Letter from Himself to a Member
of the House of Commons in Ireland; written the day before his Book was resolv’d to be
burnt by the Committee of Religion. To which is prefix’d a Narrative containing the
Occasion of the said Letter. And the book was indeed burned in public at two separate
places on September 11, 1697.102 He had similar potential legal issues in England, which
prompted Vindicius Liberius: Or M. Toland’s Defence of Himself, Against the late Lower
House of Convocation, and Others, etc.
Considering Toland’s defense of CNM in addition to Locke’s regard for
Stillingfleet’s interpretations of CNM, Locke and Toland leave us with little more than
pointing out Stillingfleet’s faulty interpretations and what Toland did not argue. Toland
follows the same cautious approach 20 years later when he is slighted for misconstruing
Locke with quotes from the Essay. The debate itself, leaves little resolved regarding a
comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies. Had Toland known that this debate
would forever tether him to Locke and would result in so many CNM misreadings that
are not apparently questioned in the secondary literature on him, perhaps he would have
responded more vigorously. In his defense, how could he have guessed?
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Receptions
While Locke’s and Toland’s responses to Stillingfleet amidst the debate leave us
with little in the way of a comparison regarding Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies,
this section will make a case that a popular synoptic statement of Toland’s epistemology
is gleaned from the debate but is no more than what is thought to be Stillingfleet’s
reading of Toland’s CNM on reason and revelation. Just as it seems very likely that those
that agree with Stillingfleet that Toland requires clear and distinct ideas for certainty
simply assume it to be true, it appears, due to lack of evidence of the pertinent analysis of
CNM, that those that agree with the popular synoptic statement are likely assuming it to
be true.
This chapter’s contentions from the beginning have been that significant
scholarship that comments on Toland likely assumes that Stillingfleet gets Toland correct
on ideas and reason, and presumably all things related. Hopefully this chapter has cleared
away all doubts to its initial claims, at least with regards to ideas, knowledge, and
certainty. Those familiar with the secondary literature might quickly point out, seemingly
contrary to this chapter’s claims, that many Toland scholars or commentators often assert
that revelation is not subordinate to demonstration, as Stillingfleet understands CNM to
assert, but is subordinate to reasonable probability. That is, revelation cannot be accepted
as such if it gives novelty. Toland biographer, Sullivan, is a case in point: “Any assertion
of revelation would have to be judged by the same tests of disinterestedness and
probability as applied to data received on human authority.”103 Again, considering
Sullivan, like many others, does not do an analysis of what Toland means by reason, nor
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what Locke means by reason, though he differentiates the two by claiming Locke accepts
things above reason while Toland rejects them, Sullivan and others likely get their
reading that revelation is subordinate to human or natural probability from the same place
that Roger Woolhouse gets the very same interpretation of Toland’s understanding of
reason versus revelation: a particular charge of logical inconsistency made by Locke
against Stillingfleet in L4.
Over a number of pages near the end of L4, Locke charges Stillingfleet with using
an argument which he “highly condemned” in others.104 Locke asserts that regarding the
doctrine of the immortality of the soul Stillingfleet essentially argues that “it [the
doctrine] is not so credible as if it were easie to give an account by Natural Reason.”105
Still on the topic of the immortality of the soul and Stillingfleet’s argument for it and his
well-known dismissal of Locke’s claims of assigning different bases to assurance of faith
and certainty, Locke fires off a series of questions:
For if in this present Case, the credibility of this Proposition, The Souls of Men
shall live for ever, revealed in Scripture, be lessened by confessing it cannot be
demonstratively proved from Reason; though it be asserted to be most highly
probable: Must not by the same Rule its credibility dwindle away to nothing, if
natural Reason should not be able to make it out to be so much probable; or
should place the probability from natural Principles on the other side? For if meer
want of Demonstration lessens the credibilty of any Proposition divinely revealed,
must not want of probability, or contrary probability from natural Reason, quite
take away its credibility?
Thus, Stillingfleet’s demand for the corroboration of natural reason for support of a
revealed doctrine—in this case, the immortality of the soul—gives natural reason all of
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the power and makes natural reason the true authority over Scripture. Thus if a particular
claim made by a revelation seemed improbable it would be rejected as revelation!
This position on revelation and reason just articulated, which Stillingfleet is
accused of holding but condemns in others, is precisely the position John Toland is often
thought to hold. Woolhouse, treating the same pages from L4 in his biography of Locke,
writes: “Locke pointed out that Stillingfleet was here accepting precisely what he had
begun by arguing against—Toland’s principle of rejecting mysteries of the faith which
are above reason. He was maintaining that ‘divine revelation abates of its credibility’ in
proportion as human reason fails to support it.”106 In other words, Woolhouse takes
Locke’s argument that Stillingfleet adopts a position he argues against as thus being
Toland’s position. The obvious problem, other than the lack of analysis of Toland, is that
Stillingfleet understands things above reason in Toland to be that which is not completely
clear and distinct, which has nothing to do with probability. That is beside the point; the
point being that Sullivan and Woolhouse, not to mention all of the yet-to-be-named
commentators of Toland, who assign him this position likely obtain it directly or
indirectly from the passages outlined above. Again, they do no analysis of reason and
ideas and their interconnections, and as will be shown in chapter four, it is an
unsupportable conclusion from CNM. They do give, at least, a more palatable
interpretation of Toland, as it acknowledges that Toland’s reason concerns probability in
CNM, than Stillingfleet’s thought that Toland accepted only that which could be
demonstrated as reasonable. In regards to Locke scholarship, interestingly enough there
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are some prominent Locke scholars who actually think the position often ascribed to
Toland is actually that of John Locke.107 They will be discussed in chapter 3.
Many incorrect interpretations of reason or reason versus faith or reason versus
revelation could have been avoided in regards to Locke and Toland if scholarship had
paid closer attention to the Locke-Stillingfleet debate. But again, it is understandable,
considering its length, truncation, and so on, that few would want to get into the debate to
challenge Stillingfleet’s reading of CNM, the correctness of which has apparently become
a matter of fact. The debate tells us better what Locke and Toland do not teach on said
issues, however, than what they do teach. Now that we have investigated Locke and
Toland on the issues of ideas, knowledge, and certainty from the Essay, CNM, and related
works, this dissertation will investigate these works on the issues of reason, faith, and
revelation. (It will be shown that they agree on those points more than most or any have
realized).
Conclusion
This chapter made a case for the suggestion that Stillingfleet is correct in asserting
agreement between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty but misinterprets
what both thinkers are conveying about these notions when he comments on them in the
Discourse. While the clarifications on ideas and certainty Locke makes in the course of
the debate are helpful, the controversy as a whole and its reception leaves little resolved
regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s respective epistemologies.
This thesis was defended in a chapter consisting of four parts. Part I gave a history
of the debate and Part II was the state of the question. Part III concentrated on the first
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half of this chapter’s thesis. After investigating the Essay and CNM, it concluded that
although CNM is much briefer on its treatments of ideas, certainty, and the intertwined
topic of knowledge, all that it says agrees with the Essay’s instruction on the same topics.
Part III then showed what Stillingfleet actually claims Locke and Toland are
promulgating on ideas and other related topics and how he is wrong. Part IV concentrated
on the second half of this chapter’s thesis. It first rehearsed Locke’s helpful clarifications
on his notions of ideas and certainty. It then turned its focus on the CNM, showing
Locke’s thoughts on its incorporation into the debate and Toland’s meager defense of it
in response to Stillingfleet. It was also shown that little was resolved regarding a
comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies in the course of the debate. In spite
of this fact, an important synoptic statement of what is thought by some to be Toland’s
epistemology surfaces in the course of the controversy. Amidst incorrect connections
and/or no evident analysis of pertinent terms and concepts, it is likely that those that
accept this synoptic statement as accurately describing Toland’s epistemology assume
this synoptic statement to be directed at Toland and to be correct.
Having already juxtaposed Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas, knowledge,
and certainty, we will continue our comparisons of their epistemologies in the following
chapters. Thus we will investigate reason, faith, and revelation in Locke in chapter 3, and
the same in Toland with a concurrent comparison with Locke in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3: LOCKE’S SUBORDINATION OF FAITH AND REVELATION TO
REASON

Introduction
Chapter 2 scrutinized and overturned the foundational epistemological allegations
that sparked the Locke-Stillingfleet debate. The debate began as a result of Bishop
Edward Stillingfleet’s allegations in A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the
Trinity (Discourse) directed at John Locke and his An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (Essay). Stillingfleet’s main grievance is based upon his understanding
that John Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious (CNM) requires clear and distinct ideas
for certainty and reason and that Toland had adopted this notion from Locke’s Essay.1
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Locke, according to Stillingfleet, does not carry this notion to its logical ends, but John
Toland does and shows its heretical fruits. Thus, Locke and his Essay are accused of
paving the way for heresy. In exploring what Locke’s Essay and Toland’s CNM teach
about ideas and certainty, and other related matters, it is abundantly clear that Stillingfleet
does not sufficiently grasp what Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty are
in the Discourse. So, chapter 2 set out to show that while Stillingfleet is correct in
asserting agreement between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty,
nevertheless he misinterprets what both thinkers are conveying about these notions when
he treats them in the Discourse. And, while the clarifications on ideas and certainty in the
course of the debate are helpful, the controversy as a whole and its reception leaves little
resolved regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s respective epistemologies.
Chapter 3 will work toward continuing a thorough comparison of Locke’s and
Toland’s epistemologies.2 Chapter 2 describes Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas,
Henry Mortlock, 1697); John Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of
Worcester’s Answer to His Letter, Concerning Some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke’s Essay of Humane
Understanding: In a Late Discourse of His Lordships, In Vindication of the Trinity (London: printed by H.
Clark for A. and J. Churchill, and E. Castle, 1697); Edward Stillingfleet, The Bishop of Worcester’s Answer
to Mr. Locke’s Second Letter; Wherein His Notion of Ideas is Prov’d to be Inconsistent with It Self, and
with the Articles of the Christian Faith (London: printed by J.H. for Henry Mortlock, 1698); John Locke,
Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Second Letter
(printed by H.C. for A. and J. Churchill and E. Castle, 1699). Moreover, there are other important works
pertinent to the Essay found in Locke’s Posthumous Works such as Of the Conduct of the Understaning and
A Discourse of Miracles. John Locke, The Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke: viz. I. Of the Conduct of
the Understanding. II. An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing all things in God. III. A
Discourse of Miracles. IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration. V. Memoirs relating to the Life of
Anthony first Earl of Shaftsbury. To which is added, IV. His New Method of a Common-Place-Book,
written originally in French, and now translated into English (London: printed by W. B. for A. and J.
Churchill, 1706); John Locke, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians,
Romans, 1 & II Corinthians, Ephesians. To which is Prefix’d, An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul’s
Epistles, by Consulting St. Paul Himself (London: printed by J. H. Awnsham and John Churchill, 1707).
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certainty, and knowledge and shows them to be compatible. Chapter three will focus on
Locke’s description of the faculty of reason, its subordinate and related faculties, and
reason’s relationships to faith and revelation. Chapter four will be a treatment of Toland
on the same issues but with a concurrent point-for-point comparison with Locke. Thus
chapters three and four will complete the comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s
epistemologies that is not treated by the Locke-Stillingfleet debate.
This chapter will focus on answering the following questions: 1) According to
Locke, what is reason?; 2) What is its relationship to faith?; and 3) What is its
relationship to revelation? In so doing, this chapter will argue that to understand Locke’s
description of reason, and thus the relationships between reason and faith and reason and
revelation, one must acknowledge that in the Essay Locke primarily conceives of the
mind employing the faculty of reason working in reason’s proper office or scope, which
entails the considerations of natural as well as supernatural sources of information, and a
corresponding proper faith that pertains to probable (uncertain) propositions from the
same sources. He asserts that divinely revealed propositions trump the propositions
supported by the probability from purely natural sources. In Essay IV.xviii, however, he
conceives of the mind employing reason in a diminished office, or concerning only
natural sources, and a corresponding faith, concerned with only supernatural sources; but
he does this partly, at least, to show that such an antithetical framing of the two fails to
ROC is based upon, but not slavishly, the “Harvard copy” of ROC. The Harvard copy is a first edition ROC
that contains Locke’s notes, emendations, and corrections. John C. Higgins-Biddle, ed., “Introduction,” in
The Reasonableness of Christianity As Delivered in the Scriptures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999),
cxxxiv. I have researched both and note the page numbers of the 1696 second edition in the footnotes and
the corresponding pagination of the critical edition in brackets. John Locke, A Vindication of the
Reasonableness of Christianity, As Delivered in the Scriptures from Mr. Edwards’s Exceptions (London:
Awnsham and John Churchil, 1696). This was published along with the 1696 2nd ed. of ROC. John Locke,
A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, etc. (London: A. and J. Churchil, 1697).
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maintain definitive boundaries. As a result, faith in or assent to a proposition from any
source and the determination of divine revelation as such morally ought to be the result of
the mind employing its power of reason in its full scope or office.
What follows is an expanded explanation of the above thesis with additional
details for clarity’s sake. In Locke’s consideration of the faculty of reason in the Essay,
he acknowledges various renderings of the term but conceptually builds his idea of
reason in its fullest sense. Reason as a faculty is a tool or power of the mind. Its
employment gives the mind knowledge and probability, the latter being that upon which
the mind should base its judgments. Reason’s proper office encompasses notices and
propositions from natural sources of information and supernatural sources. Reason must
assess whether or not something is revealed and in so doing determine how the revealed
proposition or propositions should be interpreted. While a revealed proposition cannot
overturn intuitive or demonstrative knowledge to be considered divine, it can overturn
propositions that are probable based upon purely non-revelatory considerations or
divinely unassisted reason.3 The faculty of reason considered operating in its full scope or
proper office will be called proper reason in this dissertation. Assent, faith, opinion, or
belief in natural or divine revelatory matters are not necessarily subordinate to proper
reason, but morally they ought to be, especially regarding important issues, such as
religion and morality; otherwise the mind’s belief and assent are irrational, not heeding
and utilizing properly its God-given guide. So, if the mind is acting reasonably in assent,
an act done by the mind’s power of judgment, it heeds the recommendations issued from
3

One might, through analogy and observation, assent to propositions regarding the supernatural
realm through divinely unassisted reasoning. For instance, it is possible some have reasoned that it is likely
that there are ranks of intelligent beings, some of which are immaterial, that reach up to the infinite
perfection of God (Essay IV.xvi.12).
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reason employed in its proper office, or proper reason, and will thus have what this
dissertation will call proper faith or proper belief. What is more, the natural faculties or
powers can be considered, for all intents and purposes, as reason when the mind acts
reasonably—reasonably in the sense of dictated by proper reason and in the sense of
corresponding to the appropriate thoroughness that the circumstance warrants.
Near the end of Essay IV.xvii, “Of Reason,” and in Essay IV.xviii, “Of Faith and
Reason, and their distinct Provinces,” he conceives of the faculty of reason operating in a
diminished office, what this dissertation will call vulgar reason. This is done such that
vulgar reason can be conceptually distinguished as much as possible from assent, faith, or
belief in only divinely revealed matters, what this chapter will call vulgar faith. In other
words, vulgar reason is the faculty of reason considered operating in an office without the
assistance or propositions of revelation.
My use of the label “vulgar” that Locke does not use warrants some explanation.
First, Locke referred to both considerations of reason as “reason,” and both
considerations of faith as “faith.” Not differentiating them in the Essay has led to
confusion in reading it, as will be argued in this chapter, and would likely lead to
confusion in reading this chapter. Second, it is my desire to couple the two considerations
of reason with each one’s corresponding consideration of faith to avoid undue confusion.
Locke does not make provision for this. Vulgar reason could have been called natural or
unassisted or human reason in this dissertation, which Locke actually does call it in
places, but then this dissertation would have to replace the efficient, coupling labels of
vulgar reason and vulgar faith with the less economical and disconnected labels of
natural or unassisted or human reason and vulgar (or some other adjective) faith; the
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labels natural or unassisted or human faith are not optional replacements for vulgar faith
because natural faith or unassisted faith are more appropriate terms for faith in natural
sources of information, which is ideally a function of the mind employing its natural or
unassisted reason. 4 Labeling them as common has too much room for misunderstanding
too, as referring to “common faith” seems more appropriate to describing a faith that is
uniform to everyone or most. Other prefixes such as “Chapter xviii” seem too clumsy.
Vulgar was chosen because it was a term commonly used in Locke’s day that could be
interchanged with the adjective common.
Moreover, this distinguishing of faith and reason in a vulgar understanding is
done simply as a concession since Locke believes that such an attempted distinction and
opposition is too ingrained in the common or vulgar vernacular to dislodge it. This vulgar
conception of reason is what allows Locke to concede to a category of propositions
“above reason.” That is, propositions above reason are intelligible propositions and above
natural or vulgar reason in the sense that they are novel and would typically not be the
subject of one’s perception without being divinely revealed; but in the cases that they
become the subject of one’s fanciful perception, there would be no reason to assent to
them outside of the fact that they are divinely revealed. Moreover, as the mind ought to
listen to revelation and, in its absence, vulgar reason in their recommendations involving
probability, it might not. Nevertheless, Locke shows that such an antithetical framing of
faith and reason ultimately cannot be maintained in IV.xviii.

4

Examples of natural reason: Locke, ROC, 268 [148], 278 [154]; Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply . . .
Answer to His 2nd Letter, 418, 421, 423, 426, 427, 428, 429, 439. Examples of unassisted reason: Locke,
ROC, 268 [148], 270 [149]. Examples of human reason: Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply . . . Answer to his
Second Letter, 418-419; Locke, A Second Vindication, xvi.
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Owing to the considerations of reason operating in different offices, multiple
considerations of faith have come to the fore. Proper faith refers to faith in propositions
from natural or allegedly supernatural sources reasonably assessed. Vulgar faith refers to
faith in propositions from only divine revelation reasonably assessed. Finally, irrational
faith is the result of the mind not heeding the recommendations derived from proper
reason and assenting otherwise or the result of the mind insufficiently employing reason
in its endeavor according to the thoroughness that the circumstance warrants.5
By the end of the Essay, Locke’s understanding of the relationship of proper
reason and (special) revelation is evident too. Revelation—original or immediate and
traditional or recorded original revelation—must have the appropriate external and
internal marks which reason must judge to be affirmed as revelation. The appropriate
external mark for an original revelation is a clear miracle or miracles and for traditional
revelation is accompanying fair testimonies of a clear miracle or miracles.6 The
appropriate internal marks of traditional or original divine revelation are that the
interpretation of the revealed proposition is neither definitively contrary to knowledge
nor definitively contrary to other accepted and assured revelation. One would not expect
it to be contrary to knowledge because if revelation could contradict knowledge—the
goal and highest achievement of reason and the foundation of our further reasoning—it
would be undercutting its source of validation that it is revelation. Also, God does not
5

The mind may, despite its insufficient employment of reason, conclude correctly, but Locke is
not sure how God assesses that (IV.xvii.24). Also, an over-employment of reason on a menial mental task
is poor stewardship and thus irrational in the corresponding sense (IV.xix.16).
6

John Tillotson and John Locke were friends and were in dialogue. It is possible that Locke
shared some of Tillotson’s more specific views regarding miraculous confirmation of revelation. John
Tillotson, Fifteen Sermons on Various Subjects, ed. by Ralph Barker (London: Ri. Chiswell, 1703),
especially “Sermon XI: Of the Miracles wrought in Confirmation of Christianity,” 301-342, “Sermon XII:
Of the Miracles wrought in Confirmation of Christianity,” 343-370, and “Sermon XIII: Of the Miracles
wrought in Confirmation of Christianity,” 371-396.
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contradict Himself. Furthermore, it is evident from the Essay that Locke thinks that the
Bible fits these criteria. Locke does admit, however, of unattested or extra-Biblical
original revelation. Although such revelations do not have the accompanying external
marks, the internal marks are that the allegedly revealed proposition is definitively not
contrary to knowledge and comports with either natural probability or assured
revelation.7
All of these conclusions considered, the guidelines of subordination and authority
become clear. Locke subordinates attested revelation to proper reason regarding its
external marks and internal marks or interpretation. Perhaps it is better to assert that
Locke thinks God subordinates revelation to proper reason. Natural probability is
subordinate to attested revelation. As alluded to already, Locke conceives of unattested
original revelation as being subordinate to, or consistent with, Scripture, attested
revelation, or else it must be subordinate to natural or vulgar reason. Finally, faith, the
vulgar or proper considerations, should always be subordinate to proper reason as the
mind ought to assent reasonably—reasonably, as qualified above.
This chapter will be divided into several parts. Part I will serve as the state of the
question. Part II will touch on preliminary issues. It will give a brief rehearsal of the
treatment of knowledge and certainty from chapter 2 followed by an expositional
explanation of the faculties of knowledge and judgment often associated with reason. Part
III will describe Locke’s primary conception of reason or proper reason. Part IV will
describe the relationship between reason and faith. An explanation of what propositions

7

If said natural probability and the best interpretation of said assured revelation are in conflict, the
assured revelation becomes that to which the unattested revelation must conform.
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above reason are will be offered in Part V. Part VI will describe the relationship of reason
and revelation. Finally, the chapter will end with a section focusing on conclusions.

Part I: State of the Question
There are numerous commentators on Locke. Some offer a rather brief treatment
of Locke, especially those works surveying the history of philosophy over a long period
of time and not isolated to the British Isles. And since they are not always concentrating
just on his epistemology their comments in that regard are understandably few and
important terms such as reason, above reason, and mystery are taken for granted and not
expounded upon. Such are the important works of James Livingston, Claude Welch,
Robert E. Sullivan, Frederick Copleston, John Herman Randall, Jr., James O’Higgins,
and William Uzgalis. 8 At times desired answers the commentators might have regarding

8

James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth
Century, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 18-21. Livingston is very brief in his treatment of
Locke. He says that Locke believes in that which is above and not contrary to reason. He does not explain
what he means by this phrase (18). He vaguely uses the term “mystery” to denote that which is saved by
Locke’s above but not contrary to reason category (20-21). In describing a primary difference, however,
between Locke and Toland—Locke’s acceptance of mystery and Toland’s rejection of mystery—mystery
appears to mean doctrines beyond our full understanding or that which cannot be mentally pictured but
does not offend the principles of logic (21). There is no evidence that he notices Locke uses two senses of
the word reason (18). Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1972), 35-36. Welch groups Wolff and Locke together as understanding Christianity
to transcend natural religion. This transcendence includes some “mystery.” He offers what mysteries
revelation would supply for Wolff—Trinity, Christology, grace, and atonement—but unfortunately not for
Locke. Robert E. Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy: A Study in Adaptations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982), 79. Sullivan simply claims Locke believes in ideas above, but not
contrary to reason, “for retention of the articles of faith.” As pointed out in chapter two, there is little
evidence that Sullivan grasps the notions of Locke’s ideas and reason. Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and
the Age of Reason, 1648-1789 (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1990), 13. Cragg writes, “Locke did not
challenge the need or the value of revelation, but the relative position he assigned it implies that it confirms
what can be appropriated in other ways” [emphasis mine]. It is possible that Cragg means to say that
Locke did not explicitly deny the need of revelation but implicitly did so; otherwise he would appear to be
contradictory. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. v (Westminster: The Newman Press,
1964), 69-70. Copleston claims that propositions above reason “may” include revelations not fully
understandable. John Herman Randall, Jr. The Making of the Modern Mind (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1926; reprinted with a forward, 1976), 285-9. Randall believes that Locke’s three
categories, propositions according to reason, contrary to reason, and above reason represent natural
religion, superstition, and revelation, respectively. “Locke’s disciple John Toland, in his Christianity not
Mysterious, further pointed out that the first and last formed really but one class . . .” (289). There is no
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important questions can be inferred, but frequently this is impossible. Sometimes they
make claims with important implications that they do not have time to explain more
thoroughly. In short, these accomplished commentators leave the reader wanting more!
Some scholars go beyond the role of general commentator and could be classified
as critics. But sometimes these critical treatments are too brief to offer supporting
explanations. One scholar, John C. Biddle (aka John C. Higgins-Biddle), claims that
Locke’s treatment of reason and revelation is “by no means thorough, clear, or
consistent,” while offering no evidence why he concludes this.9 Although not explicitly
charging Locke with contradictions or inconsistencies, Ian Leask notices vaguely that
whereas Locke seemed to embark on a critique of faith by reason—the independence of
reason and the weakness of faith—he in the end makes room for instances where faith
overcomes reason.10

attempt to clarify important terms such as reason or superstition, the latter being Randall’s term and not
Locke’s. James O’Higgins, Anthony Collins: The Man and His Works (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1970), 52. O’Higgins writes this single cryptic statement on Locke: “Locke, however, admitted verbally at
least, the existence of truths above reason” (52). From the surrounding context of this quotation, this
chapter takes O’Higgins to mean Locke allows that there are some truths that should be believed but when
put together cannot be reconciled or imagined. William Uzgalis, “Anthony Collins,” Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, first published Mon Aug 25, 2003 with substantive revisions Mon Feb 23, 2009 (accessed
on March 13, 2009) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collins. Uzgalis appears admittedly uncertain exactly
what is being said by Locke and others in regards to what it means that things are above reason (13-14).
9

John C. Biddle, “Locke’s Critique of Innate Principles and Toland’s Deism,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 37, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 1976): 411-422 [quote from p. 415]. What Biddle writes regarding
Locke’s understanding of the relationship of revelation and reason is helpful. He does seem surprised how
we could have assurance in revelation when it is only a matter of probability (416). He also, with no
evidence of doubt, claims the Trinity would fit into the category of things above reason (422).
10

Ian Leask, “Personation and immanent undermining: On Toland’s Appearing Lockean,” British
Journal for the History of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2010): 231-256 [241-243 referenced above]. Leask also
gives no evidence that he realizes the distinction between propositions “above reason” and propositions
contrary to natural probability (243). That is propositions above reason are propositions that we would not
be expected to think of on our own, but if we did, we would not have any grounds for assenting to it, or,
equally, not be able to arrive at a probability on purely natural considerations that is for or against it. But
there are other propositions that are also from revelation but are not above reason; they are simply contrary
to natural probability (Essay IV.xviii.7-8). He also thinks that Locke’s ideas of substance would fit into the
above reason category (251-2). Moreover, Leask indirectly calls Locke inconsistent since he claims Toland
applied Locke’s principles to revelation more consistently than did Locke: “Rather, the distinction between
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What is more, many who comment at length on Locke’s views on reason and
revelation or reason and faith strive to reconcile statements Locke makes that seem
inconsistent or even contradictory or at least point out the seeming incongruities.11 A
subset of this group are those that rightly acknowledge that faith regarding divinely
revealed propositions can overturn reasonable probability, and thus reason is subordinate
to faith in such instances. But they become perplexed by virtue of the duties that are
ascribed to reason—duties that this chapter ascribes to the proper office of reason, or
proper reason—that, on the other hand, seem to make faith regarding divine revelation
subordinate to reason. Richard Ashcraft and Alan P.F. Sell fall into this subset.12

them was far more to do with Toland’s greater consistency in applying Lockean principles to the questions
of revealed mystery—the results of which consistency were now horribly evident” (247). Leask does not
appear to have followed the Locke-Stillingfleet debate very closely. It seems he is trying to prove
Stillingfleet’s original charge that Toland was more consistent with the Essay’s foundational
epistemological principles than was Locke.
11

Chapter 3 will argue that the source of these inconsistent or seemingly contradictory statements
is the multiple considerations of faith and reason Locke employs in the Essay.
12

Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy,” in John Locke: Problems and
Perspectives, ed. by John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194-223. Ashcraft
struggles to define the correct relationship between faith and reason. He notices rightly that there is an
unexpected shift in the description of faith in chapter xviii of book IV of the Essay. Whereas faith and
opinion were once identified prior to IV.xviii, that changes. He calls Locke’s treatment of the relationship
of faith and reason in the Essay unclear, inconsistent, and contradictory (215-216). After assessing the
implications of the Essay and ROC, Ashcraft remarks, “If, ultimately, the epistemological views of Locke,
the Christian, cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with those of Locke, the philosopher, it is the faith of the
former which ensures the salvation of the latter.” In other words, Ashcraft is saying that the inconsistencies
in the Essay are not reconciled by what is found elsewhere in Locke other than the fact that he believes
Locke’s goal was to emphasize and legitimize the importance of faith over reason in his overall program
(223). Alan P. F. Sell, John Locke and the Eighteenth-Century Divines (Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
1997), 97. Alan P. F. Sell seems likewise concerned: “It is hardly surprising that, given Locke’s oscillation
between the view that reason judges Scripture and is therefore in some sense above Scripture, and his less
frequently expressed opinion that God can give a revelation which goes ‘against the probable conjectures of
reason,’ some divines should emphasize the former position and others the latter” (97). Sell is sensing
rightly the tensions inherent in the vulgar faith and vulgar reason contradistinction that Locke shows to be
ultimately untenable. That is, vulgar reason is forced to assist vulgar faith as vulgar faith must rely on
vulgar reason for the identification of revelation as such and the interpretations of revelation. In my mind
this subset is the best of those operating with a notion of reason simpliciter as they see the resulting
inconsistencies and hold them in tension, as opposed to distorting the Essay as some do.
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Wioletta Polinska reads Locke similar to the way that Sell and Ashcraft read him.
She acknowledges, like Sell and Ashcraft, that Locke asserts that revelation can overturn
the dictates of reasonable probability made apart from revelation. She also acknowledges
some seemingly incongruous Lockean statements on faith and reason and reason and
revelation as Ashcraft and Sell do, but thinks that faith and reason are not to be placed in
a hierarchical relationship. In other words, while Polinska acknowledges that there are
aspects of Locke’s teaching where reason appears to be authoritative—reason must
identify revelation as being revealed, reason must interpret revelation, and revelation
cannot contradict knowledge—faith and reason are to be understood as compatible
because faith can overturn divinely-unassisted reasonable probability. 13 When Locke
writes, “Reason must be the last Guide and Judge in every Thing,” in his chapter “On
Enthusiasm,” what he really intends to convey is the rule that reason must be utilized to
reject revelations that are contrary to knowledge and to Scripture. 14
Furthermore, another subset of thinkers shares the common general assertion that
if reason and revelation are ever in conflict, Locke assumes that revelation must submit:
Paul Helm, David C. Snyder, and R.S. Woolhouse. Helm believes that according to
Locke revelation cannot be allowed to overturn reasonable probability.15 Helm’s reading

13

Polinska, Wioletta, “Faith and Reason in John Locke,” Philosophy and Theology, 11, no. 2
(1999): 287-309.
14

Polinska, “Faith and Reason in John Locke,” 305. Some might interpret her as saying that faith
and reason are complimentary in that when they are identified with divine and natural revelation they will
not, if viewed correctly, contradict one another. However, this goes without saying in Locke scholarship.
That is, of course Locke would assert that general and special revelation should agree. Also, while not
referencing Sell, she is tending to one of Locke’s statements that gives him pause. Sell, John Locke, 93. Her
express primary interlocutors are David C. Snyder and Roger Woolhouse, who will be discussed below.
15

Paul Helm, “Locke on Faith and Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly 23, no. 90 (Jan.,
1973): 52-66. Near the beginning of the article in discussing the role that reason has in interpretation he
believes that Locke is asserting that an internal mark of a revelation is that it is possible to be interpreted
not contrary to knowledge or probability when Locke writes: “Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent
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of Locke, as pointed out in chapter two, is actually the rule Locke charges Stillingfleet
with logically holding in the bishop’s defense of the immortality of the soul. David C.
Snyder and R.S. Woolhouse show no evidence that they think that reason has anything to
do with probability or opinion.16 Interestingly, this is similar at one point to Stillingfleet’s
reading of Locke, simply in that reason results in only knowledge.
Moreover, the only scholar to my knowledge who recognizes that Locke is
working with multiple senses of the term reason is Nicholas Jolley.17 His work is worthy
of a few initial comments. First, and generally speaking, he is primarily interested in
making the distinction between two different senses of reason known and the immediate
consequences of it, but does not venture into clearing up the many places in the Essay
that trouble scholars. He is clear that anything beyond that goes beyond the goal of his
study. Second, Jolley thinks that Locke is trying to be deceptive with the sense of reason
Locke focuses on in Essay IV.xviii.

with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith,
wherein reason has nothing to do” (Essay IV.18.10). He fails to pay attention to the “clear and self-evident”
that precedes “dictates of reason.” This is a round about way of saying certain knowledge; reasonable
probability is not self-evident. Also, Helm creatively comes up with a reading that frames Locke working
simultaneously with two theses in the Essay that appears rather convincing if it were not for his
subordination of revelation to natural or vulgar reason. In the end he is unable to fully reconcile Locke’s
various statements based on his two theses theory. That is no surprise due to his conceiving of reason
simpliciter and his other mentioned misreading.
16

David C. Snyder, “Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47, no. 2
(Apr.-Jun., 1986): 197-213. He is clearly operating with a faith-versus-reason distinction such that reason
has nothing to do with probable belief, not even in non-divine revelation matters. In other words, Snyder
thinks Locke’s reason only gives knowledge, when in truth it gives probability and thus, if the mind is
being rational, belief as well. This allows him to make the incorrect conclusion faith cannot contradict
reason, the correct statement being faith (proper or vulgar) cannot contradict knowledge (if the mind is
operating rationally). R.S. Woolhouse, Locke (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 140143. Woolhouse has the same faith-versus-reason distinction. The idea that Locke’s reason results only in
knowledge was also held by Stillingfleet as discussed in chapter two. It seems unlikely they adopted their
views from Stillingfleet, as it seems likely that most Locke scholars have not dove into that prolix and
cumbersome debate.
17

Nicholas Jolley, “Locke on Faith and Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay
Concerning Human Understanding,’ ed. by Lex Newman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
436-455.
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There are a few other related issues upon which scholars take different stances,
one being the size of the compass of the faculty called reason. From some of the scholars
listed above, one might reasonably infer what they might say on the matter. However, of
those that comment specifically on the question, Michael Ayers believes reason is the
natural faculties in general.18 Nicholas Jolley points out that the narrow sense or
discovery sense of reason has to do with finding out probability as well as the certainty of
propositions and it is the broader sense of reason that Locke equates to the natural
faculties in general.19 Nicholas Wolterstorff, unlike Jolley, does not read Locke as
operating with the double sense of the term reason, and thus understands the Essay
IV.xviii’s definition of reason as Locke’s official one. He believes reason to be
“specifically, that faculty whereby we discover arguments and ‘perceive’ their logical
force, thereby also forming beliefs as to the cogency of the inferences of which those
arguments are the content.” Wolterstorff takes issue with readings of Locke that make out
all psychological faculties to be reason because Locke acknowledges that we hold and
even assent to irrational beliefs. 20

18

Michael Ayers, Locke Volume 1: Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 1991), 121. Ayers
believes that Locke’s “[e]vident purpose in the chapters ‘Of Faith and Reason’ and ‘Of Enthusiasm’ was to
clip the wings of revelation by subordinating it to ‘reason’, i.e., to the natural faculties in general.” His
comments on ulterior motives by Locke regarding revelation aside, Ayers is correct in what he affirms
about the relationship between reason and revelation. However, his comments, though correct, are too
general and unsupported to be of interest.
19
20

Jolley, “Locke on Faith and Reason,” 442. Jolley cites Essay IV.xviii.3 for his support.

Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: University Press, 1996)
[quote taken from p. 87]. Wolterstorff is working from IV.xviii’s definition of reason as Locke’s official
definition, but he does quote and build upon the definition of reason from Essay IV.xvii (88). I believe he
thinks Locke is mistaken when in IV.xvii.2 Locke makes reasoning or illation or inference a part of reason
(88n75, 89). Wolterstorff believes that illation or inference assents to opinion; and if this is allowed to be
part of reason, we would contradictorily admit that our faculty of reason that does not err makes bad
judgments at times. This work of Wolterstorff finds its start in: Nicholas Wolterstorff, “John Locke’s
Epistemological Piety: Reason is the Candle of the Lord,” Faith and Philosophy 11, no. 4 (Oct 1994): 572591.
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Still there is another important issue, and it deals with the question: What does
Locke say regarding reason and the Bible? Helm argues that it doesn’t make sense for
Locke to call the Bible “infallibly true” (Essay III.iii.23) when believing the Bible to be
true is based on testimony and thus only probable; in other words, “‘it is probable that p
is infallibly true’ reduces to ‘p is probably true.’”21 Snyder, responding to Helm’s
concerns, explains that Locke “is simply asserting either that their source, God, is
infallible, and so they [revelation propositions] in fact provide an unshakable foundation
for morality and religion, or that they could afford us full assurance of faith if we could
certainly know that they are revealed.”22 Other than that, he has his own concerns about
Locke. Snyder’s biggest issues derive from the fact that Locke understands belief and
knowing to be two distinct acts. First, considering that faith involves doubt in the
revelation being revealed and knowledge comes only by natural means, one cannot
properly categorize the Biblical writers who were certain the revelation came from
God.23 Snyder believes this problem is compounded when one considers that a teaching
of Scripture is that through faith one can have knowledge (Hebrews 11:8-19).24 Second,
Snyder acknowledges that Locke conceives of a distinction between certainty and
assurance, but “he is being less than honest [with Stillingfleet] when he concludes that as
a result he never says or implies that therefore we cannot have full assurance of faith.”25

21

Helm, “Locke on Faith and Knowledge,” 57-58.

22

Snyder, “Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay,” 206.

23

Snyder, “Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay,” 207.

24

Snyder, “Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay,” 210.

25

Snyder, “Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay,” 211.
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Moreover, Wolterstorff points out issues involving miracles as external indicators of
revelation that are problematic, namely, “how much of a biblical writer’s book is
confirmed by a particular miracle?”26 Polinska responds to some of these challenges. She
argues that faith is based on probability and has only fallible interpretations, whereas the
infallibility attributed to Scripture is based on the divine character of God, the one
believed to have given it. She also argues that certainty is ascribed to knowledge and its
analogue of sorts, or highest degree of reasonable conviction, in the act of believing, is
assurance.27
Another issue that deserves mention is the question of whether Locke is a
necessitarian or libertarian. One of the largest sticking points in the discussion is how the
suspension of judgment is to be understood. Locke’s younger friend and necessitarian,
Anthony Collins, criticizes Locke either for admitting of occasions of liberty or because
his discussions of the suspension of the judgment can be read that way.28 This is
important as Collins was proclaimed by Locke to understand the Essay better than
anyone he knew.29 Libertarian Samuel Clarke, in his comments on Locke’s suspension,
called Locke “much perplexed.” From the context, it is not clear if he means that he
thinks Locke was confused and did not know it or he was confused and did know it.30 In
26

Wolterstorff, “John Locke and the Ethics of Belief,” 132.

27

Polinska, “Faith and Reason in John Locke,” 291-297.

28

Anthony Collins, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, 2nd Edition, Corrected
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short, from the generation coming after Locke, some were not pleased with his lack of
clarity or consistency. The libertarian versus necessitarian interpretation of Locke
continues today but this chapter will not enter the lists with contemporary scholarship on
this issue.31 It will suffice to point out the problematic nature of the suspension of
judgment when pertinent.

Part II: Preliminaries
Before extrapolating on reason, there are several preliminary concepts to cover,
some more or less in detail depending on what the later sections in this chapter require.
In other words, a few concepts will be treated here, and will be built upon later on in the
chapter. These notions bear directly upon our discussion of reason and are, in fact,
discussed by Locke in building up to his discussion on reason. The terms that will be
briefly discussed here are: knowledge, judgment, and assent.
Chapter 2 already revealed a few things related to knowledge. There it was
specifically discussed as the result of the employment of powers by the mind.
“Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas (IV.i.2).” Inherent in the
definition are the notions of knowledge as a faculty or power and the notion of
knowledge as a result of the employment of that faculty or power. There are four sorts of
knowledge in the resultant sense: identity and diversity, relation in general, co-existence
or necessary connection, and real existence (IV.i.3). He gives the following examples of
31
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the four sorts: “Thus Blue is not Yellow, if of Identity. Two Triangles upon equal Basis,
between two Parallels are equal, is of Relation. Iron is susceptible of magnetical
Impressions, is of Co-existence, God is, is of real Existence” (IV.i.7). Moreover, the
power of knowledge is that which gives us certainty. 32 If one knows something that
person is, by definition, certain about it.
There are three methods or routes by which the mind comes to have knowledge
and be certain in degrees: intuition, demonstration, and sensation. The last, sensation, is
not technically certainty but the high degree of assurance deserves the name of
knowledge, according to Locke (IV.xi.3). Our powers of sensation give us a certainty of
things that is not as secure as we are capable of in other circumstances, but it is all that
our condition requires as ordained by God (IV.xi.8). Intuition is when the mind simply
sees the truth without mental discourse by the use of the faculty of distinct perception
(IV.ii.5). The resultant intuitive knowledge is the most certain (IV.ii.1). The next degree
of knowledge, demonstration, is achieved by the method that goes by the same name. The
power of sagacity—or the quickness of the mind to find these intermediate ideas and
apply them rightly—aids in the mind’s building of indubitable proofs that comprises the
method of demonstration (IV.ii.2). According to Ayers, the perception in demonstration
and sensation are not fallible. What makes them have a lower degree of certainty is a
lower security from “the error of taking ourselves to perceive (or have perceived) what is
not (or was not) really perceived.”33
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Knowledge is one of two faculties Locke affords a certain pre-eminence. Locke
writes, “Thus the Mind has two Faculties, conversant about Truth and Falsehood. First,
Knowledge, whereby it [the Mind] certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the
agreement or disagreement of any Ideas” (IV.xiv.4). In sum, the term knowledge thus
refers both to a power or faculty and that power’s end (Cf. IV.xiii), perception, and the
mind has three methods by which to attain these perceptions.34
The second faculty, “conversant about Truth and Falsehood,” and our last main
topic in this subsection, is judgment (IV.xiv.4). This is what we must rely on in issues
where knowledge cannot be had, and what we do rely on sometimes out of laziness,
unskillfulness, or haste, where knowledge could be had. Judgment is the faculty
“whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to agree, or disagree; or which is the same, any
Proposition to be true, or false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the
Proofs” (IV.xiv.3). He expands further:
As Demonstration is the shewing the agreement, or disagreement of two Ideas, by
the intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and
visible connexion one with another; so Probability is nothing but the appearance
of such an agreement, or disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose
connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least not perceived to be so, but is,
or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge
the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary (IV.xv.1).
In other words, in demonstration the yield is knowledge by the linking together of
intuitive connections; and probability is the appearance of agreement or disagreement
that is sufficient for the mind to judge accordingly, but without the certainty that
accompanies the former. Whereas indubitable proofs are required for demonstrative
knowledge, probability, “likeliness to be true,” is what is required for faith, belief, assent,
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or opinion (IV.xv.3). All of the grounds of probability are what ought to be considered by
the mind in judgment when conditions warrant it (IV.xv.5).
Probability supplies the defect in our knowledge and helps to guide us where it
fails (IV.xv.4). Again, when our mind judges a proposition true based on probability, this
is not knowledge, but something else: belief, faith, assent, or opinion (IV.xv.2-3).
Moreover, probability is grounded by “First, The conformity of any thing with our
Knowledge, Observation, and Experience,” and “Secondly, the Testimony of others,
couching their Observation and Experience” (IV.xv.4). “In the Testimony of others, is to
be considered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witnesses. 4. The
Design of the Author. 5. The Consistency of the Parts, and Circumstances of the Relation.
6. Contrary Testimonies” (IV.xv.4). The mind ought to examine all grounds of
probability and see how each makes the proposition more or less probable. Upon a due
balancing by the mind, which occurs “if it will proceed rationally,” the proposition will,
or at least should, be rejected or received with more or less assent “proportionably to the
preponderancy of the greater grounds of Probability on one side or the other” (IV.xv.5).
There is another ground of assent, other than conformity and testimony that is not
legitimate, and that is authority, or taking a proposition that is merely one’s opinion to be
true on that person’s say-so. In other words, one must be convinced from their own
reasoning and study into a particular matter, or from the veracity of the claims of
another’s knowledge, and not to be influenced by the respect of or deference to an
esteemed person’s or group’s opinion (IV.xv.6; IV.xix.18).

105
Locke finds the implicit faith corresponding to authority as a basis of assent
especially dangerous in religion (IV.xv.6).35 For one, each person rationally ought to be
exceedingly concerned about the eternal state of his or her soul (IV.xix.3-6). And for any
doubtful of his natural, rational argument of this intellectual burden each of us carries (or
the intellectual abilities God has given us to assent rationally in matters of religion, and
therefore the obligation to do so), despite our own low estimation of our mental abilities,
he argues the same in discussing the nature of Scripture and the Christian’s
corresponding individual and obligatory response to it in his theological treatise, ROC,
and its two vindications. It is one’s individual duty as a kingdom member to understand
the duties and doctrines for one’s self.36 He writes:
That every Man should receive from others, or make to himself such a System of
Christianity as he found most conformable to the Word of God, according to the
best of his understanding, is what I never spake against, but think it every one’s
Duty to Labour for, and to take all opportunities as long as he lives, by Studying
the Scriptures every day, to perfect.37
In fact, while God forbids that we treat anyone as our infallible interpreter, we can and
must rely on the Spirit of God.38 He believes that Christendom would have more
Christians if “reading and study of the Scripture were more pressed” and people were
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sent to the Bible for religion as opposed to having it “put into their hands only to find the
Opinions of their peculiar Sect or Party.”39
There are several degrees of assent. These “are, or ought to be regulated” by the
grounds of probability (IV.xvi.1). Due diligence in this area should be increased based on
the gravity of the issues at hand (IV.xvi.3, IV.xix.2-340). There are two types of
propositions “we receive upon Inducements of Probability”: matters of fact or that which
are capable of human testimony and speculation or that which are beyond our senses41
(IV.xvi.5). Locke starts discussion with the matters of fact or that which is capable of
human testimony. The first and highest degree of assent is assurance. This occurs when
propositions testified of by fair witnesses are supported by our never-failing experience.
Examples of these are properties of bodies and proceedings of causes and effects in the
course of nature. “These Probabilities rise so near Certainty, that they govern our
Thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the most evident
demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them
and certain Knowledge” (IV.xv.6). The next degree is confidence and it is produced in
two different scenarios. The first scenario is when a fact is attested by numerous,
undoubted witnesses and conforms to one’s own occasional experiences (IV.xvi.7). The
second scenario that produces confidence is when the truth of a proposition could not
benefit anyone and it is attested by many unsuspected witnesses and contradicted by none
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(IV.xvi.8).42 The above propositions and described contexts “leaves us as little at liberty
to believe, or disbelieve, as Demonstration does.”43 This is not the case when experience
contradicts testimony and/or testimony contradicts testimony. In any of these instances,
judging rightly requires diligence. There are so many factors and issues to consider that
Locke does not attempt to describe the situations associated with subsequent levels of
assent. He remarks:
this only may be said in general, That as the Arguments and Proofs, pro and con,
upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular Circumstance, shall to
any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree, to
preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such
Entertainment, as we call Belief, Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust,
Disbelief, etc. (IV.xvi.9).
Thus, instead of going through the lengthy descriptions of the situations and scenarios
that induce the mind to varying degrees of assent commonly called conjecture, guess,
doubt, etc., he simply reiterates the point that every pertinent matter must be weighed and
considered.
Locke then turns his focus to assent in matters where human testimony cannot be
had. These matters include finite immaterial beings, material things too small to be
observed with our bare senses, material things too far away to be observed with our bare
senses (extraterrestrials, distant planets, etc.), and the causes of the sensible effects that
we experience in nature. Locke says very little regarding assent in these matters. He only
relays that analogy is the only help that we have. We typically observe gradual
connections throughout nature that leave no discernible gap. So, for instance, just as we
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see a gradual connection, or chain of life, moving from humans downward, it would
appear likely that there are a ranks of beings between humans and God. Thus we can
interpolate and extrapolate based on our sensible observations in the areas of natural
philosophy. Other than that, he says little other than that we draw all our grounds of
probability from analogy in these instances. But it is “This sort of Probability, which is
the best Conduct of rational Experiments, and the Rise of Hypothesis has also its Use and
Influence: and a wary Reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of
Truths, and useful Productions, which would otherwise lie concealed.” (IV.xvi.12).
In this discussion of judgment and degrees of assent, Locke also discusses
miracles and revelation. Whereas assurance is produced by the ordinary course of things
and fair testimony, there is one case—namely miracles—where the strangeness, or
contrariety to the ordinary course of things, with fair witnesses are sufficient to produce
assent. Miracles should be considered possible as God is able to change the course of
nature. Moreover, just as the greater number of fair witnesses will tend to increase the
firmness of assent, so will the greater the outlandishness of the event. In short, these
miracles are used by God to give credit to God’s revelation (IV.xvi.13). This comports
with what Locke says in ROC regarding revelation and miracles:
For though it be as easie to Omnipotent Power to do all things by an immediate
over-ruling Will; and so to make any Instruments work, even contrary to their
Nature, in Subserviency to his ends; Yet his Wisdom is not usually at the expence
of Miracles (if I may so say) but only in cases that require them, for the
evidencing of some Revelation or Mission to be from him. He does constantly
(unless where the confirmation of some Truth requires it otherwise) bring about
his Purposes by means operating according to their Natures. If it were not so, the
course and evidence of things would be confounded: Miracles would lose their
name and force, and there could be no distinction between Natural and
Supernatural.44
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In short, God uses miracles sparingly, as it would seem, and uses them as external
indicators or marks that a message or mission is from Him.
The section following the aforementioned IV.xvi.13 is extremely dense and will
not be treated fully here. For accuracy purposes it will be treated later in this chapter,
once the relationship between reason and revelation has been discussed more extensively,
as Locke might recommend. Locke writes this ending to the section: “But of Faith [faith
in divinely revealed propositions], and the Precedency it ought too have before other
Arguments of Persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is
ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to Reason: though in Truth, it be nothing else but
an Assent founded on the highest Reason.” There are two important things to notice.
First, and most importantly, Locke says that at a later time he will set faith in divine
revelation in contrast to reason, although it is really assent or the result of the act of
rationally assenting.45 That is why revelation is included in the chapter on assent, chapter
xvi. Second, it appears, at least some propositions that one assents to as being divinely
revealed will have a precedence or priority over all other persuasions, a thing that Paul
Helm and others deny.46

Part III: Reason
It is not until Chapter xvii, “Of Reason,” that Locke formally begins his
discussion on reason. After giving several senses in which others use the term reason,
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Locke gives his lengthy definition. Reason is needed for the enlargement of our
knowledge, as was indicated earlier by its role in demonstration, and for “regulating our
Assent.” The extended definition of reason is crucial for understanding what he really
intends by the term reason throughout most of the Essay. This definition is also important
for understanding the disagreements that have arisen regarding the interpretation of
reason. Thus the lengthy definition will be given in full, but segmented by numbers in
brackets inserted into the text of the definition.
[1] What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our
Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do, both in Knowledge and
Opinion, and is [2] necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties,
and indeed contains two of them, [3] viz. Sagacity and Illation: By the one, it
finds out, and by the other, it so orders the intermediate Ideas, as to discover the
connexion there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held
together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth sought for, which is
that we call Illation or Inference, and consists in nothing but the Perception of the
connexion there is between the Ideas, in each step of the deduction, whereby the
Mind comes to see, either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two
Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable
connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion [4]. . . And in
those Cases, where we are fain to substitute Assent instead of Knowledge, and
take Propositions for true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find
out, examine, and compare the grounds of their Probability. [5] In both these
Cases, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to
discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call
Reason. [6] For as Reason perceives the necessary, and indubitable connexion of
all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each step of any Demonstration that
produces Knowledge; [7] so it likewise perceives the probable connexion all the
Ideas or Proofs one to another, in every step of a Discourse, to which it will think
Assent due. [8] This is the lowest degree of that, which can be truly called
Reason: For where the Mind does not perceive this probable connexion; where it
does not discern, whether there be any such connexion, or no, there Men’s
Opinions are not the product of Judgment, or the consequence of Reason; but the
effects of Chance and Hazard, of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without
choice, and without direction (IV.xvii.2).
In summary, [1] the faculty of reason has functions pertaining to knowledge and assent
and [2] it contains (at least) two other faculties: sagacity and illation. [3] Sagacity here, as
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in the description of the demonstrative process described earlier, finds the intermediate
ideas, and illation indicates the surety (certainty or degree of confidence) two ideas have.
In the end reason displays to the mind either certainty—and the mind has knowledge—or
the probability of a proposition. [4] When we do not have certainty but are only able to
assent or dissent we must consider and weigh the related factors and their associated
probabilities. [5] Reason is the faculty that obtains knowledge and probability. [6] It
obtains knowledge through indubitable demonstration and [7] determines and assesses
probabilities. In regards to probability, reason gives the mind a recommendation for
assenting or dissenting. [8] The lowest type of reasoning we have is that which ascertains
probability. But if we didn’t have that, decisions and beliefs would be given to chance.
This interpretation of reason runs counter to important scholarship on the issue.
While the above interpretation claims that reason offers [7] recommendations to the mind
in instances where only probability can be had, Jolley’s and Ayers’s interpretations rule
this out as they indicate from clear textual evidence that reason is the natural faculties in
general.47 In other words, this claim that reason comprises the natural faculties in general
appears to make the mind interchangeable with reason.48 Jolley references a quote
subsequent to the one above from the Essay in this regard: “For our simple Ideas then,
which are the Foundation, and sole Matter of all our Notions, and Knowledge, we must
depend wholly on our Reason, I mean, our natural Faculties” [emphasis mine]
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(IV.xviii.3; Cf. IV.xviii.2).49 To allow Reason to be the sum total of our natural faculties
would include the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of judgment, the faculty through
which the mind assents, or takes something only probable to be true (IV.xiv.3). Against
the position held by Ayers and Jolley that reason is the totality of the natural faculties, as
it appears to be in the quote from IV.xviii above, one could argue a separation between
reason and the “distinguishing faculty” that perceives agreement or disagreement of two
ideas in intuition. That is, one could argue that intuition has no need of reasoning and
thus this distinguishing faculty is likely conceived of by Locke as being separate from
reason (IV.i.1; IV.xiii.1). But it is possible that that distinguishing faculty (or faculty of
distinct perception) is the very same faculty used by reason to acknowledge the
indubitable connection between two steps in a proof (IV.ii.5-6). In fact it is likely as
Locke does not find it helpful to talk about faculties as if they were agents but rather
faculties as being the powers or abilities the body and mind have (II.xxi.20). In other
words, the power to perceive agreement or disagreement immediately in intuition is the
same power to perceive agreement or disagreement or identity and diversity immediately
in a step in a demonstrative proof. So, the distinguishing faculty is likely a part of the
whole called reason, which comports with reason being all the natural faculties in the
quote pointed out by Jolley. What is more, it appears that the faculty of knowledge could
be subsumed entirely under the faculty of reason as reason can result in knowledge.
This likelihood that knowledge is part of reason, however, does not fully explain
the aforementioned distinction between reason and the mind in Locke’s definition of
reason. The mind has the powers or faculties of understanding or perceiving and willing
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or preferring (II.xxi.6). Presumably the mind has all of the intellectual faculties or
powers. In [2] reason is said to assist our other powers or faculties, while reason contains
two faculties itself. Presumably all faculties discussed in the definition of reason are
mental. The part cannot be the whole so reason cannot be the total of the mind’s faculties
or powers. Furthermore, in [3] Locke says that the mind, and not reason, gives or
withholds assent. Again, Locke appears to be proposing that reason recommends to the
mind where it thinks assent due in [6] and [7]: “[6] For as Reason perceives the
necessary, and indubitable connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each
step of any Demonstration that produces Knowledge: [7] so it likewise perceives the
probable connexion all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in every step of a Discourse, to
which it will think Assent due.” Thus the phrase at the end of [7] just quoted, “to which it
will think Assent due,” is better interpreted as “to which reason recommends Assent to
the mind” as opposed to “to which reason assents for the mind.” Further support for the
former interpretation is that the latter interpretation effectively negates “think” in “think
Assents,” making think and assent the same action and thus a useless redundancy in the
definition.
The discussion regarding how it is possible that the sum total of the mind’s
powers can be identified with reason in one sense by Locke, as pointed out by Jolley and
Ayers, and distinguished in another by Locke, however, has not been answered. This
recommendation function that reason might have is consistent with an “oughtness” that
Locke associates often with judgment. For instance, where Locke is discussing the use of
probability in assent, he notes that the grounds of probability, supplied by reason, are “the
measure whereby its [Assent’s] several degrees are, or ought to be regulated” [emphasis
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mine] (IV.xvi.1). Thus, this quote might be read as implying the mind’s ability to avoid
following the guidance of the probability supplied by reason. There is another location in
the same general vicinity that appears to advance this same sense of oughtness in
following reason. While Locke describes situations where sometimes the intermediate
ideas are tied so tightly together with the extremes in a probable proof that assent
necessarily follows, especially in indifferent matters (IV.xvi.6-9), and thus the
recommendation would functionally be a determination, this might not always be the case
based on a quote from the very next chapter: “The great Excellency and Use of the
Judgment, is to observe Right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each
Probability; and then casting them up all right together, chuse that side which has the
overbalance” (IV.xvii.16). In other words this last citation might be read as saying we
should judge reasonably or, equally, the proper “Use” of the judgment is to follow
reason’s findings on reasonable probability (Cf. II.xxi.67), and not simply that we ought
to employ reason, which results in the determination of our mind.
Regardless of whether this is the correct reading of this last quote or not, there is
support for this sentiment of “oughtness” elsewhere or, in other words, the implied ability
of the mind not to follow its conclusions arrived at through the employment of reason. In
the chapter of “Wrong Assent and Errour,” Locke notes instances when judgment will
actually take the less probable side. In one area he describes general ways in which the
mind can avoid the most apparent probabilities: 1) ceasing the weighing of the evidence
built and continually mounting, or at least rapidly building, in a particular proposition’s
favor, and not employing reason in examining the issue any further or thoroughly, and 2)
suspending the assent to a proposition that is already due, and thus, by default, taking
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what is in fact the less probable side for the time-being (IV.xix.12-14).50 Locke gives a
somewhat amusing real-life scenario where one avoids the most apparent probabilities.
He says, “Tell a Man, passionately in Love, that he is gilted; bring a score of Witnesses
of the Falshood of his Mistress, ‘tis ten to one but three kind Words of hers, shall
invalidate all their Testimonies . . . What suits our Wishes, is forwardly believed”
(IV.xix.12). He subsequently describes the arguments in which such a one will likely
attempt to alleviate some of the mental discomfort created by the preponderance of
testimonies to the contrary side. One can console oneself by dismissing the disturbingly
or uncomfortably reasonable argument by focusing on the fact that the argument might
have a fallacy latent in it or that one does not know yet what is to be said on the contrary
side (IV.xix.13-14).51 Besides, “One does not want to act rashly!” is a true (and easily
abused) life principle. Despite this ability to avoid obvious probabilities, Locke concludes
that upon a full examination with reason, and thus an accompanying willingness to
possibly greatly inconvenience oneself, judgment will always go to the most probable
side (IV.xix.15-16). In short, Locke does conceive of instances where the mind will not
follow reason’s recommendation. But other than that, reason is, in a sense, the natural
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faculties when the mind heeds reason’s recommendations in operation, which is most of
the time.52
Although this explanation of in what sense reason can be the natural faculties is
helpful, that the mind can suspend assent in some instances in which reason and
probability are involved but is necessarily determined by reason’s recommendations in
another has been a source of no little controversy from the beginning.53 It is possible that
Locke intends for strong inclinations, just like false hypotheses, to be mistaken by the
mind for knowledge, and thus there is no oddity in a high probability given by the mind
engaged in reasoning to be subordinated by the mind itself to something it mistakes as
knowledge. And then a full examination prompted by a suspiciously high probability
would encompass the examination of proofs and the root of the so-called knowledge and
thus a suspension of judgment until all is settled. In short, in this general scenario, the
mind realized it may have employed reason properly but from incorrect premises and
then corrects for it. But that does not seem what he is attempting to convey when
discussing the mind judging irrationally and the nature of suspense in IV.xix.12-16,
referenced above. In Locke’s descriptions found there, it appears as though the mind has
a nagging suspicion or uneasiness supplied from reason that it (the mind) might not be
52
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judging correctly or at least it is doing so without sufficient information, as in the case of
the jilted lover. The mind can stop rational inquiries and avoid a thorough examination of
a situation that at first glance appears likely to yield an unfavorable answer.
What is more, the suggestion made here, that the mind can avoid being guided by
reason, has support through an analogue in the area of knowledge. Locke notes instances
where the mind actually decides against what knowledge would say is certain! 54 The
Roman Catholics, for instance, believe that the bread in the Lord’s Supper is the body,
contrary to their sensitive knowledge and the intuitive knowledge that a body cannot be
in two places at once and other like instances (IV.xix.10; IV.xviii.5). Nevertheless, either
reason is the natural faculties or reason can be equated to the natural faculties when the
mind is acting reasonably. The weight of the evidence tilts the scales in favor of the latter.
“Acting reasonably,” in the statement, “reason can be equated to the natural
faculties when the mind is acting reasonably,” just made is deserving of a qualification.
In the above discussion, acting reasonably was described in regards to a specific case
where one judged contrary to the most apparent probabilities—what we typically call
lying to one’s self. In other words it is unreasonable for the mind to believe or act against
the dictates provided by reason. Locke would hardly think it reasonable, in a yet a
different sense, to treat every instance of mental uneasiness with a full examination.
Acting reasonably in general, then, does not encompass a full examination into every
possible issue that arises—“The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great
Concerns, will not bear delay” (IV.xvi.3)—but only on issues that are of great concern to
us such as morality or religion, or as Wolterstorff says, issues that are of “maximal
54
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concernment” (II.xxi.67-68).55 Although appropriated here in a somewhat different
context, C.S. Lewis’s assessment of scruples is apt here: “And scruples are always a bad
thing—if only because they distract us from real duties.”56 In short, acting or operating
reasonably is when the mind is working reasonably—reasonably in the sense of dictated
by reason and in the sense of corresponding to the appropriate thoroughness that the
circumstance warrants.
So far in this section, there are a few conclusions that come from pondering an
objection to this chapter’s claims that Locke’s definition of reason portrays reason as
recommending to the mind what it should believe (Essay IV.xvii.2). The objection, again,
is that this would make the sum total of the natural faculties distinct from the reason; and
some interpret the reason to be the sum total of all the natural faculties. Although
understanding reason as all of the natural faculties has some warrant, it does not account
for the instance where Locke acknowledges people believing against their reason. So, it
this chapter’s conclusion that reason is taken as the natural faculties when the mind is
acting reasonably. But even acting reasonably needs to be qualified. Acting reasonably
has both to do with heeding reason and the investigative thoroughness required by the
circumstance and importance of the issue at hand.
The other important scholarly assessment of Locke’s reason to which this chapter
objects is Nicholas Wolterstorff’s. Wolterstorff interprets Locke’s extended definition of
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reason somewhat differently and ultimately thinks Locke’s prevailing view of reason is
far narrower than this chapter’s or Jolley’s or Ayers’s. He believes that the fundamental
sense of reason that Locke operates with in the Essay is “the capacity to ‘perceive’ the
logical force of arguments.”57 This corresponds, for Wolterstorff, to the third degree of
reason spoken of in IV.xvii.3: “So that we may in Reason consider these four degrees; the
first and highest, is the discovering, and finding out of Proofs; the second, the regular and
methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order; the third is
perceiving their connexion, and the fourth, the making a right conclusion” [emphasis
mine]. Wolterstorff notes that “Locke’s subsequent discussion leaves little doubt that he
regards the third in the list as fundamental.” Part of his textual support for this comes
from IV.xvii.2’s definition of reason that he believes is describing reason’s capacity to
perceive indubitable and probable connections: “[8] This is the lowest degree of that,
which can be truly called Reason.” Wolterstorff thus claims that the “lowest degree”
means fundamental degree, as in the fundamental degree or aforementioned third degree
in the Essay IV.xvii.3.58
That the working sense or predominant sense of reason’s activity that Locke
employs in the Essay is not described best by all four degrees in concert but rather the
third degree alone is problematic for a few different reasons. First, it is unclear why
Wolterstorff claims that Locke’s “subsequent discussion leaves little doubt that he
regards the third in the list as fundamental.” The subsequent discussion is a lengthy
discourse on syllogisms that is in turn followed by a discussion of explanations of why
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and when reason fails us. In this latter portion, Locke talks of reason “proceeding”
(IV.xvii.12), being “puzzled” (IV.xvii.13), etc. These descriptions appear opposed to
Wolterstorff’s claims that Locke’s further treatment of reason shows that he conceives of
reason as merely perceiving connections or the logical force of an argument.
The second problem with Wolterstorff’s minimalistic interpretation of Locke’s
understanding of reason is that he wrongly believes it is stated in the quotation from
IV.xvii.2. That is, Wolterstorff thinks the following quotation from Locke’s definition of
reason shows that Locke primarily conceives of reason in a very narrow scope:
[6] For as Reason perceives the necessary, and indubitable connexion of all the
Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each step of any Demonstration that produces
Knowledge; [7] so it likewise perceives the probable connexion all the Ideas or
Proofs one to another, in every step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent
due. [8] This is the lowest degree of that, which can be truly called Reason
(IV.xvii.2).
So Wolterstorff believes the “lowest degree” of reason refers to the perception of
“indubitable” and “probable” connections. The quote above is, however, followed by
more:
[8] . . . For where the Mind does not perceive this probable connexion; where it
does not discern, whether there be any such connexion, or no, there Men’s
Opinions are not the product of Judgment, or the consequence or Reason; but the
effects of Chance and Hazard, of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without
choice, and without direction (IV.xvii.2).
Thus, the “lowest degree,” taken in its right context, is not in relation to the perception of
indubitable and probable connections, but rather pertains to the probable connection
alone. That is, if we had no abilities to construct probable proofs, we would act in a
random fashion in most circumstances where we did not have knowledge. So Locke is
not drawing boundaries around what Wolterstorff thinks is his fundamental and working
sense of reason in the main definition of reason. In other words, the “lowest degree” of
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reason in IV.xvii.2 is not equal to the third degree of reason in IV.xvii.3 as Wolterstorff
thinks.
There is still more that witnesses against Wolterstorff’s interpretation of reason
and claim that it is the predominant sense. For instance, near the beginning of the Essay,
Locke, in the context of deductions of our reason, writes, “For all Reasoning is search,
and casting about, and requires Pains and Application” (I.ii.10). Similarly, sagacity, the
faculty that discovers the middle terms, is part of reason in Locke’s treatment of
demonstration (IV.ii.3; IV.iii.2). These descriptions of reason are much more multidimensional and involved than Wolterstorff’s description of reason as perception of
logical force. These early utilizations of reason by Locke speak of reason searching and
casting about for ideas and constructing arguments and not just perceiving. Besides, it
does not seem likely that Locke would use a subordinate definition of reason in material
occurring before IV.xvii, the chapter that finally describes the faculty of reason in detail.
In the end, Locke might very well agree on some points with Wolterstorff, another
brilliant and accomplished philosopher. The agreement, however, would be on what
Locke should or could have said and not what he did say.
So far, in sum, reason is the faculty or power employed by the mind to obtain
demonstrative knowledge and probability and generally to assess situations and
problems. Reason is all of the natural faculties, for all intents and purposes, when the
mind acts reasonably—reasonably in the sense of dictated by its employment of reason
and in the sense of corresponding to the appropriate thoroughness that the circumstance
warrants. Only in cases of maximal concernment need the mind employ reason in a full
examination to that which it would otherwise give a lesser exertion.
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Part IV: Reason and Faith
The relationship between reason and faith and reason and revelation in Locke has
been a significant point of perplexity for Locke scholars. The main reason is that
IV.xviii’s definitions of reason and faith are set in contrast to one another, while in IV.xvxvi the judgment assents, believes, has faith in, or opines based on the probability
provided by reason (at least ideally). In Locke’s earlier treatment of assent, IV.xvi, he
incorporates revelation and miracles, or, in short, discussions of assent to or faith in
things divine. So, there are two major changes that take place in chapter xviii: 1) while
there was no distinction between faith, assent, belief, and opinion prior to xviii, faith is
separated from the rest and has only to do with revealed propositions in xviii; and 2)
while faith (and equally assent, belief, and opinion) prior to xviii should be based on the
probability supplied by reason, making faith a product of reason when the mind is acting
reasonably, they are set in contrast in IV.xviii.
This has been the source of confusion for some well-known Locke scholars.
Scholars such as Richard Ashcraft struggle to define the correct relationship between
faith and reason. He notices rightly that there is an unexpected shift in the description of
faith in chapter xviii of book IV of the Essay. Whereas faith and opinion were once
identified, in IV.xviii that is no longer the case. He calls Locke’s treatment of the
relationship of faith and reason in the Essay unclear, inconsistent, and contradictory.59
Also, there are scholars such as David C. Snyder and R.S. Woolhouse who show no
evidence that they realize that reason has anything to do with probability or opinion. It
appears as they somehow reconfigure what Locke had said about reason and faith prior to
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IV.xviii with the definitions of reason and faith he gives there.60 Perhaps they have kept
IV.xviii’s contradistinction of faith and reason, but identified pre-IV.xviii faith and
IV.xviii’s faith. In other words, for them, reason produces knowledge and anything not
certain is a matter of faith.61 Whatever the case may be, the potential for confusion in
understanding the Essay is rather high.
While IV.xviii’s definitions of faith and reason are considered by nearly all of
Locke scholarship as his official or intended definitions of faith and reason, this chapter
argues that they are nothing more than concessions to “vulgar” or common ways of
speaking. In chapter xviii, “Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces,” Locke
writes:
Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to Faith, I take to be the
discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the
Mind arrives at by Deductions made from such Ideas, which it has got by the use
of its natural Faculties, viz. by Sensation and Reflexion.
Faith, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made
out by the Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming
immediately from GOD; which we call Revelation (IV.xviii.2).
Thus Locke has negated the association of assent to divinely revealed propositions as
such from this new definition of reason. The new definition of reason does incorporate
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assent to propositions that are only probable; but this probability is based on reason
without the assistance or information provided by divine revelation.62
Contrary to Jolley, the only Locke scholar who notices that Locke uses two
definitions of reason, Locke is not toying with the Christians by giving new definitions of
faith and reason in IV.xviii wherein faith is still ultimately subordinated to its counterpart
despite Locke’s contradistinction of the two. Rather, Locke twice forewarns the reader of
this alternative construal of the elements of the epistemological faculties with which he
has been working. In Locke’s earlier discussion of probability, chapter xv, he writes,
“And herein lies the difference between Probability and Certainty, Faith and Knowledge,
that in all the parts of Knowledge, there is intuition; each immediate Idea, each step has
its visible connexion; in Belief not so” [emphasis mine] (IV.xv.3). There faith is nothing
more than assent or belief. But, in the last section of chapter IV.xvi, “Degrees of Assent,”
he refers to faith as the assent to divine revelation as such and its propositional content.
The last sentence of that chapter demonstrates, however, what he is planning: “But of
Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Persuasion, I shall
speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to
Reason: though in Truth, it be nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason”
(IV.xvi.14). In other words, faith is a function of reason (again, ideally), but Locke
notifies the reader that he will treat it “in contradistinction” to reason as is frequently
done. Also, this forthcoming contradistinction and the resulting new definitions of faith
and reason would explain the difference between “Reason” and the “highest Reason” in
62
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the quote. That is, reason might refer to the IV.xviii version of reason and the highest
reason could refer to the pre-IV.xviii version of reason. All said, this is but the first
indication of the future construal or shift in the definitions of “faith” and “reason.” The
second comes at the end of chapter xvii, before chapter xviii (where faith and reason are
set in “contradistinction”):
There is another use of the word Reason, wherein it is opposed to Faith: which
though it be in it self a very improper way of speaking, yet common Use has so
authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it: Only I
think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however Faith be opposed to
Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind; which if it be regulated,
as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good Reason; and so
cannot be opposite it (IV.xvii.24).
Locke states clearly above that faith and reason cannot be opposites, but speaking about
them as opposing ideas is so prevalent that he cannot hope to remedy it.63
In sum, Locke isolates the mind’s assent to divine revelation as such and thus the
revelation’s propositional content in IV.xviii and calls it faith. This faith is different from
the faith of which he spoke of in previous chapters. In the previous chapters faith was
assent to any probable proposition, including divinely revealed ones. Both versions of
faith, pre-IV.xviii and IV.xviii versions, are still a function of proper reason when the
mind is acting reasonably.64 Therefore Locke defines a new version of reason
corresponding to his new version of faith in IV.xviii by re-marshalling the Essay’s
epistemological elements. This new version of reason corresponds with assent to only
natural, probable propositions. In the end, Locke’s IV.xviii version of reason concerns
63
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knowledge and judgment of natural, probable propositions and his new version of faith
concerns assent to divinely revealed propositions.
It is not only in the Essay that Locke acknowledges a conception of reason
without the assistance of divine revelation. Responding to Stillingfleet’s concern that the
immateriality of the soul cannot be demonstrated from Locke’s principles, Locke writes:
This your Accusation of my lessening the Credibility of these Articles of Faith is
founded on this, That the Article of the Immortality of the Soul abates of its
Credibility, if it be allowed, That its Immateriality (which is the supposed Proof
from Reason and Philosophy of its Immortality) cannot be demonstrated from
natural Reason: Which Argument of your Lordship’s bottoms, as I humbly
conceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its Credibility in all those
Articles it proposes proportionably as Humane Reason fails to support the
Testimony of God . . . But if Humane Reason comes short in the Case, and cannot
make it out, its Credibility is thereby lessened; which is in effect to say, That the
Veracity of God is not a firm and sure foundation of Faith to rely upon, without
the concurrent Testimony of Reason, i.e. with Reverence be it spoken, God is not
to be believed on his own Word, unless what he reveals be in it self credible, and
might be believed without him.65
Thus, Locke refers to reason without the considerations and assistance of divine
revelation as natural and human reason in the above quote. He eventually uses the term
natural reason in reference to his IV.xviii delimited reason in his chapter “Of
Enthusiasm” that he adds to the Essay in 1700. There he speaks of three grounds of
assent: faith, reason, and enthusiasm.66 He rejects the third, but keeps the first two:
“Reason is natural Revelation . . . Revelation is natural Reason enlarged.”67 In short, he is
operating with the versions of faith and reason as described in IV.xviii in his 1700
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chapter addition, “Of Enthusiasm,” which allows him to call that version of reason
natural reason.
From this point on special labels will be employed to distinguish between the two
considerations of faith and reason. Proper reason and proper faith or assent will denote
the conceptions of reason and faith or assent being utilized prior to IV.xviii.68 They are
labeled with “proper” because those are the definitions he builds throughout book IV and
they are not concessionary. Thus, proper reason is reason employed or operating in its
proper office or with its concernment with natural and divine sources of information.
Proper faith is its corresponding faith that concerns assent to natural and divine probable
propositions. Vulgar reason and vulgar faith will denote the considerations of reason and
faith used as a concession to the vulgar or common manner of speaking in IV.xviii.
Vulgar reason is reason employed or operating in its diminished office or concernment
with only natural sources of information. Vulgar faith is its corresponding faith and
concerns only assent to divine revelation as such and thus its propositional content.
The use of the label “vulgar” that Locke does not use warrants some explanation.
First, Locke referred to both considerations of reason as “reason,” and both
considerations of faith as “faith.” Not differentiating them in the Essay has led to
confusion in reading it, as is argued in this chapter, and would likely lead to confusion in
reading this chapter. Second, it is my desire to couple the two considerations of reason
with each one’s corresponding consideration of faith to avoid undue confusion. Locke
does not make provision for this. Vulgar reason could have been called natural or
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unassisted or human reason in this dissertation, which Locke actually does call it in
places, but then this dissertation would have to replace the efficient, coupling labels of
vulgar reason and vulgar faith with the less economical and disconnected labels of
natural or unassisted or human reason and vulgar (or some other adjective) faith; the
labels natural or unassisted or human faith are not optional replacements for vulgar faith
because natural faith or unassisted faith or human faith are more appropriate terms for
faith in natural sources of information, which is ideally a function of the mind employing
its natural or unassisted reason. 69 Labeling them as common has too much room for
misunderstanding too, as referring to “common faith” seems more appropriate to
describing a faith that is uniform to everyone or most. Other prefixes such as “Chapter
xviii” seem too clumsy. Vulgar was chosen because it was a term commonly used in
Locke’s day that could be interchanged with the adjective common.
In sum, this section has argued that Locke makes a critical and unsurprising shift
to new definitions of faith and reason in IV.xviii. The pre-IV.xviii proper reason, or
reason employed in its proper office, concerns knowledge and certainty and the
probabilities associated with natural and divine sources of information. The IV.xviii
vulgar reason, or reason employed in its diminished office, concerns the same, but with
the exception of divine sources of information. Proper faith corresponds to proper reason
and it concerns assent to natural and divine probable propositions based on the
assessment of proper reason. Vulgar faith concerns only assent regarding divine
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revelation. Giving attention to the previous section as well, we could add irrational faith
to this short list of faiths. Irrational faith arises from two general situations: 1) the mind
not heeding its own conclusions wrought from its employment of reason, or 2) the mind
not employing reason appropriate to what the circumstance warrants. Enthusiasm would
be an extreme case of the latter, where the reason is underemployed.
The next two sections will continue to build on the interaction of faith and reason
by focusing on the relationship of reason and revelation.
Part V: Propositions “Above Reason”
The differences between proper reason and proper faith versus vulgar reason and
vulgar faith, help explain what Locke intends by labeling certain propositions as being
“Above Reason.” Many take this category of propositions as being Locke’s window for
allowing doctrines that transcend the strictures and office of reason or that are beyond
reason. But, in light of the previous sections, it is crucial to understand to which
definition of reason Locke is referring when he labels things as being above reason. One
might think that he is working with proper reason since this is prior to chapter xviii and
its new consideration of reason, but this appears unlikely from what follows. Locke
writes in chapter xvii:
By what has been before said of Reason, we may be able to make some guess at
the distinction of Things, into those according to, above, and contrary to Reason.
1. According to Reason are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by
the examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflexion; and
by natural deduction, finds to be true, or probable. 2. Above Reason are such
Propositions, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those
Principles. 3. Contrary to Reason are such Propositions, as are inconsistent with,
or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas. Thus the existence of one GOD is
according to Reason; the Existence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reason;
the Resurrection of the Body after death, above Reason. Above Reason also may
be taken in a double sense, viz. above Probability, or above Certainty; and in that
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large sense also, Contrary to Reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken (IV.
Xvii.23).70
In all three categories “reason” pertains to the human faculty involved in obtaining
knowledge through indubitable demonstration and guiding the judgment through
probability. The “natural deduction” corresponding to the “According to Reason”
category is most likely taken in a sense that rules out supernatural assistance or divine
revelation. Thus propositions according to reason are any that come to us by natural
means and thus the reason being used here is vulgar reason. This is even more likely
since “Above Reason” apparently denotes propositions that we could not possibly come
up with ourselves. That is, above reason propositions are those we could not have
conceived of simply by the contemplation of the ideas that are available to us naturally.
On the outside chance that we did conceive of such a true proposition and its ideas on our
own we would have no basis to assent to it. In short, “Above Reason” is above vulgar
reason. In addition, above reason propositions are intelligible, conceivable, or
imaginable-in-part because their examples are: the rebellion of the angels and
resurrection of the dead (IV.xvii.23; IV.xviii.7). That means that they do not transcend
our ideas and are still within the compass of our proper reason and are not beyond it.
Finally, they are supernatural in focus because their examples all are.
Still more can be said about these three categories that points to vulgar reason
being the reason incorporated into them. It appears that propositions above reason are
judged to have been truly revealed. So propositions that are above reason are reasonable
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in the proper reason sense and true and propositions that are according to reason are true
and reasonable in either the vulgar or proper sense.71 Interestingly enough, propositions
contrary to reason are unreasonable only in that they carry a logical contradiction. That is,
contrary to reason does not even include propositions that would be judged unlikely by
proper reason or vulgar reason. As a result, the three categories appear not to be truly
exhaustive of all propositions and thus seem to be peculiarly inefficient handles.
In short, the according to reason category of propositions appear to be those that
are determined only through natural sources and are the concern of vulgar reason. The
above reason category of propositions are, as a result, those that are determined through
divine sources, are comprehensible or intelligible, are supernaturally focused, and are
something that we would not determine on our own; but if we happened to conceive of
something above reason without any revelation, we would have no basis to assent to it.
And finally, the category of propositions contrary to reason involves only those
propositions that are unintelligible because they contain a contradiction.
That above reason propositions are within the compass of proper reason and thus
consist of ideas capable of being held by humans is supported by other places in the
71
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probability supporting the according to reason proposition becomes irrelevant. Into which category would
this proposition be placed? In short, the set of divinely revealed propositions is not identical to, but larger
than, the set of above reason propositions. The categories of propositions do not appear, based on their
descriptions, to be able to accommodate to all divinely revealed propositions. Furthermore, does the source,
natural or divine, necessarily attach to the proposition such that two propositions although verbally and
conceptually the same cannot be considered identical based on the fact that God asserted one and a human
asserted another?
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works of Locke and elsewhere in the Essay. In Locke’s final reply to Bishop Stillingfleet,
Locke explains that ideas are always the objects of our minds in thinking and further,
“everything which we either know or believe, is some Proposition. Now no Proposition
can be framed as the Object of our Knowledge or Assent, where two Ideas are not joined
to, or separated from one another.”72 That above reason propositions are graspable by the
human mind also comports with Locke’s insistence in A Second Vindication of the
Reasonableness of Christianity that it is not possible to assent to doctrines that are
unintelligible. There he defines “Mysteries” as “things not plain, not clear, not
intelligible to common apprehensions,” and writes that when those thinkers who claim it
is necessary for people to assent to such mysteries, allegedly in Scripture, they are
making a requirement out of “what is impossible for them to do.”73 Also, each
proposition or doctrine that he labels as being “above reason” later on in the Essay is
always imaginable in some respect: rebellion of the angels and the resurrection of
humans (IV.xviii.7).74 That does not mean that every doctrine or idea is easy to conceive
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This chapter makes no claims about Locke’s stance on the doctrine of the Trinity other than the
following. Any version or explanation that was not imaginable or irreconcilable should be rejected
according to the Essay. Perhaps Locke had a version of the Trinity in mind that he accepted because it was
supported by Scripture and was imaginable or perhaps he had suspended his judgment on the doctrine
awaiting an imaginable version or explanation. It is noteworthy, however, that he apparently thought the
ideas of human free will and God’s omnipotence difficult to reconcile (IV.xvii.10), yet he still writes of
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libertarian free will and rejected versions of the Trinity, however, might be that we can visualize or
remember our experience of free choice regardless of its reconciliation with God’s power. Whatever the
case may be, such exploration and speculation on the topic of Locke and the Trinity would take us too far
afield.
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or determine (IV.xvii.10), nor that a doctrine’s corresponding ideas are clear in all parts
or distinct from every other idea.75
Considering proper reason as the reason he is utilizing in the three categories of
propositions proves to be even more evidence that vulgar reason is the reason being used.
Again, this limitation of reason to natural deductions, as is the case with the “According
to Reason” category, does not square with the concept of proper reason developed prior
to this point in IV.xvii, the conception of reason that incorporates divine testimony and
revelation. And, if he were using his conception of proper reason, the category of “Above
Reason” propositions would logically collapse into the category of propositions
“According to Reason,” because proper reason, which includes revelation, would make
“Above Reason” propositions properly reasonable, and thus “According to Reason.”
Therefore it follows that Locke made an early shift to the vulgar conception of reason
that he explains more thoroughly in chapter xviii and about which he gave two
forewarnings earlier. In fact, one of the forewarnings is immediately after his discussion
of the three categories of propositions (IV.xvii.24). Thus, vulgar reason is a theme and
touch point of both sections 23 and 24 of IV.xvii. Again, this suggestion that vulgar
reason is being used in the three categories of propositions is bolstered by the fact that
vulgar reason in chapter xviii is in agreement with the restriction of “reason” to natural
deductions offered in the “According to Reason” category. All of this illuminates why
Locke notes that he is making “some guess” at the distinction of things into these three
categories. In order to make accommodations to the masses’ improper way of speaking

75

E.g., Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply . . . Answer to His Second Letter, 73.

134
without making any conceptual changes in his epistemology he fashioned the three
categories of propositions based on vulgar reason.
A very important conclusion is now evident: Locke’s proper categories of
propositions, had he named them, would be according to reason and contrary to reason.
But the reason associated with these two categories is proper reason. The three categories
of propositions that have been discussed in this section and that were the focus of the
block quote above are, again, based on vulgar reason; and since vulgar reason is a
concession so is the associated categorization of propositions Locke gives in IV.xvii.
Thus, removing the aforementioned inefficiencies found in the construal of the three
categories of propositions, it is likely that Locke would have labeled propositions that are
unintelligible and not subject to our further reasoning as contrary to reason, and perhaps
all other propositions as being according to reason, because they are all intelligible,
whether true or false.
It is noteworthy to consider his mindset in accommodating his understanding of
reason to vulgar, improper ways of speaking. Locke apparently does not think of himself
as so much constructing or prescribing a better epistemology as he is describing how we
operate at our best. He cannot simply describe anyone on any day, but rather describes
the mind working with the principles of logic and with prudence. This is sometimes
called experimental philosophy. Of Locke’s experimental philosophy, James Harris
writes:
Experimental philosophy, is, simply, philosophy that aims to be true of the facts
of experience, and the experience in question might well be that of everyday life.
An important factor in Locke’s success was the manner in which he succeeded in
making it possible for his readers to think of themselves as practicing philosophy
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when they compared the description of the mind given in the Essay with their own
experience of themselves, their acquaintances, and the world in general.76
He makes his descriptive designs of the Essay explicit in his response to Stillingfleet’s
labeling his treatment of the faculty of thinking “new”: “my Lord, if it be new, it is but a
new History of an old Thing, For I think it will not be doubted, that Men always
perform’d the Actions of Thinking, Reasoning, Believing, and Knowing, just after the
same way they do now . . .”77 So, assuming we all have similar mental equipment and
fundamental mental processes, Locke does not simply disregard the opposition of faith
and reason by some because they are technically wrong. Instead, he wants to figure out
for himself why they are claiming what they are claiming and how might there be some
truth in it. So, just as Locke is making “some guess” regarding the way some would
categorize propositions based on a contradistinguished faith and reason, he does not
assert with confidence what vulgar reason is but instead writes, “Reason therefore here,
as contradistinguished to Faith, I take to be . . .” [emphasis mine] (IV.xviii.2).
As an additional corrective to scholarship, Locke never claims that the “Above
Reason” category is “Above and According to Reason” or “Above and not Contrary to
Reason.” John Toland shows his displeasure with the label “above and not contrary to
reason” and what is meant by it in his book Christianity Not Mysterious. Since all think
that he is attacking Locke’s propositional category of above reason, Toland is the or a
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likely root for such augmented labels being applied by Locke and Toland scholars to John
Locke’s above reason category.78
Furthermore, the augmented labels applied in place of Locke’s “Above Reason”
simpliciter label are not appropriate. Due to the way that Locke has drawn the boundaries
of the three categories of propositions, a proposition that is above reason cannot be
according to reason as well. And to say that an above-reason proposition is not contrary
to reason is a needless redundancy. That is, an above-reason proposition is by definition
not according to reason and not contrary to reason. What is more, if any scholars are
incorrectly operating with proper reason and using these augmented labels, they are
equivocating in that they are saying some proposition or doctrine is above reason in the
sense that human reason cannot mentally represent the doctrine but according to reason in
the different sense that it does not defy logical principles. 79
This chapter is now in the position to clarify the end of the block quotation
describing the three categories of propositions: “Above Reason also may be taken in a
double sense, viz. Above Probability, or above Certainty; and in that large sense also,
Contrary to Reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken” (IV. Xvii.23).80 Here Locke is
78
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giving—albeit in a compressed way—other manners in which he has heard the notion of
“above reason” spoken. Things above reason are above or beyond probability or certainty
because we could not demonstrate them or conceive of them with unaided or unassisted
reason, and if we did conceive of them we would have no grounds to assent to them.81
“Above” is not intended to imply that above reason propositions can overturn divinelyunassisted or natural probability or knowledge, although later this chapter will discuss
revealed propositions’ abilities to overthrow propositions that are based on natural
probability. Finally, Locke “supposes” some might say the above reason category is
contrary to reason in the sense that it consists of propositions that divinely unassisted
reason would not know through demonstration or believe through natural probable
reasoning. Thus above reason refers to things known by a different means or source of
information. Again, from the examples, these above reason propositions are divinelyrevealed propositions of a supernatural nature. In other words, they are about things we
would have no good reason to affirm or deny if told to us by an ordinary, and even
trusted, human.82
Moreover, it is not completely clear if Locke has incorporated human testimony
of non-supernatural propositions in his understanding of vulgar reason. Again, from the
examples he gives of above reason propositions, the above reason category of
81

It is possible that someone without any direct or indirect association with Scripture could
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propositions are all supernatural propositions directly from God or from a human
intermediary, a distinction that will be discussed more in depth shortly. This question is
pertinent here because it is argued above that vulgar reason corresponds to the sense of
reason utilized in the “according to reason” category. An argument for the inclusion of
human testimony of non-supernatural propositions is that it is one of the grounds of our
reasonable—reasonable pertaining to proper reason—probability, so it would be
surprising if it were left out of consideration entirely. Furthermore, since all of Locke’s
examples of things “above reason” are supernatural in nature, it is likely that through his
distinction of things according to reason and things above reason he is making a natural
versus supernatural distinction as best as he can as opposed to a demonstration-andnatural-probability-grounded-only-in-conformity (to experience and knowledge) versus
divine testimony (including divine immediate revelation and testimony of it by a human
intermediary) distinction. In short, although it is possible that human testimony regarding
non-supernatural propositions is not factored into vulgar reason, human testimony of nonsupernatural propositions at least fits into vulgar reason. Since Locke thinks this is an
improper way of framing the elements of the discussion anyway, the matter will be left to
rest.
The placing of the three categories of propositions, and thus the interjection of
vulgar reason, into the chapter where proper reason is being explained has been the
source of much mischief. This is likely why many think that vulgar reason, given in the
Essay’s subsequent chapter, is the official definition of reason and that which Locke was
attempting to clearly explain throughout IV.xvii. This perhaps imprudent interjection of
vulgar reason into IV.xvii has assisted in compelling nearly all to try to reconcile with it
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all that had been said by Locke about reason prior to it. Furthermore, this might have
something to do with R.S. Woolhouse’s and Ian Leask’s reasoning that truths about the
properties and powers of material substances and substances themselves are “above
reason.”83 They both miss the point the point that the above reason category and its
associated vulgar faith concept are both reserved purely for supernatural propositions.
So far in this chapter, several things have been suggested. It has been concluded
that Locke is operating with two considerations of reason and faith. There is proper
reason and proper faith (or assent) that he is using throughout the bulk of the Essay.
Reason operating or employed in its proper office or proper reason offers demonstration
and probability working with ideas from knowledge, propositions from experience, and
propositions from human and divine sources. The natural faculties can be considered
reason when the mind acts reasonably—reasonably in the sense of dictated by proper
reason and in the sense of corresponding to the appropriate thoroughness that the
circumstance warrants. Reason operating or employed in its diminished office or vulgar
reason is the same with the exception of its exclusion of propositions that originally came
from God. His vulgar conceptions of reason and faith, vulgar reason and vulgar faith, are
concessions. They are incorporated into his well-known three categories of propositions.
This is thereby a concession as well. Locke’s proper or preferred categories of
propositions, therefore, would be: according to (proper) reason and contrary to (proper)
reason.
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Part VI: Reason and Revelation
Locke offers his most thorough discussion of revelation in chapter xviii of book
IV. This includes its relationship with reason, which this section will make explicit.
Locke is working with vulgar reason throughout chapter xviii, but part of his plan is to
show the insufficiency of such a vulgar distinction between faith and reason. That is, the
nature of revelation as an accepted source of information makes the distinction between
vulgar faith and reason ultimately untenable. His position on vulgar reason and vulgar
faith and the relationship between revelation and reason that come to the fore in IV.xviii
also help clarify the very dense section 14 of IV.xvi that this chapter touched on briefly in
its discussion on judgment in the “Preliminaries” section.
Locke begins the discussion with a taxonomy of divine special revelation. First
there is original revelation, impressions made by God on a human’s mind “to which we
cannot set any Bounds.” There are two primary types of original revelation,
incommunicable and communicable. Regarding the former, God may communicate to the
human mind by new simple ideas and complex ideas made up of them. This type of
original revelation is incommunicable to other humans by words or signs for there are no
latent ideas in the minds of others of such new simple ideas; for words seen or heard
recall to our thoughts ideas that already are in the mind and cannot introduce any new
simple ideas into it. Natural human simple ideas come from natural human sensation and
reflection. So, God can impress on the human’s mind the ideas received by the sixth
sense of an extraterrestrial, for instance, but these ideas would be as incommunicable to
others as the simple ideas of colors would be to a person born blind. Locke claims that
this is the type of revelation Paul received in the third heaven. This type of original
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revelation cannot be communicated to other humans unless God supernaturally equips a
person with the faculty or faculties, not naturally found in humans, which can receive
these new simple ideas and their complex counterparts. He does not, however, insist that
all original revelation is in this incommunicable form. Original revelation may also be of
the communicable sort. Thus it consists of impressions using our common, latent ideas.
One who is given original revelation of this type can convey it to others.84 Finally,
traditional revelation is revelation conveyed from God to humans via a human
intermediary “delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our
Conceptions one to another.” Thus, traditional revelation is made possible by original
revelation of the communicable sort (IV.xviii.3).
Locke proceeds to clarify a few issues that arise regarding revelation. First, there
are some truths that can be conveyed to us by traditional revelation that are discoverable
to us by vulgar reason, namely demonstration achieved by vulgar reason. There is little
use for revelation in such instances as the assurance afforded by human testimony can
never be as secure as the certainty afforded through our knowledge. Also, the
“knowledge” we have that it is from God can never be as certain as intuition or
demonstration.85 Thus, Locke writes:
As it were revealed some Ages since, That the three Angles of a Triangle, were
equal to two right ones, I might assent to the Truth of that Proposition, upon the
Credit of the Tradition that it was revealed: But that would never amount to so
84
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great a Certainty, as the Knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my
own clear Ideas of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle.
The same holds true for a matter of fact: the certainty of seeing the fact for oneself is
more certain than hearing of it second hand (IV.xviii.4).86
Locke then shifts a bit, turning the Essay to considerations of certainty and
assurance regarding revelation. It is true that God never errs and our minds do. So, one
might think, hypothetically, if we could know a proposition was from God and know its
interpretation as well, both via original revelation, then that proposition’s status and
interpretation would have more certainty than our knowledge. That is, we would trust
God over our finite (but God-given) faculties. But, since we have human faculties, the
highest certainty we can have is human certainty. That is, in reality there is no higher
certainty than intuitive knowledge. This has a few important implications. For instance, it
is reason that must determine if a given proposition is revealed. Reason concerns
identification of a miracle in original revelation or probability in traditional revelation. So
if the foundation of reason—our intuitive knowledge—were contradicted by a revealed
proposition, the revealed proposition would be undercutting the source that gives it
authority, or deems it divinely revealed. And if revelation, therefore, cannot overturn
intuitive knowledge, it cannot overturn or contradict demonstrative knowledge either
(IV.xviii.5-6).
Some may object to one of the above assertions because in these passages Locke
says nothing explicitly about revelation’s inability to contradict demonstrative
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knowledge. If that were an option—that is, revelation could overturn demonstrative
knowledge—he would not need to reiterate the point that revelation can overturn a
proposition based on probability. Besides, demonstration is less liable to error than our
senses, which helps identify miraculous phenomena. In the case of traditional revelation,
revelation’s status as such is only probable. In the case of original revelation, one is
always certain that something is being revealed. Putting aside the issues of certainty and
probability regarding revelation’s divine origin, one still has to wrestle with the fact that
interpretations of the revelation are often uncertain. Thus there is some level of
probability, at least with one aspect of an allegedly, originally revealed proposition. All
of this points toward revelation not being able to overturn a demonstration. There is one
case, however, in which a revelation could contradict a “demonstrative proposition”: a
revealed proof that provides one with a demonstrative proof that serves as a correction to
an erroneous proof that was thought to be demonstrative. In Locke’s economy the
revealed proof would be demonstrative knowledge and not probable, even though its
status of being a divine revelation is but probable. In other words, the probable divinely
revealed status of a demonstrative proof would not affect the fact that it is a
demonstrative proof.87
It is in this immediate discussion that he starts his critique of vulgar reason. First,
Locke indicates one important insufficiency of separating vulgar reason and vulgar faith:
something needs to identify an originally revealed proposition as being such. That
something is reason employed by the mind. So it is impossible to separate faith and
87
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reason (IV.xviii.5). Second, he follows this up with a similar critique of vulgar reason
versus vulgar faith in a short discourse on traditional revelation: “But to all those who
pretend not to immediate Revelation, but are required to pay Obedience, and to receive
the truths revealed to others, which, by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are
conveyed down to them, Reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can
induce us to receive them.” He notes that the matter of vulgar faith, as he understands it,
is only propositions that are supposedly divinely revealed. But, something has to identify
the proposition as being revealed or not, and that thing would have to be vulgar reason.
Locke does point out one scenario where vulgar faith in some proposition or propositions
is based on vulgar faith in another proposition. That is the situation in which one receives
an original revelation that a certain proposition or an entire book was divinely revealed.
So, that book or proposition is thought to be revealed based on another revelation; but
that latter revelation is still confirmed as such by reason (IV.xviii.6).88 Again, it is
impossible to separate faith and reason as those who ascribe to the vulgar notions of faith
and reason suggest.
Directly after the sections referenced above, Locke specifically discusses
propositions with which vulgar reason has “directly, nothing to do.” This indirect sense is
other than the employment of reason for confirmation of revealed propositions as such.
These propositions correspond to a subset of propositions that would be found in
Scripture. They are beyond the discovery of our natural faculties and consist “of many
88
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Things, wherein we have very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of
whose past, present, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties, we can have
no knowledge at all.” Examples are the rebellion of the angels and the resurrection.
Locke calls these propositions “above Reason,” “the proper Matter of Faith,” and “purely
Matters of Faith” (IV.xviii.7). Reason has nothing directly to do with them because
propositions according to vulgar reason don’t overlap with propositions that are above
vulgar reason. If propositions that are above vulgar reason could be imagined by vulgar
reason without any help from revelation, they would still have no grounding for assent. In
other words, that one can imagine something is no basis for assent to it. Thus to believe
them would not be done according to vulgar reason.89 So although vulgar reason has
nothing directly to do with above vulgar reason propositions in the sense just outlined,
vulgar reason would still have to determine whether or not something is a revealed
proposition, even the divinely-revealed above reason propositions. Again, this is outside
vulgar reason’s office of operation as determined by the definitions Locke gives at the
beginning of IV.xviii.90
Moreover, Locke provides the reader with another operative rule governing the
relationship of revelation and reason that concurrently shows the insufficiency of the
vulgar reason and vulgar faith paradigm. Anything with the character of divine revelation
is a “matter of faith,” although not necessarily a “proper matter of faith” or above vulgar
89
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reason. While divine revelation cannot contradict intuition and demonstration, it can tell
us that which we could not have come up with on our own; or if we did come up with
something above reason we would have a very imperfect idea of it, and would have no
basis to judge that idea true. But, there are also divinely revealed propositions that come
into the realm of the probability of vulgar reason. That is, there are some propositions
that we could conceive of without divine assistance to which we could rightly and (in a
vulgar sense) reasonably assent that are confirmed or denied by a divinely revealed
proposition. Responding to the scenario when an unassisted proposition contradicts a
revealed proposition, Locke declares: “In these, Revelation must carry it, against the
probable Conjectures of Reason: Because the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that
it does not evidently know, but is only probably convinced of, is bound to give up its
Assent to such a Testimony, which, it is satisfied, comes from one, who cannot err, and
will not deceive” (IV.xviii.8; Cf. IV.xviii.9-10; IV.xvi.14). Nevertheless, Locke adds,
reason must judge the truth of it being a revelation as well as interpreting it or judging “of
the signification of the Words wherein it is delivered”. The interpretation, although
possibly contrary to vulgar reason’s reasonably probable proposition, cannot be contrary
to vulgar reason’s knowledge (which is identical to the knowledge of proper reason)
(IV.xviii.8). Therefore, and here is the rub, the vulgar reason and vulgar faith distinction
falters not only because reason must determine whether or not a revelation is divine but
also how it is to be interpreted. What is more the interpretation made by vulgar reason
might contradict the otherwise-probable proposition provided by natural or vulgar reason.
Although a brief aside, there is a related epistemological principle that Locke
makes in his debate with Stillingfleet that further illuminates the relationship of
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revelation and vulgar reason. Locke is adamant that a particular doctrine derived from
Scripture is not to be thought more or less credible depending on the probability for or
against it supplied by vulgar reason.91 What can be inferred from that is that, while vulgar
reason without Scripture may provide us with a possible interpretation, one should not be
compelled in any sense to use or favor such an interpretation. So, an interpretation of a
passage that is supported by a prevailing theory of natural science is not because of that
to be given more weight than an interpretation that does not seem as probable under only
natural considerations. When it comes to multiple, possible interpretations, the only
advice Locke has is one proposition of Scripture cannot contradict another. If that cannot
be done with two propositions, for instance, after “fair endeavours,” one must suspend
one’s judgment.92
Moreover, that a proposition deemed to have favorable probability by vulgar
reason is subordinate to divine revelation speaking to the same issue is also further
evidence against thinking Locke approves of the three categories of propositions, namely
according to reason, above reason, and contrary to reason. How would one label an
intelligible, revealed proposition that is identical to a proposition that was affirmed by the
probability given to it by natural or vulgar reason? It could not be in the above reason
category as the concern is sufficiently understood to the point where the proposition at
hand can be reasonably judged without divine assistance. Locke’s definition of above
reason propositions is those propositions “whose Truth or Probability we cannot by
Reason derive from those Principles.” On the other hand, such a proposition made by
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divine revelation cannot be placed in the according to reason category because it did not
issue forth from there. Besides, its credibility is higher than other probable propositions
since it was revealed. And, since it is intelligible, it cannot be contrary to reason. So,
apparently, such an intelligible, revealed proposition would technically not have a
category into which it fits. The implication is that while Locke shows intentionally that
the vulgar reason and vulgar faith distinction collapses, his discussion implicitly shows
how the corresponding vulgar categories of propositions also fail.
The point made above, that a revealed proposition might overturn a proposition
thought to be probable on purely natural considerations, is an important point. Some deny
it and some do not understand its full import. Before concluding our discussion on
Locke’s explanation of the rules governing revelation and reason and his concurrent
erosion of the vulgar faith and reason contradistinction, this chapter will point to how a
few important scholarly works that have responded to the seeming authority that
revelation has over natural probability.
Paul Helm believes that revelation cannot overturn natural probability. He notes
that there is a quote in IV.xviii.18 that sounds like it is the case, but the subsequent lines
show otherwise. The following is Helm’s quote of the Essay IV.xviii.18 with his
emphasis in italics:
Because the mind, not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know,
but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent
to such a testimony which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will
not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a
revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered.
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Helm thinks that the first part seems to indicate that revelation can overturn probability
but that the italicized line qualifies “it beyond recognition.”93 He unfortunately says
nothing more. Contrary to Helm’s assertion that revelation cannot overturn divinely
unassisted probability, one section later there is a very clear quote to the effect that
revelation can overturn probability:
For where the Principles of Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be
certainly true or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and
Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be Matter of Faith, and be also
above Reason. Because Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no
higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination, where Reason came short;
and Revelation discovered on which side the Truth lay [end of section]
(IV.xviii.9).
In other words, natural probability is not certain and so can be overturned. God can,
through his revelation, correct and inform our limited capacities that work with limited
sources of information.
Some guess can be made regarding the root of Helm’s misunderstanding. He
rightly acknowledges that reason must identify a proposition as revealed and also
interpret it. He also, as discussed, believes the interpretation must be thought probable on
purely natural considerations to be considered valid. This chapter takes that to mean that
the revealed proposition, if the proposition is truly from God, must not be definitively
contrary to natural, unassisted probability. So, if an interpretation could not be derived
from the alleged revelation that comports with natural, unassisted probability, the alleged
revelation cannot be considered as divinely revealed. An interpretation can be contrary to
natural probability, however, as long as it is accompanied by a supporting proof in the
revelation with a higher natural probability than the natural probability that (originally)
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opposed the interpretation of the revelation. If this is what Helm is thinking, his reasoning
does not square with the last quote from Locke given above. Helm is likely noticing how
reason operating in its vulgar office keeps creeping into vulgar faith’s province in
IV.xviii; that reason must determine if a revelation is divine and must interpret the
revelation is discussed after the defining of vulgar reason and faith in IV.xviii; but this
encroachment, unbeknown to Helm, is because of the insufficiencies of such a conceived
contradistinction. Helm thus misses Locke’s critique on such a contradistinction. As a
result, Helm thinks Locke subordinates faith to vulgar reason as opposed to subordinating
it to proper reason. The same could be expected of any scholar who notices that Locke is
clearly subordinating “faith” to “reason” prior to IV.xviii but then views those chapters
retrospectively through the vulgar faith and vulgar reason lenses of chapter xviii. In short,
subordinating vulgar faith to proper reason—as Locke does—allows revelation to
overturn a proposition supported by natural, unassisted probability, whereas
subordinating vulgar faith to vulgar reason—as Helm does—subordinates revelation to
propositions supported by natural, unassisted probability. Again, in Helm’s view the
interpretation of a revelation must comport to what is thought reasonable by purely
natural considerations; and if such an interpretation is not feasible, the alleged revelation
cannot be considered as such. Part of Locke’s plan in chapter xviii is to show how that
chapter’s definitions of vulgar reason and vulgar faith, more specifically the limitations
of reason’s vulgar office and the province of vulgar faith, therein breakdown. To miss
this point is to miss a significant piece of the Essay.
On a related point, Polinska believes that Locke’s rule that revelation is able to
overturn reasonable probability shows that faith and reason are compatible and not in a
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hierarchical relationship. That is, while faith cannot overturn reason in the realm of
knowledge, it can overturn reason in the area of probability. As true as that is in Essay
IV.xviii, it seems as though she has not fully answered the concerns of other scholars like
Ashcraft and Sell who see faith as subordinate to reason, at least, by the fact that reason
sets the bounds to faith and identifies revelation as such.94 It appears that she like Helm
has not considered the steady deconstruction of the vulgar reason versus vulgar faith
distinction made in chapter xviii. Had she interacted with Ashcraft’s declarations of
Locke’s inconsistencies between chapter xviii and what preceded it, she may have
concluded that although at first blush faith is portrayed as not being subordinate to vulgar
reason, that relationship eventually erodes as the power of reason is forced back into its
proper office. And when reason is in its proper office, assent, even pertaining to divine
propositions, ought to be reasonable (according to the double sense of reasonable
discussed earlier). Hence, faith in or assent to propositions from any source ought to be
subordinate to proper reason and so are to be rational. The mind could assent irrationally,
but assent or faith ought to be subordinate to the power of reason. For all intents and
purposes Locke thinks we should operate as if faith and reason are not two powers, but
rather that faith is a result of the mind acting reasonably.
Locke ends the discussion of revelation and reason with a brief explanation of
rules governing the relationship of vulgar reason and revelation and vulgar reason and
vulgar faith, which serves, perhaps, as a summary of the chapter (IV.xviii.10-11). It also
serves to summarize the argument that faith and reason cannot rightfully be separated. It
is not clear however if he is treating traditional revelation or both original and traditional
94
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revelation in section IV.xviii.10. There he writes: “Whatever GOD hath revealed, is
certainty true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But whether
it be a Divine Revelation, or no, Reason must judge; which can never permit the Mind to
reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor preferr less Certainty to the
greater.” What follows is a statement on traditional revelation. So he might be moving
from a statement on divine revelation in general to one specifically on traditional
revelation, or it might be a movement of original revelation to traditional revelation. The
latter reading is possible because he has used “divine Revelation” specifically in regards
to original revelation in IV.xviii.5-6. Either way, a basic principle that has been quite
explicit throughout and is reiterated here is that reason must judge whether a divine
revelation is such. So again, vulgar faith is not actually separable from reason, whatever
strictures one puts on it.
Section IV.xviii.10 continues the explanation of principles undergirding the
relationship of vulgar reason and vulgar faith that show they are inseparable. Immediately
after the quote given above, is the following:
There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in
the Words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, so clear, and so
certain as those of the Principles of Reason: And therefore, Nothing that is
contrary to, and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason,
has a Right to be urged, or assented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein Reason hath
nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine Revelation, ought to over-rule our Opinions,
Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a Right to be received with a full Assent: Such
a Submission as this of our Reason to Faith, takes not away the Land-mark of
Knowledge.

The first sentence alludes to the probability that is involved in two areas regarding
traditional revelation. The status of a particular traditional revelation being from a divine
original is probable, and thus not certain. And the interpretation is only probable as well,
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not because of its probable status as divine revelation, but because of the imperfect nature
of communicating concepts with words. The second sentence says that a divine revelation
and its interpretation cannot contradict the “clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason.”
The clear and self-evident dictates means at least intuitive knowledge but could also refer
to demonstration since it is comprised of intuitive links.95 Whatever the case is,
something cannot be assented to unless it is intelligible or comprehensible. In other
words, one must be able to form a mental representation of it or else it is contrary to
reason. The third sentence makes it clear that a divine revelation and its thoughtful
interpretation should overturn unassisted, natural probability.96 Locke ends the chapter
stating that if these rules governing reason and faith are not adhered to, there will be no
room for reason. This would mean no one is culpable for taking the wrong way in
religion (IV.xviii.11).
So, in the end, faith in divine matters is a function of proper reason. Belief in
matters of divine faith, or assent to divinely revealed propositions, ought to follow proper
reason. But this statement is mollified by considering John C. Biddle’s assessment of
Locke and traditional revelation: “Although the right and necessity that reason judge the
content as well as the authenticity of revelation appears to be the height of religious
rationalism, such an interpretation would grossly belie Locke’s intentions . . . he sought
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in the Essay to establish traditional revelation as the primary guide in that proper science
and business of mankind, morality and religion.”97 Locke says as much in ROC. In fact,
he portrays Christ and the Scriptures as clarifying morality and religion for us and
showing us what we should try to demonstrate. Thus, while monotheism and morals are
demonstrable and certain now for Locke, we were guided there by divine revelation first.
Nature gave sufficient evidence but the world did not use its reason prior to Christ.98
This chapter is now in a better position to revisit the last section, section 14, from
the chapter “On Assent.” As already discussed, IV.xvi.13, the preceding section of the
same chapter, discusses a paradigmatic instance of miracles: great contrariety to the
normal and observable course of nature and many fair witnesses. After this brief
description of miracles and assenting to them as such, Locke begins section 14 as
follows:
Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort of Propositions that
challenge the highest degree of our Assent, upon bare Testimony, whether the
thing proposed, agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary
course of Things, or no. The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such
an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God Himself. This
carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called
by a peculiar Name, Revelation, and our Assent to it, Faith: which has as much
Certainty99 as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own Being,
as we can, whether any Revelation from GOD be true. So that Faith is a setled and
sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt
or Hesitation.
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First, in reference to the quote above, and as already discussed, the faith in the quote is
vulgar faith. The quote, however, is primarily discussing the nature of communication
from God, objectively speaking. God cannot be deceived or deceive so everything he says
is true and we can rely on His testimony. This is obviously not the case with our other
sources of information. Therefore, God’s revelation can overturn propositions that would
otherwise have been thought to be reasonable.
Locke then abruptly moves from a theoretical discussion of revelation into
practical discussions related to divine revelation in general:
Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it
right; else we shall expose ourselves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and
all the errour of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not
divine Revelation. And therefore in those cases, our Assent can be rationally no
higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of
the Expressions it is delivered in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that
this its true Sense be only on probably Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher
than an Assurance or Diffidence, arising from the more, or less apparent
Probability of the Proofs.
As already established, but indicated also above, reason in practice has a role not only in
identifying a divine mark of the revelation (the miracle) or the probability of truthfulness
of the human testimony that there was in fact a divine mark or marks, but further, reason
must provide an interpretation. As already discussed, this interpretation would not
definitively contradict knowledge, which among other things, assures that one is not
assenting to something that is incomprehensible. And, although he does not say it here
explicitly, if it is divine it would not contradict other propositions one is convinced are
divinely revealed.100 In short, while God cannot deceive or be deceived and thus a
revelation from Him would be truthful, we must use our reason in practice to ascertain
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whether or not a communication is from Him. Furthermore, our degree of assent should
be proportional to the probability that the so-called divine revelation is such.
Finally Locke has another subtle shift, focusing specifically on divinely revealed
propositions, whose evidence of being divine is such that we have assurance, the highest
degree of assent, that they are such: “But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have
before other Arugments of Persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as
it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to Reason: though in Truth, it be nothing else
but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.” As discussed already, this is Locke’s first
explicit indication that he is conceiving of faith and reason in two senses in the Essay.
That is, faith in this passage deviates from faith throughout the rest of the chapter since
faith here pertains only to divine revelation; faith throughout the rest of the chapter
pertains to any proposition that is probable. And, there is a distinction between the first
mention of reason, which is contradistinguished to vulgar faith, and the “highest Reason,”
which is actually responsible for the assent to the revealed proposition. In other words,
vulgar reason and proper reason are distinguished in the quote as well.
There are some very important implications that are worthy to make clear and
explicit from our discussion focusing on IV.xvi.14. It is not just any allegedly revealed
propositions that do not contradict knowledge and have associated claims of miraculous
testimony that will have the highest assurance. The more outlandish the miracle(s) and/or
the greater the number of those with fair testimony of the miracle(s), the more convinced
the mind will be that the associated proposition or revelation is divine. Scripture
somehow meets these criteria and is deserving of the highest assent.
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Having now looked at the dense section, IV.xvi.14, there are a few final points
that are worthy of mention pertaining to revelation. They are prompted by our discussion
on section 14. First, what additional evidence is there that Locke thinks the mind should
be assured that the Bible is revealed? Second, how much of a divine revelation is
confirmed by a miracle?
First, there is significant evidence for thinking that Locke has the Bible in mind
as the paradigm of the traditional revelation that is a subject of his vulgar faith, the
construal of faith discussed in IV.xvi.14 and more thoroughly in IV.xviii. It is that which
qualifies for assurance, the highest degree of assent. First, all of the examples that he uses
of propositions above reason are biblical. Second, he refers to the Old and New
Testaments as infallibly true (III.ix.23). Contrary to Paul Helm, infallibly true refers not
to the certainty of the truth of revelations, but rather that by assurance of it being God’s
word, we must take a hermeneutical stance that it cannot contradict itself or, in other
words, it is infallibly true.101 Presumably Locke can say this in part because he has not
found propositions in Scripture that are necessarily contradictory. Third, few Locke
scholars deny his self-identification as a Christian and the divine status he ascribes to the
Bible. Finally, his later added chapter, “Of Enthusiasm,” which appears in the fourth
edition of the Essay, supports the Bible’s paradigmatic status. There, Locke notes that
God sends marks—miracles—which “reason” cannot be mistaken in to verify to the
recipient that it is He who is giving the revealed propositions.102 His examples are Gideon
and Moses. Moses was also given the power to perform miracles in front of others to

101

Helm, “Locke on Faith and Knowledge,” 55-58.

102

This is from IV.xix.14 of the 4th edition and critical edition of the Essay.

158
show that he was the emissary of God.103 Furthermore, Locke does not deny that God
might enlighten men’s minds today in apprehending certain truths and influence us to
action by the immediate assistance and influence of the Holy Spirit without any sign. He
notes that if such a proposition without an external mark is to be received as a divine
revelation it must be consonant to reason or Scripture:
Where the Truth imbraced is consonant to the Revelation in the written word of
God or the Action conformable to the dictates of right Reason or Holy Writ, we
may be assured that we run no risque in entertaining it as such, because though
perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on
our Minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given
us of Truth.104
In short, Scripture, for Locke’s Essay, is a metric to which all other revelation must
conform.105
While the Bible is the paradigm for traditional revelation, it does not necessarily
exhaust all traditional revelation, even though Locke might appear to personally think
that it does.106 First, he talks of traditional revelation, not Scripture, in chapter IV.xviii.
Second, since he makes room for present-day original revelation, it only follows that he
would make room for that conveyable type of original revelation with clear external
marks or miracles to be set down in writing or passed on to others. That revelation thus
becomes traditional revelation. So if a present day original revelation has the clear
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external marks, miracles, and internal marks, an interpretation not definitively contrary to
knowledge and other confirmed Scripture, it should be considered Scripture.
Secondly, the problems of miracles being evidence of divine revelation have
been noted by Nicholas Wolterstorff. He communicates some of these problems with the
following questions: “How much of what a person believes has been divinely revealed to
him is confirmed as having been divinely revealed to him by the miraculous sign of
which he is the recipient? Correspondingly, how much of what a person claims to have
been divinely revealed to him is confirmed as having been divinely revealed to him by his
performance of a miracle?”107 Unfortunately, Locke does not answer these questions.
Some have responded that a detailed treatment of these issues was not pressing for Locke
since his targets in the Essay are Christians. Nonetheless, miracles were used by others as
external indicators of divine revelation. For instance, Locke’s friend, Archbishop
Tillotson, extolled God’s use of confirming revelation through miracles. For Tillotson,
the number, greatness, surety, public nature, and the duration of miracles was important
for Jesus’, the apostles’, and Moses’ legitimacy as divine agents.108 Perhaps for Locke,
the association of great and numerous miracles with the group of apostles confirms their
divine agent status and thus they are to be considered authoritative in anything that they
wrote or affirmed that was written by another. Something similar could be the case for
the Old Testament books. Any Old Testament books, however, without an association
with a miracle or miracles or some likely affirmation by an Old Testament author who
was indicated as a divine agent by a miracle or miracles could be viewed as affirmed by
107
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Jesus and the apostles as there is no historical evidence that they disputed with the Jewish
leaders over the canon. Rather the apostles and Jesus quote from or allude to the Old
Testament frequently.109
In summary, there are a number of important principles and implications from the
Essay regarding the relationship of revelation and reason. For one, alleged revelation
must be confirmed or denied as being such by the mind employing the power of reason.
Reason must judge through the external marks and internal marks whether a divine
revelation is such. This relationship necessarily overturns any attempted separation of
reason and faith in divine revelation into distinctive provinces or spheres. Otherwise,
faith is irrational. In the end, the idea of reason operating in a restricted office or the idea
of vulgar reason breaks down and reason is forced back into its proper office. Thus faith,
understood as pertaining to just divine revelation (vulgar faith) or any proposition with
only probabilities for and/or against it (proper faith), ought to be reasonable in the proper
sense of the term. Furthermore, while Locke may be suspicious of the many claims to
original revelation, he does not rule all such claims out. If an alleged original revelation is
reasonable on purely natural considerations or comports with Scripture there is no harm
in allowing one to consider it as divine. Moreover, while Scripture does not necessarily
exhaust his category of traditional revelation, it is the paradigm of assured divine
revelation that deserves the highest degree of assent. Such traditional revelation with
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proper external and internal marks can overturn any proposition to which one has
assented on purely natural considerations.

Conclusion
This chapter has explained Locke’s conception of reason and its relationships to
faith and revelation. In Locke’s consideration of the faculty of reason in his An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, he acknowledges various renderings of the term but
conceptually builds his idea of reason in its largest sense. Reason as a faculty is a tool of
the mind. It gives the mind knowledge and probability, the latter being that upon which
the mind should base its judgments. Reason’s proper office does not only deal with
natural sources of information but also divine sources. The faculty of reason, then,
considered operating in its full scope or proper office was called proper reason by this
chapter. Proper reason’s corresponding faith (or assent, opinion, or belief), what this
chapter called proper faith, concerns natural and divine revelatory matters as well. While
the mind’s faith and the judgment that produces it morally ought to be based on proper
reason’s recommendation and thus should be subordinate to it, especially in important
areas such as religion and morality, the mind’s assent might not follow proper reason. In
that case the mind does not have proper faith but irrational faith as the mind is not
heeding and utilizing properly its God-given guide. In short, proper faith, an act done by
the mind from its judgment, if reasonable, heeds the recommendations issued from reason
working in its proper office. What is more, the natural faculties can be considered, for all
intents and purposes, as reason when the mind acts reasonably—reasonably in the sense
of dictated by proper reason and in the sense of reason being utilized to the appropriate
thoroughness that the circumstance warrants.
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Near the end of Essay IV.xvii, “Of Reason,” and in Essay IV.xvii, “Of Faith and
Reason, and their distinct Provinces,” he conceives of the faculty of reason operating in a
diminished office, what this chapter called vulgar reason. This is done such that vulgar
reason can be conceptually distinguished as much as possible from assent, faith, or belief
in divinely revealed propositions as such and their content, what this chapter called
vulgar faith. In other words, vulgar reason is the faculty of reason considered operating in
an office without the assistance or propositions of divine revelation. This distinguishing
of faith and reason in a vulgar understanding is done simply as a concession to the masses
since Locke believes that such a distinction and opposition is too ingrained in the
common vernacular to dislodge it. This vulgar conception of reason is what allows Locke
to concede to a category of propositions “above reason.” If Locke were adhering to his
preferred consideration of reason, proper reason, the three categories of propositions
often associated with Locke—according to reason, contrary to reason, and above
reason—would actually transmute into two categories—according to reason and contrary
to reason.
By the end of the Essay, Locke’s understanding of the relationship of reason and
revelation becomes evident, as does its bearing on the relationship of reason and faith.
Original and traditional revelation must have the appropriate external and internal marks
which reason must judge to be affirmed as revelation. The appropriate external mark for
original revelation is a clear miracle or miracles and for traditional revelation is
accompanying fair testimonies of a clear miracle or miracles. The appropriate internal
mark is that the interpretation of the revealed proposition is definitively not contrary to
knowledge or contrary to already accepted and assured divine revelation. One would not
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expect divine revelation to be contrary to knowledge because if revelation could
contradict knowledge—the goal and highest achievement of reason and the foundation of
our further reasoning—it would be undercutting its source of validation that it is
revelation. One would not expect a divine revelation to contradict another revelation
either. Moreover, this inseparable role reason has in vindicating faith in revelation as
such and its interpretation of revelation makes a contradistinguishing of vulgar faith and
vulgar reason into distinct provinces untenable. Thus, Locke subordinates revelation to
reason proper with regards to external marks and internal marks or interpretation. And
proper or vulgar faith should be subordinate to proper reason as the mind ought to believe
rationally.
There are a few other important arguments Locke makes pertaining to reason,
faith, and revelation. First, when an attested and assured divine revelation stands in
contradiction to a proposition supported not by reasonable certainty but natural
probability, regardless of the subject matter, the revelation ought to trump the proposition
that is probable on purely natural considerations. Second, while the Bible is the best
example of traditional revelation and deserves the highest degree of assent, it does not
necessarily exhaust traditional revelation or traditional revelation deserving of assurance.
This is because Locke does not rule out God performing miracles and giving original
revelation today that might be recorded. Third, if an alleged original revelation does not
have external marks accompanying it, one can receive it as such as long as it is consonant
with vulgar reason or Scripture. Fourth, it is possible that miracles associated with a
person or persons mark them as divine agents. Thus, this divine agent status confirms that
what they affirm in writing or confirm in the writing of another to be divine revelation is
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such. Of course, the so-called revelation must not definitively contradict knowledge or
other assured revelation.

CHAPTER 4: TOLAND’S SUBORDINATION OF FAITH AND REVELATION TO
REASON AND COMPARISON WITH LOCKE

Introduction
Although John Toland (1670-1722) penned numerous books on a variety of topics
in his two and a half decades of writing, the book that brought him the most notoriety was
his very first work, Christianity Not Mysterious (CNM).1 In it he borrows heavily from
John Locke’s (1632-1704) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay), a book
that by then had made a considerable and largely favorable impression on the educated.2

1

John Toland, Christianity not Mysterious: OR, A TREATISE Shewing, That there is nothing in
the GOSPEL Contrary to REASON, Nor ABOVE it: And that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d
A MYSTERY, 2nd ed. (London: printed for Sam Buckley, 1696). This is a slightly enlarged version of the
original and anonymously published 1st edition (London: 1696). From here onward, the page numbers of
CNM (2nd ed.) will be referenced parenthetically. The 1st edition of the work will be referenced in the
footnotes when needed. John Toland, An Apology for Mr. Toland, In a Letter from Himself to a Member of
the House of Commons in Ireland, etc. (London: 1697); John Toland, A Defence of Mr. Toland in a Letter
to Himself (London: printed for E. Whitlock, 1697); John Toland, Vindicius Liberius: or, M. Toland’s
Defence of himself, Against the late Lower House of Convocation, etc. (London: printed for Bernard
Lintott, 1702). The 2nd edition version of CNM is printed with the Apology in 1702 (London). From here
onward, CNM (2nd ed.) will be referenced parenthetically, indicating the page.
2

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, 3rd ed. (London: printed for
Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship, 1695). The 1695 edition is essentially a page for page
reprint of the 1694 edition (London: printed for Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship). Both
have been consulted and there are no important differences that are of concern here. Also, the 1695 edition
is the latest edition that John Toland would have been able to consult prior to the publication of Christianity
Not Mysterious. Also consulted is the critical edition of the Essay: John Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, ed. by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). From here onward, the
Essay (3rd ed.) will be referenced parenthetically, indicating the book, chapter, and section. Other pertinent
works of Locke pertain to Locke’s second most famous work, The Reasonableness of Christianity (ROC),
which came out prior to John Toland’s CNM. Locke also became embroiled in a verbose debate with John
Edwards which resulted in two vindications of ROC by Locke. John Locke, The Reasonableness of
Christianity, As delivered in the Scriptures, 2nd ed. (London: Awnsham and John Churchil, 1696); John
Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity As Delivered in the Scriptures, edited by John C. HigginsBiddle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). Higgins-Biddle’s critical edition of ROC is based upon, but not
slavishly, the “Harvard copy” of ROC. The Harvard copy is a first edition ROC that contains Locke’s notes,
emendations, and corrections. John C. Higgins-Biddle, ed., “Introduction,” in The Reasonableness of

165

166
Bishop Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), who was in a heated debate with the Unitarians
at the time, spied in Toland’s CNM what he thought was a defense of the Unitarians
against him on certain points and an attack on the doctrine of the Trinity. Stillingfleet also
noticed the numerous Lockean appropriations in CNM. In A Discourse In Vindication of
the Doctrine of the Trinity (Discourse) Stillingfleet takes aim at CNM and parts of
Locke’s Essay from which he sees Toland building his case. While Locke himself was
not charged with heresy, Stillingfleet accuses Locke of paving the way—albeit
unwittingly—for it. That is, Stillingfleet believed that Toland had shown the unorthodox
conclusions of the foundational, epistemological principles of the Essay, to which Locke,
its very author, only loosely adhered. Locke felt he and his Essay were under fire, and
despite advice to the contrary, two of the great theological and philosophical minds of
their generation became embroiled in a rigorous debate. John Toland essentially became
a bystander in this particular controversy, allowing Locke to clarify grossly
misinterpreted parts of CNM for Stillingfleet.3

Christianity As Delivered in the Scriptures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), cxxxiv. I have researched both
and note the page numbers of the 1696 second edition in the footnotes and the corresponding pagination of
the critical edition in brackets.
3

Edward Stillingfleet, A Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity with an Answer to the Late
Socinian Objections Against It from Scripture, Antiquity and Reason, 2nd ed. (London: printed by J.H. for
Henry Mortlock, 1697). The 1st edition has the same bibliographic information. There are no pertinent
differences between the editions that concern this chapter. The subsequent works in or referencing the
debate are, in order of dissemination: John Locke, A Letter to Edward Ld Bishop of Worcester, Concerning
Some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke’s Essay of Humane Understanding: In a Late Discourse of his
Lordships, In Vindication of the Trinity (London: printed for A. and J. Churchill, 1697); Edward
Stillingfleet, The Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Letter, Concerning Some Passages Relating
to His Essay of Humane Understanding, Mention’d in the late Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity
(London: Printed by J.H. for Henry Mortlock, 1697); John Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend
the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to His Letter, Concerning Some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke’s
Essay of Humane Understanding: In a Late Discourse of His Lordships, In Vindication of the Trinity
(London: printed by H. Clark for A. and J. Churchill, and E. Castle, 1697); Edward Stillingfleet, The
Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Second Letter; Wherein His Notion of Ideas is Prov’d to be
Inconsistent with It Self, and with the Articles of the Christian Faith (London: printed by J.H. for Henry
Mortlock, 1698); John Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s
Answer to his Second Letter (printed by H.C. for A. and J. Churchill and E. Castle, 1699).

167
Despite the glaring mistakes Locke points out in Stillingfleet’s understanding of
the notions of ideas, certainty, and knowledge found in the Essay and Toland’s CNM,
Toland is still to this day portrayed somewhat as Stillingfleet paints him. While originally
portrayed by Stillingfleet as having brought the Essay’s foundational principles to their
true unorthodox end, Toland is now portrayed as having largely borrowed from the Essay
and having adapted it to his own heretical ends. This altered picture stands because most
are skeptical of or deny the accuracy of Stillingfleet’s reading of Locke and the Essay in
light of Locke’s defense, but for some reason assume that the bishop’s reading of
Toland’s CNM is correct.
Scholarly assessments of Toland tend to abound with a few major, intertwined
problems related to this prevailing view that Stillingfleet read CNM correctly and that
Toland did greatly diverge from Locke despite the fact that both built on similar
foundations. Supporting or resulting from this view are three common assertions often
made regarding the juxtaposition of Locke and Toland: 1) Toland appropriates the
foundational principles of Locke’s Essay to a significant degree, 2) Locke accepts
propositions above reason, while Toland does not, and 3) Locke accepts divine revelation
and Toland rejects, or essentially rejects, divine revelation. These three assertions, which
are related to the prevailing view of CNM, are teeming with problems. First, assertion one
is simply vague. Assertion two is the most widely known. There is clear textual evidence
that Locke accepts things “above reason” and Toland rejects them. In fact, it seems as
though this clear textual evidence is the best piece of evidence supporting the prevailing
view that Toland, the disciple, attacked his master. But, due to the lack of specificity of
assertion one, an imposing assumption actually undergirds assertion two. The assumption
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is that Locke and Toland are operating with the same notion of reason in Locke’s
acceptance of things above reason and Toland’s rejection of things above reason.
Surprisingly, no one has attempted an in-depth explanation of Toland’s understanding of
reason. To operate as if it is the same as Locke’s is not only presumptuous but
problematic since Locke’s understanding of reason is one of the most contested topics in
Locke scholarship. Furthermore, due to the lack of comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s
foundational, epistemological principles and their respective views of reason, assertion
three is made. In fact, some incorrectly identify above reason propositions and revelation
making assertions two and three identical. But of those that understand propositions
above reason to be a subset of revelation or think the two to be overlapping somehow,
they appear to think assertions two and three are mutually supportive for one reason or
another.4 Together the three assertions are coherent and they give a slightly more detailed
explanation of the prevailing view’s claim that Toland did greatly diverge from Locke.
But while Locke scholarship is fraught with significant detailed analysis that works
toward answering important questions that bear on the relationship between Locke and
Toland, this is clearly not the case in Toland scholarship. It is riddled with reliance on
second-hand information on or readings of Toland, which is likely due to the prolixity of
the Locke-Stillingfleet debate and CNM’s hard-to-follow style. In short, there are
numerous problems in Locke and especially Toland scholarship, some named above,

4

As indicated in chapter two, some misunderstand propositions above reason to include
propositions from natural sources about natural things. The correct understanding of the relationship of
propositions above reason and revelation is that propositions above reason are revealed propositions that
we would not have conceived of on our own, but if we had, we would have no reason to assent to them. All
of Locke’s examples are supernatural in nature. Above reason propositions do not exhaust revelation since
revelation might provide us with natural or supernatural propositions that we could have arrived at on our
own or that might deny propositions that we arrived at on our own without revelation. Revelation also deals
with past, observable matters of fact in history.

169
which have caused Locke and Toland to be viewed as very similar in some respects but
greatly different in others.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, whose ultimate goal is to compare the epistemologies of
Locke and Toland, help correct and inform these three assertions and more. Chapter 2 set
out to show that Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty comport and that the
ensuing debate between Locke and Stillingfleet and its reception left little resolved
regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies. Chapter 2 went part
way in clarifying assertion one and correcting assertion three, among other clarifications
and corrections. Regarding assertion one, it was shown, as already stated, that Toland’s
notions of ideas and certainty actually comport with Locke’s notions. It was thus shown
that Stillingfleet’s claim that CNM makes the sole duty of reason to be obtaining certainty
and his related claim that certainty can only be had by clear and distinct ideas in CNM are
false. In regards to assertion three, the suggestion was made in chapter 2 that the charge
that Toland rejected revelation or at least undercut its authority actually came from
Locke’s discovery that Stillingfleet, at one point in the debate, makes an argument whose
logical implications, unbeknownst to him, undercut the ability of revelation to be novel
and correct natural probability. Locke notes that Stillingfleet actually is working with
premises held by the position of those whom he opposes. And so it appears that many,
like Roger Woolhouse, think the position which Stillingfleet was trying to oppose was
that of John Toland, who stands at the beginning of the debate.5 So, that is most likely
where the idea came from that revelation, according to Toland’s CNM, must be

5

Roger Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 408409. Cf. Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply . . . Answer to His Second Letter, 419-420.
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subordinate to a divinely unassisted, natural reason and thus is not able to be novel or
correct natural probability.
Chapter 3 is the completion of the exploration into Locke’s epistemology and sets
the stage for making corrections and improvements to the three assertions. While chapter
2 focuses on Locke’s ideas, certainty, and knowledge, chapter 3 continues the
investigation, focusing primarily on reason and its related faculties and reason’s
relationships with faith and revelation. It suggests what reason and its related faculties are
and explains the relationships between reason and faith and reason and revelation. There
it is argued that to understand Locke’s description of reason, and thus the relationships
between reason and faith and reason and revelation, one must acknowledge that in the
Essay Locke primarily conceives of the mind employing the faculty of reason working in
reason’s proper office or scope, which entails the considerations of natural as well as
divine sources of information, and a corresponding proper faith that pertains to probable
(uncertain) propositions from the same sources. He also asserts that divinely revealed
propositions trump the propositions supported by the probability from purely natural
sources. In Essay IV.xviii, however, he conceives of the mind employing reason in a
diminished office, or concerning only natural sources, and a corresponding vulgar faith,
concerned with only divine sources; but he does this partly, at least, to show that such an
antithetical framing of the two fails to maintain definitive boundaries. As a result, faith in
or assent to a proposition from any source and the determination of divine revelation as
such morally ought to be the result of the mind employing its power of reason in its
proper scope or office. Moreover, it is vulgar reason that allows him to concede to a
category of propositions above reason.
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Chapter 4 will finish the comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s epistemologies,
which will enable improvements or corrections to the three assertions discussed above.
Chapter 4, the present chapter, will focus on the same questions regarding Toland that
were asked of Locke in chapter 3: 1) According to Toland, what is reason?; 2) What is its
relationship to faith?; and 3) What is its relationship to revelation? But, in chapter 4, a
concurrent point-for-point comparison with Locke will be undertaken.
Thus, this chapter argues that the salient differences between Locke and Toland
with respect to their understandings and treatments of reason, its related faculties, faith,
and revelation are not based on or evidenced by their respective categorizations of
propositions, but rather on Toland’s attempt at working out the implications of Locke’s
epistemological principles in conjunction with Toland’s interpretations of certain biblical
passages and certain theological preferences and presuppositions. Had Locke ordered
propositions according to his preferred consideration of reason, his categorization of
propositions would be the same as Toland’s. The resultant, substantial differences
between Locke and Toland in their understandings and treatments of epistemology are
connected with Toland’s definite or likely rejections of theological and philosophical
positions that Locke does not dismiss: non-materialism of the soul, post-New Testament
original revelation and miracles, and prior-to-the-close-of-the-New-Testament divine
revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed faculty and private miracles for believers.6
This chapter will follow the same outline as chapter 3. Part I will serve as the state
of the question. Part II will touch on preliminary issues. It will give a brief rehearsal of
6

Toland would reject any claim of a private miracle that occurred in the presence of a biblical
unbeliever that was not to have been done by God and for the purpose of helping the unbeliever with her
unbelief (CNM 151). John Locke does not specifically discuss the claims of believers in non-biblical
religions regarding miracles done in favor of their religion.
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ideas, knowledge, and certainty followed by an expositional explanation of the faculties
of knowledge and judgment often associated with reason. Part III will describe Toland’s
conception of reason. Part IV will describe the relationship between reason and faith. An
explanation of what propositions above reason are will be offered in Part V. Part VI will
describe the relationship of reason and revelation. Finally, the chapter will end with a
section focusing on conclusions.

Part I: State of the Question
The scholarship on Toland’s epistemology is notably variegated and is
intertwined with various supposed narratives that will be discussed in what follows. In
the last chapter it was shown that nearly all miss Locke’s distinction between proper
reason and vulgar reason. It is thus not surprising that most miss what Toland precisely
intends by the faculty of reason, since all acknowledge Toland’s epistemological
principles are significantly dependent on or presuppose Locke’s Essay.7 Those who
misunderstand Locke on reason and then move from Locke to Toland, presupposing an
adoption of Lockean vulgar reason, will misunderstand Toland as well, at least on a few
points. As said above, they will wrongly identify Locke and Toland as meaning the same
thing in labeling propositions as being above reason. Whatever the case, in the end they
see Toland as subordinating revelation to natural, unassisted revelation or rejecting
revelation outright. Immediately below are cases in point for both conclusions.
Most often and especially, but not exclusively, in pre-1980’s scholarship, Toland
is portrayed as deistic or a deist—one who rejects an epistemological need of revelation

7

See the following footnotes regarding what each scholar has to say in regards to Toland’s
dependence on Locke’s Essay.
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for true religion. This scholarship can be divided into two groups, based on whether they
argue that Toland thinks that Scripture is useful for Christians or not. These scholarly
works tend to be brief in their treatments of Toland or his epistemology making their
placement in one of the two groups only likely and placement based on further
distinctions within the contours of these two groups conjectural. The first of these groups
claims amount to this: regardless of his claimed intentions, Toland’s primary intent with
CNM is to argue that either acceptable divine revelation is superfluous or that divine
revelation does not exist. These scholars can sometimes be read either way due to a lack
of clarity. Moreover, they interpret Toland as arguing that we should make no functional
distinction between the natural religion of reason, or morality, and Christianity. Such
scholars are: Daniel C. Fouke, Gerald R. Cragg, Philip McGuinness, and Leslie Stephen.8

8

Daniel C. Fouke, Philosophy and Theology in a Burlesque Mode: John Toland and “The Way of
Paradox” (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2007), 237-238. Fouke writes, “Toland advanced a number of
powerful arguments for reducing Christianity to a purely natural religion based on reason alone” (237). It
would have been helpful had Fouke given a definition of what he thinks Toland means by the faculty of
reason. It is not even defined in his subsection “Reason and Enthusiasm” (81-86) or in his discussion of
CNM (222-240). It appears that Fouke thinks that Toland does not believe that any propositions are actually
revealed by God (221, 227, 236). In regards to his dependence on Locke, Fouke writes: “While Christianity
not Mysterious set out an official epistemology that was clearly modeled on Locke’s, Toland’s mode of
philosophizing revealed epistemological concepts that were far different from Locke’s, with a strong
emphasis on what we might now call the ideological functions of discourse” (23). At no point in the work
does he give a treatment of Locke’s Essay. Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason, 16481789, revised (New York: Penguin Groups Ltd, 1990), 78, 160. Cragg notes that Toland presupposes the
necessity of revelation in CNM, but then claims that Toland thinks revelation is supplementary. It is not
totally clear what he means. It is possible that he means that for Toland revelation is not necessary for
salvation, but is helpful in other areas. It is also possible that he meant that Toland verbally committed to
the necessity of revelation but in effect argues the opposite in CNM (78). What he says in a later passage
supports this latter interpretation. From the context of the said later passage he groups Toland with the
Deists. The Deists were those who thought revelation “was at best superfluous, at worse superstitious.”
Moreover, he also notes that Toland’s CNM effectively banishes mystery, but without giving a definition as
to what is meant by “mystery.” “Reason” according to Toland, likewise, goes undefined (160). In regards
to Toland’s dependence on Locke, Cragg simply notes, “Toland presupposed Locke’s views and expanded
them, but he was more than Locke’s echo . . .” (78). No clarity is lent by another work of Cragg: Gerald R.
Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964),
67, 78, 83. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1972), 36-38. He places Toland in a group whose shared conviction is: “genuine
Christianity is identical with the religion of nature; natural religion is a perfect thing, and ‘additions’ are
both unnecessary and false” (37). He notes, however, that Toland thought that “The essence of Christianity
is the same as natural religion; there is nothing mysterious or above reason in the Gospel.” This naked
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The second group’s claims amount to this: regardless of his claimed intentions, Toland’s
primary intent with CNM is to argue the primacy of reason in religion without denying
the existence of revelation, unless a particular alleged revelation makes claims that don’t
match up with what one would think is reasonable under the consideration of purely
natural sources of information. In other words, revelation can be accepted as such as long
as it lends clarity or confirmation but not novelty. Such scholars are: James Turner, John
C. Higgins-Biddle, John Herman Randall, Jr., and Diego Lucci.9

statement would leave open the possibility that Toland accepted things as being divinely revealed (36).
Welch goes on to write: “Already in this second stage, the real primacy of natural religion is apparent. It
was only a short step to the declaration that revealed religion was wholly unnecessary, or even opposed to
the true religion of reason” (38). It is unclear what the difference between revelation being “unnecessary”
(37) versus “wholly unnecessary” (38) might be. (Also, the grouping together of those that claim that
revelation is “wholly unnecessary” with those that claim revelation might be opposed to religion is
suspect). In the end, there is too little given by Welch to conclude what Toland thinks reason to be and
whether or not he believes that there is such a thing as divinely revealed propositions. If we concentrate
solely on his comments regarding the group in which he places Toland (37), however, it would seem that
he thinks Toland rejects Scripture as being divine because it has the unnatural gospel. Philip McGuinness,
“Christianity Not Mysterious and the Enlightenment,” in John Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious: Text,
Associated Works and Critical Essays, ed. by Philip McGuiness, et al. (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, Ltd,
1997), 231-242. McGuinness interestingly makes no direct assertions about Toland, only quoting what
others have said about him. It appears as though he believes Toland to be a deist, someone who rejects
miracles and thinks “Morality should thus be based on natural law rather than revelation” (237). This
statement is why I placed him with those who reject revelation or think it superfluous. He does agree with
John Biddle’s claims of CNM’s dependence on the Essay (233-235). Leslie Stephen, History of English
Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), 94-118. Leslie claims
that Toland, through CNM, attacked the authenticity of the Bible (94). He is admittedly confused because
he says in certain respects Toland seems to indicate scholastic theology as a “possible science,” but then
writes: “The most obvious interpretation of Toland’s words would admit of pure Deism” (109). This latter
statement is why Stephen gets placed into this grouping of scholars. In respect to his relationship with
Locke, he notes that the whole of Toland’s philosophy was substantially derived from Locke (94).
9

James Turner, Without God, Without Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in America (Baltimore: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 51ff. He defines Deism thus: “Deism professed to be a religion
founded on reason alone, composed solely of truths about God evident in the order of nature, subjecting all
beliefs to the tests of reason and experience. In fact, it usually amounted to a severely stripped down
version of Christianity, with all that smacked of mystery and superstition pared away” (51-52). This could
be clearer. Do deists believe divine revelation is possible presently or in the past? If so, might revelation
provide a better argument? Specifically regarding Toland, he notes that Toland believed revelation must
submit to reason’s judgment. In this light, it appears that Turner doubts that Toland actually considered
revelation a legitimate category (52). However, he refers to “[t]horoughgoing Deists” as those who
categorically rejected revelation, miracles, and “anything inaccessible to reason” (53). It thus appears he
views Toland as secretly a thoroughgoing deist or possibly one that admitted revelation of some sort.
Regarding Toland’s epistemological dependence on Locke, Turner simply notes that Toland “argued from
Lockean principles that only reason offered certitude and that revelation itself must submit to reason’s
judgment” (52). Based on this statement, I have placed him with those that understand Toland as accepting
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Many Toland scholars since the publication of Robert E. Sullivan’s 1982
biography on John Toland—John Toland and the Deist Controversy—have concentrated
on two levels of thought in CNM. While Toland is sometimes portrayed as undergoing
radical theological and philosophical development through his thirty years of writing,
which accounts for the increasingly unchristian slant in his publications,10 it has been
widely accepted by recent scholars, at least in part due to Sullivan’s arguments, that
Toland was a pantheistic materialist through his entire career; and thus CNM offers
Toland’s public or exoteric theology, while his later works progressively reveal his

revelation as such as long as it does not lend novelty. John C. Biddle, “Locke’s Critique of Innate
Principles and Toland’s Deism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 1976): 411-422.
Biddle is unclear in his treatment of Toland (417-422). He notes that Toland is highly dependent on Locke
but differs on one important point; whereas for Locke a revealed proposition cannot be believed if it is
contrary to knowledge, for Toland it cannot be believed if it is contrary to “‘natural’ or ‘common notions’”
(419-420). Biddle thinks Toland and Locke differ on this point somehow (but, in truth, as this chapter will
show they are making the same assertion). It becomes unclear, then, what Biddle means regarding
mysteries, things above reason, etc. He is clear that Toland might be read as “challenging the acceptance of
Scripture as revelation” (420). Also, John C. Higgins-Biddle, ed., “Introduction,” in The Reasonableness of
Christianity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), xv-cxv. The same vagueness regarding Toland and the
differences between Toland and Locke are seen here as well (xxviii-xxxv). Due to his framing of Toland as
considering revelation as such, even though it would be subordinate to natural reason, Higgins-Biddle is
placed in this group. John Herman Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind: A Survey of the
Intellectual Background of the Present Age (New York: Columbia, 1926; reprinted with a forward, 1976),
285-289. Randall understands two main factions to be disputing at the end of the 1600’s: orthodox or
supernatural rationalists—who insisted upon the “importance” of revelation—and the radicals or deists—
who “rejected” revelation. That “[b]oth agreed that the core of religion was a set of doctrines that could be
established by the unaided natural reason” (285) demonstrates the insufficiency of two categories at that
time period when considering the orthodox Reformed and Lutheran, let alone Locke, none of who think
very highly of our unaided reason in the area of religion. Nevertheless, it appears that Randall places
Toland in the supernatural rationalist category. He notes that Toland points out that Locke’s according to
reason and above reason categories are combined by Toland and that “testimony may be given by
revelation.” But then he claims that Toland rejects revelation that contradicts anything experience teaches
(289). He in the end is not fully clear. He does call Toland “Locke’s disciple” (289). Diego Lucci, Scripture
and Deism: The Biblical Criticism of the Eighteenth-Century British Deists (New York: Peter Lang, 2008).
Lucci interprets Toland as teaching that a doctrine from Scripture must be demonstratively certain or
probable upon purely natural sources of information to accept it as true and revealed (72-73). Regarding
Toland’s relationship to Lockean thought, Lucci says that Toland radicalized Lockean thought in that while
using Lockean principles Toland collapsed faith into knowledge (81-82). (The collapsing of faith and
knowledge is a common misunderstanding that was corrected in chapter two).
10

Cf. Robert E. Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy: A Study in Adaptations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 114-115. Here he assesses Chiara Giutini’s proposal as
found in Chiara Giutini, Panteismo e ideologia repubblicana: John Toland (1670-1722) (Bologna: Il
Mulino, 1979).
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esoteric or actual theology. There are two main reasons for this latter narrative, which has
found a significant and favorable hearing in scholarship. First, Toland, although denying
he ever wrote in this way, refers to those that do in CNM (1696) and Tetradymus
(1720)—evidence that he is cognizant of the writing form. Second, significant Toland
scholarship agrees that the anonymous Two Essays Sent in a Letter from Oxford to a
Nobleman in London, which is more antagonistic to Christianity than CNM and was
published before it, was written by John Toland.11 Thus scholars reason, CNM cannot be
Toland’s real views and he must have been a pantheistic materialist his entire writing
career, as is only revealed later.12 Although a coherent narrative results, Rhoda Rappaport
has argued effectively that Sullivan’s line of reasoning that many have adopted is faulty
on a few different counts. First, in her opinion, Two Essays is not pantheistic.13 Second,
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E.g., Sullivan, John Toland, 43-47, 114-119. L.P. Master of Arts, Two Essays in a Letter from
Oxford to a Nobleman in London (London: R. Baldwin, 1695). Cf. Rhoda Rappaport, “Questions of
Evidence: An Anonymous Tract Attributed to John Toland,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 2
(Apr., 1997): 339-348. Rappaport cites Giancarlo Carabelli as making a possible connection between
Toland and the Two Essays. Giancarlo Carabelli, Tolandiana: materiali bibliografici per lo studio
dell’opera e della fortuna di John Toland (1670-1722) (Florence, 1975), 20-21. Rappaport smartly notes:
“Carabelli’s cautious attribution would require no comment, were it not for the fact that what began as
conjecture has evolved into an established fact—all this without any notable addition to Carabelli’s
evidence” (339).
12

Toland explicitly rejects the notion that nature or the universe are God in Letters to Serena (pp.
219-220). He also sharply criticizes Spinoza in the work. John Toland, Letters to Serena: Containing, I.
The Origina and Force of Prejudices. II. The History of the Soul’s Immortality among the Heathens. III.
The Origin of Idolatry, and Reasons of Heathenism. As also, IV. A Letter to a Gentelman in Holland,
showing SPINOSA’s System of Philosophy to be without any Principle or Foundation. V. Motion essential
to Matter; in Answer to some Remarks by a Noble Friend on the Confutation of SPINOSA. To all which is
Prefix’d, VI. A Preface: being a Letter to a Gentleman in London, sent together with the foregoing
Dissertations, and declaring the several Occasions of writing them (London: printed for Bernard Lintot,
1704), 219-220.
13

Rappaport, “Questions of Evidence,” 347. I agree with the Rappaport. There are no reasons one
would or should arrive at the conclusion. The opening pages of the Two Essays are only taken by some to
be materialistic or pantheistic or naturalistic-atheistic because of the author’s reserve in accounting
something as a miracle. Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the
Early English Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 247. Beiser is another example
of a scholar who thinks wrongly that the Two Essays is naturalistic. He gives no reasons other than a naked
referencing of pages ii-iii, 2, & 4 of the Two Essays for support.
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Sullivan’s reasoning on the authorship idea, according to Rappaport, is circular: “He
begins with the assumption that Toland wrote the Two Essays; there must therefore be
clues to Toland’s authorship in the text: and the discovery of such clues then confirms the
initial assumption.”14 Her conclusion is that the evidence that John Toland wrote the Two
Essays is “feeble.”15 An important implication that Rappaport does not mention is that
her conclusion rocks Sullivan’s argument for concluding that CNM taken at face value
was not Toland’s true beliefs at that time. Scholars have taken Sullivan’s thesis
unquestioned, however, and most since Rappaport have not heeded her conclusion or at
least have not seen the major implication of it.
There are a few different groups of scholars that approach Toland’s CNM from
this esoteric/exoteric angle. The first group’s claims, regarding CNM, can be summarized
as follows: Toland’s intentions are to legitimate revelation in CNM because revelation
teaches right morals and civil order, even though he does not personally believe any
propositions are divinely revealed. He additionally intends all readers to understand he is
confirming the existence of revelation while plainly arguing that, nevertheless,
Christianity is an instance of natural religion.16 That is part of his exoteric program as
14

Rappaport, “Questions of Evidence,” 344.

15

Rappaport, “Questions of Evidence,” 348.

16

Sullivan, John Toland; Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason. They believe that CNM
teaches that revelation is not necessary for salvation nor is belief in Christ necessary for salvation (Sullivan
133, 228; Beiser 243, 255). They also believe CNM was written to “legitimate revelation in light of reason”
(quote from Beiser 243, Cf. 220 ) because the moral principles in revelation were important for civil order,
even though Toland knew that if reason were pushed to its limits it would lead rightly to naturalism or
materialism (Sullivan 119, 138, 173-4, 207-208; Beiser 244). Thus they both agree that Toland, at face
value, is affirming of revelation as such in his exoteric theology promulgated in CNM, while he is actually
a materialist who denies the possibility of revelation (Sullivan 125, 127, 216, 275; Beiser 247-9). They both
believe that Toland does use complex arguments, however, to attack or criticize revelation that is not
directly related to morals (Sullivan 119, 126, 133, 135; Beiser 254-7). Regarding Toland’s relationship with
Locke from Sullivan’s perspective, he believes he adopted Locke’s position on clear and distinct ideas (76)
and his epistemology was reliant on both the Essay and Unitarian tracts (124). He does discuss the ways in
which he thinks Toland differed from Locke in his epistemology, however (124ff). Regarding Toland’s
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unorthodox as it may be. The first scholar who is placed in this category, and who is most
responsible for scholars reading CNM from an esoteric/exoteric angle, is Robert E.
Sullivan, discussed above.17 The most significant oversight made by Sullivan in regards
to his reading of CNM, other than not treating what reason means or his attribution of the
Two Essays to Toland, is his taking Toland’s claims about the book of Revelation for the
New Testament. Sullivan writes: “In light of his conception of the New Testament as a
‘Prophetical History of the External State of the Church’ containing ‘no new Doctrines,’
its importance as a means of information seems doubtful.”18 Toland’s claims here are
clearly and explicitly about the book of Revelation and not the New Testament. If this is
not the fundamental reason Sullivan thinks Toland argues that Christianity is an instance
of natural religion, it at least fuels his faulty reading. He is also convinced that Toland
taught that we can only accept clear and distinct ideas in CNM and that with regards to
the Bible this “precludes any discoveries.”19 In other words, revelation is subordinate to
unassisted, natural reason or vulgar reason; or, if it is not thought at least probable on the
consideration of purely natural sources of information, an alleged divinely revealed
proposition is to be rejected.
The second scholar that can be placed in this group with Sullivan is Frederick C.
Beiser. He does not simply echo Sullivan’s claims, however. For instance, he portrays
relationship with Locke from Beiser’s perspective, Beiser writes that Toland took Locke’s critical use of
(Locke’s) concept of reason one step farther. While Locke defended experimental philosophy and attacked
scholasticism with Lockean reason, Toland did the same; but he also attacked doctrines with non-moral
implications as they were useless for salvation and civil well-being, both based on morality (Beiser 256-7).
17

Sullivan, John Toland. He notes that CNM’s epistemology was rather opaque to all at its
publishing (124). He affirms, however, CNM’s critical appropriation of the Essay (76).
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Sullivan, John Toland, 125.

Sullivan, John Toland, 216; Cf. 133, 139. It is not clear he understands how Locke uses clear
and distinct ideas either (223).
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Toland in a slightly different way. He thinks that Toland has esoterically merged his
pantheism with his earlier Christianity. Thus, according to Beiser, while maintaining both
in his esoteric or true doctrine, Toland only incorporates his Christian thoughts
exoterically.20 In response to those who might object to this notion due to some
materialistic points that appear in CNM, Beiser concludes that these are occasional slips
of the pen where his esoteric materialism inadvertently comes out.21 There are other
epistemological claims that Beiser makes regarding CNM that are problematic. As
chapter two shows, Beiser (and Sullivan) do not grasp what Toland or Locke means by
the terms clear and distinct ideas or how they incorporate them into their respective
epistemologies. Furthermore, Beiser maintains that Toland is advocating a verifiability
criterion for propositions in addition to Toland’s insistence that we should not (or cannot)
assent to anything but clear and distinct ideas (clear and distinct ideas understood by
Beiser vaguely as being non-mysterious ideas). That is, according to Beiser, unless
experience can verify what an alleged revelation is stating, we are not to assent to it.22
Thus anything we cannot obtain evidence for “in principle” is above reason and should be
rejected.23 But this is only part of Toland’s attack, according to Beiser, and it is aimed at
propositions above reason. Toland puts forth, Beiser claims, another argument more
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Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 129-130,
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Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 247.
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Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 250-2.
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Beiser understands CNM to admit truths above reason that are above reason only in that they
lack evidence to confirm or deny them. Regardless, they are comprehensible. The above reason
propositions that CNM rejects, according to Beiser, are those that are “incomprehensible” and cannot be
empirically verified in principle. It is quite possible Beiser deems something incomprehensible based on the
fact it cannot in principle be empirically verified. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 254. Beiser does
express surprise at the radical implications of this criterion. Instead of doubting his reading of Toland, he
doubts that Toland wanted to use this verifiability criterion in all applicable situations (252).
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consistently. This argument is that it is irrational to hold any beliefs of no use to us; and
therefore, anything in revelation not dealing with morality—the means of salvation—is
irrational to entertain.24
The second group of scholars that approach John Toland from the
esoteric/exoteric angle believe that Toland has a three-tiered intention in his writing.
They do not think that Toland’s true intent is to defend supposedly divine revelation that
supports moral and civil order like the first group comprised of Sullivan and Beiser. The
three-tiered intention is as follows: first, Toland wants CNM at face value to read like a
Christian work—for instance, defending revelation; second, Toland wants to lead unwary
readers to make for themselves the irreligious conclusions against which Toland pretends
to be writing; and third, Toland wants to convey to the intelligent, irreligious readers his
true beliefs. Thus these thinkers are tied together with the common theme that John
Toland is subversive in a fashion that is not readily apparent. (Thus these interpreters go
beyond Justin Champion’s claims that Toland is being openly and intentionally
“subversive” against civil and spiritual tyranny—as Toland sees them).25 These scholars
admittedly believe their respective treatments point to Toland being a more brilliant
thinker than his two major biographers, Pierre Desmaizeux and Robert E. Sullivan, as
well as many others, have allowed.26 David Berman and Daniel Fouke are two of the
most notable scholars in this group.27 Moreover, it is not just these broad conclusions that
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Justin Champion, Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 16961722 (New York: Manchester University Press), 35, 250ff.
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Cragg, Reason and Authority, 67, Sullivan, John Toland, 43.
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David Berman, “Deism, Immortality, and the Art of Theological Lying,” Deism, Masonry, and
the Enlightenment, ed. by J.A. Leo Lemay (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), 61-78; David
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they share but some commonalities in their published treatments of Toland. Both
presuppose Toland is insincerely Christian, a common position since Sullivan, and make
assertions amidst scant exegetical work.28
The major challenges that should confront their readings are formidable. First,
there is Rappaport’s implicit undercutting of the esoteric/exoteric reading of CNM.
Second, while many doubt that Locke was orthodox in his beliefs, despite what he may
have thought, few doubt his sincerity of admitting of divinely revealed propositions and
related arguments.29 This chapter will argue that Toland is heavily reliant on Locke. All

Berman, “Disclaimers as Offence Mechanisms in Charles Blount and John Toland,” Atheism from the
Reformation to the Enlightenment, ed. by Michael Hunter and David Wooton (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992), 255-272; David Berman, “Toland, John,” in The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, ed. by Tom Flynn
(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2007), 749-751; Cf. David Berman, A History of Atheism in Britain: From
Hobbes to Russell (New York: Croom Helm, 1988); Daniel C. Fouke, Philosophy and Theology in a
Burlesque Mode: John Toland and “The Way of Paradox,” (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2007).
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David Berman believes Toland engages in the practice of “theological lying.” Toland, like
others, could not promulgate their unorthodox views overtly because of the oppression from the orthodox
(Berman, “Disclaimers as Offence,” 256). In one essay, Berman, with scant exegetical evidence to build on,
writes: “The dilemma I am posing, in short, is that either Blount and Toland, were orthodox, rather boring
Christians, or they were theological liars.” He doubts any of his own critics would conclude the first option
is feasible and therefore they must agree with the second (Berman, “Disclaimers as Offence,” 257). Little
clarity and evidence supporting this argument are given by this or the other essay involving Toland. In his
other essay, he argues that deists, by definition, minimally reject Christian mysteries and the authority of
Scripture; and whenever they use arguments from Scripture or Scripture authoritatively their more
intelligent readers would understand that they mean the opposite; and therefore, since Toland is a deist,
when he makes conclusions that are dependent on Scripture he means the opposite (Berman, “The Art of
Theological Lying,” 61). What is more, this account given by Berman about Toland’s deism is in fact a
simplification of Toland’s legerdemain. That is, CNM is a disguised deism. But Toland knows if one were
to follow his reasoning, deism will yield pantheism and pantheism will yield atheism (Berman,
“Disclaimers as Offence,” 271-2). Regardless as to whether he is right or wrong, Berman does not
demonstrate how CNM inevitably leads to atheism. That would be very helpful to understand. Furthermore,
Berman claims, like others, that Toland actually means the opposite in CNM when he says that he is not
writing satirically (Berman, “Disclaimers as Offence,” 271-2). Daniel Fouke, who also believes Toland is a
theological liar, notes the difficulties of interpreting such a one: “[H]is [Toland’s] philosophy reveals little
of what he actually believed. Philosophy and theology, as he practice them, had very little to do with the
positive expression of his beliefs. He practiced philosophy to undermine, rent, and up-heave the social basis
of power and privilege” (Fouke, Philosophy and Theology, 12; Cf. 187). Despite similar claims to this
effect, ironically both Berman and Fouke are resolute in their assertions of what Toland does believe.
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Jonathan Donald Conrad, “Locke’s Use of the Bible in: The Two Treatises, The Reasonableness
of Christianity, and A Letter Concerning Toleration” (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 2004). He
arrives at a tentative conclusion that would not be welcomed in the majority of Locke scholarship: that
Locke “is an esoteric writer who may have been attempting to undermine the authority of the Bible while
simultaneously appealing to it” (abstract). Cf. David Foster, “The Bible and Natural Freedom in John
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Toland scholars would agree with that statement to a point. So if it is really Locke’s
arguments that inevitably lead to irreligious conclusions, might not Locke really be
playing the esoteric/exoteric game, too? Or, is it that Toland is so intelligent that he sees
holes in Locke’s arguments and writes as if the intelligentsia, of which Locke is
obviously not a part (I am being coy), will see these errors too? Either way, until they
give a thorough exegetical treatment as to what Toland is arguing and how, their readers
are left with little more than assertions (many of which the readers are left to check for
themselves). Also, it matters little that Toland’s contemporaries believed he wrote in a
subversive manner—evidence thought to be substantial and relied upon heavily by
Berman and Fouke. What is really important is that these scholars actually show how he
did so.
Moreover, while most acknowledge that Toland adopts and appropriates Locke’s
principles to a significant degree but critiques Locke for allowing a category of
propositions above reason (as noted above), Ian Leask believes that Toland ought to be
read as undermining or subverting Locke not only by clearly denying a category of
propositions above reason but because he also subtly does two things in CNM: 1) shows
that Locke’s own Essay undercuts Locke’s above reason category and 2) rejects Locke’s
critique on innate ideas, the foundation of the Essay. Leask begins his essay on Toland
and Locke by rightly acknowledging that Toland’s treatment of ideas, sensation and
reflection, intuition and reason, and his musings on the performative self-undoing of
Locke’s Political Thought,” in Piety and Humanity, ed. by Douglas Kries (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 181-212. His earlier claims are in the same vein as Conrad’s. Contrast
these assessments with Justin Champion’s assessment: “As many historians have established beyond
doubt, Locke was a pious man, committed to exploring and understanding his Christian faith and belief
with absolute rigor and industry.” Justin Champion, “’A law of continuity in the progress of theology’:
Assessing the Legacy of John Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity, 1695-2004,” Eighteenth-Century
Thought 3 (2007): 111-142 [page cited: 122].
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‘total’ skepticism, and his comments on ‘real’ and ‘nominal essences are “thoroughly
Lockean,” albeit not as detailed.30 The problems with Leask’s essay, however, from that
point on are many. He takes Toland’s rejection of propositions above reason to be an
indication that Toland “refuses in any way to subordinate reason.”31 He thinks that the
unintelligible mysteries that Toland rejects in CNM are all allegedly revealed
propositions with novelty.32 In short, he errs on this particular point by failing to make a
distinction between revelation that contains some things that we would most likely not
imagine unless told, but once told are imaginable, versus revelation that is true but not
imaginable when revealed. The latter is what Toland (and Locke) rejects (recall from
chapter 2 that Toland rejects any assertion or assertions from any source that cannot be
imagined). This oversight made by Leask is also made by most, if not all, Locke and
Toland scholarship. This crucial distinction is chapter 3’s distinction between above
vulgar reason propositions, which are acceptable, and above proper reason propositions,
which are unacceptable.
Moreover, Leask also incorrectly claims that Toland’s priority of maintaining the
supremacy of reason is to such an extent “that he will even declare an identity of faith
and knowledge (CNM, 3.4.65).”33 In other words, he like Beiser spots what he thinks is a
verifiability criterion in CNM where one must reason from her personal experience before
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assenting to a proposition. 34 This last point was shown to be incorrect in chapter two of
this dissertation.
This theme of great divergence between Locke and Toland is further reinforced in
other ways by Leask. For instance it is reinforced by Leask’s correct understanding of
Toland’s view of substance—that Toland does not allow things to be considered “above
reason” because their real essences cannot be known—but with a wrong application—he
thinks this is leveled against Locke’s category of above reason. In short, Leask thinks that
Toland has shown how Locke’s Essay undercuts itself and a further way that much of
revelation is ultimately to be denied.35 Contra to Leask on this point and as shown in
chapter three of this dissertation, Locke never conceived of the above reason category in
regards to substance or anything natural, but only supernatural things. As will be shown
in this chapter, among other things, the actual critique made by Toland referenced by
Leask, which in truth is against someone other than Locke, undercuts nothing in Locke
and simply repeats in short order what Locke claims. With this clarification in mind, for
anyone to think that Toland’s argument that substance is not above reason is against
Locke would be to suppose that Toland misunderstands Locke. What is more, Leask
thinks that Toland undermines Locke’s critique of innate ideas by conflating intuition and
innate ideas, thus subtly critiquing Locke’s rejection of innate ideas. 36 As was shown in
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Leask, “Personation and Immanent Undermining,” 245; Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 251,
254. Again, Beiser writes of Toland’s verifiability criterion negating things that are “in principle” not
empirically verifiable (254). For instance, he writes, “What we cannot verify in any possible experience is
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Leask, “Personation and Immanent Undermining,” 254. Leask writes: “. . . the founding
principle of that philosophy [Essay] is never employed, either directly or indirectly, and is neither
adumbrated or discussed; it is a kind of void or hole that is, paradoxically, all the more present in its

185
chapter 2, this is patently false. That Leask denies that Toland simply presupposes
Locke’s critique of innate ideas is due in part to the misinterpretations Leask has made on
the earlier aforementioned points.37 Finally, Leask claims that CNM “deserves to be
treated as a work of philosophical significance” because Toland smartly undermines
Locke with Locke’s own Essay or because of his subtle divergence. This is incorrect.
CNM, in truth, deserves to be treated as a work of philosophical significance because
Toland seems to be a scholar of note who grasps Locke’s epistemology.
On another issue, scholars typically believe that Toland does not believe in the
occurrence of supernatural miracles. This is typically thought to be the case because of
his esoteric naturalism (pantheistic materialism) or because some think that CNM actually
argues against them. The latter reading is typically held by those who think CNM is a
thorough-going deistic work. Those that think that Toland rejects miracles because he is a
deist or pantheist often find support for their interpretation in their concurrent
misunderstanding of what “mysteries,” which CNM rejects, are.38
Another important issue that deals with the epistemologies of Locke and Toland is
John C. Higgins-Biddle’s hypothesis that Locke wrote ROC after seeing a draft of CNM
because CNM, being deist and using Lockean epistemology, would make Locke and his
Essay appear deistic. This hypothesis was then incorporated into Sullivan’s biography on
absence. We might even say that the entirety of CNM is dominated by this absence—an absence that takes
on extra significance when we consider the extent to which the direct engagement with Locke shapes so
much else in CNM.”
37
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Beiser is an interesting example. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 226, 247-8. Beiser thinks
Toland trips himself up when he tries to write with orthodox content from a naturalistic frame of reference.
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Toland and has been treated as fact ever since.39 The implication of this chapter for
Higgins-Biddle’s hypothesis is this: What happens to this hypothesis when it becomes
evident CNM is not a thorough-going deistic work but affirms past supernatural miracles
and divine revelation, while denying only present claims? Locke himself seemed
somewhat suspicious of present-day claims of revelation and miracles in the Essay
(IV.xviii.6) and ROC.40

Part II: Preliminaries
Before exploring reason, faith, and revelation in Toland and a concurrent pointfor-point comparison with Locke, this chapter will cover preliminary concepts in Toland
that are foundational to the discussion. The topics that will be covered here are the
following: ideas, knowledge and certainty as results of the employment of our mental
faculties by the mind, the term knowledge in the faculty sense, and the term judgment.
This section will answer the following two questions for each foundational concept: 1)
What is it?, and 2) How does it compare to the analogue notion in Locke? Our coverage
of ideas, knowledge (resultant sense), and certainty will be a brief review of the
comparison of those notions that appear in chapter 2. Furthermore, the same general
description of Toland’s treatment of ideas, knowledge, and certainty that was discovered
in chapter 2 will be shown to hold for the remaining preliminary concepts treated in this
section. Thus, CNM’s treatment of these topics is not as detailed as the Essay’s nor does
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it always use the same terminology, but CNM definitely comports with the Essay on these
topics.
Ideas, as recalled from chapter 2, are foundational concepts for CNM and the
Essay. For Toland, ideas are “the immediate Object of the Mind when it thinks, or any
Thought that the Mind imploys about any thing” (11). Both Locke and Toland talk of
simple ideas that are received passively by the mind either by the senses or reflection
upon our mental operations. The only differences between the two thinkers’ treatments
are terminological. Toland calls Locke’s simple ideas “simple and distinct” and he never
uses the term reflection, but rather alludes to awareness or consciousness of the
operations of the soul (9-12). What is more, both thinkers refer to the combinations of
simple ideas as “complex ideas” (12-13). Again, while Locke’s treatment of simple and
complex ideas is lengthy, Toland’s is extraordinarily brief. Nothing he says however
disagrees with Locke’s treatment of the corresponding notions (Cf. xvii).
While Locke delineates five antithetically paired categories of propositions—clear
vs. obscure, distinct vs. confused, adequate vs. inadequate, real vs. fantastical, and true
vs. false—Toland operates conceptually with only the first three. He uses the terms clear
and obscure and opposes them (60). And he, like Locke, notes that some complex ideas
are clear in part and obscure in others (80-81). That is, an idea of a thing may be
composed of permanent and conceivable parts and also parts that are obscure or unclear.
Furthermore, while he does not use the word “confused” in reference to ideas, he does
use distinct on occasion without any formal definition of the term. Regardless, the way he
uses “distinct” comports with the way in which Locke uses the label; it is something that
can definitely be distinguished from something to which it is similar (25, 85-86). As to
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the adequate versus inadequate distinction, Toland’s use of the distinction is consistent
with Locke’s. An adequate idea is any idea that is complete, whereas an inadequate idea
is any that is incomplete or, in other words, an idea whose properties we do not all know
(74). As a note, within his discussion of adequate and inadequate ideas he references “an
excellent modern Philosopher,” whom all universally acknowledge to be Locke (82).
Finally, while Toland does not explicitly use the real vs. fantastical or true vs. false
distinctions in reference to ideas, it is impossible to imagine that he would deny the
legitimacy of such distinctions. In fact, all of the examples of ideas in his adequate vs.
inadequate discussion are what Locke would call “real” or those ideas that actually exist
(74-87). For Locke and Toland only real ideas can be called adequate or inadequate.
Toland’s discussion of knowledge falls within the bounds of what Locke
discusses in regards to his analogue, although Toland’s treatment is much less detailed.
Toland’s definition of knowledge is: “nothing else but the Perception of the Agreement
or Disagreement of our Ideas in a greater or lesser Number, whereinsoever this
Agreement or Disagreement may consist” (12). It is merely a rewording of Locke’s
definition of knowledge: “Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception
of the connection and agreement, or disagreement or repugnancy of any of our ideas”
(IV.i.2). While Locke goes on to explicitly delineate four sorts of knowledge, Toland
does not. Toland does heavily utilize Locke’s identity and diversity sense of the word
knowledge, but never ascribes to it a distinguishing term. In the Essay, Locke writes: “As
to the first sort of Agreement or Disagreement, viz. Identity, or Diversity. ‘Tis the first
Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments or Ideas at all, to perceive its Ideas, and so
far as it perceives them to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their
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difference, and that one is not another” (IV.i.4). So simply to perceive or understand an
idea is to know that idea in a qualified sense in Locke. Likewise Toland uses knowledge
in this qualified sense (139). This is how Toland can say that matters of faith are matters
of knowledge. To miss this point, as shown in chapter two, is to gravely misunderstand
Toland’s epistemology.
Toland’s treatment of degrees of knowledge also comports with Locke’s. What
Locke calls intuitive knowledge, Toland calls immediate knowledge: “When the Mind,
without the Assistance of any other Idea, immediately perceives the Agreement or
Disagreement of two or more Ideas” (12). Both agree that the method of knowledge by
which this comes about is called intuition (13-14). The second degree of knowledge,
what Locke calls demonstrative knowledge, Toland calls mediate knowledge. This is the
result of successfully employing the faculties to show an indubitable proof that some
proposition is necessarily the case (13-14). Toland agrees with Locke that the method of
knowledge corresponding to that degree of knowledge is reason or demonstration (14).
Furthermore, Toland, like Locke, acknowledges that both these types of knowledge give
certainty or show the constant and necessary agreement or disagreement between two or
more ideas. All else is but probable (14-15). Moreover, while Locke is explicit that we
should count the assurance that our powers of sensation give us of things (such as the
thing’s existence) as certain, although it is technically not the case, Toland is not so overt.
Since “Nothing can have no Properties, and I cannot make one single Idea at my
Pleasure, nor avoid receiving Ideas when Objects work on my Senses,” Toland concludes
that we must trust our powers of sensation (20). So, while Toland does not call the
information provided to us by our powers of sensation sensitive knowledge, the
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conceptual and functional results are the same. Our powers of sensation are treated as
providing us with knowledge and thus certainty.
Just as Toland’s treatment of Lockean knowledge is brief compared to Locke’s,
so is Toland’s discussion of judgment and probability, which results in a less detailed
Lockean version of both. While he makes comments on judgment and probability now
and then in CNM, he does designate two very brief chapters to the discussion in Section I,
the first entitled, “Of the Means of INFORMATION,” and the next, “Of the Ground of
PERSWASION.” Starting with the subject matter of the first chapter, means of
information, he discusses the sources that inform our minds of the knowledge that we
comprehend. Again, sometimes when Toland uses “knowledge,” as in these chapters, he
does not necessarily mean intuition or demonstration, but rather the mind’s
comprehension of ideas. As stated before, that is a copy of Locke’s identity and diversity
sense of the term knowledge. In fact, Toland’s definition of the means of information
reflects that notion of knowledge: “those Ways whereby any thing comes barely to our
Knowledge, without necessarily commanding our Assent” (16). In other words, some
proposition can be introduced into our mind such that we perceive it—and thus have
knowledge of it in the identity and diversity sense of the term—but that does not mean
we will believe it. The means of information are experience and authority, but further
distinctions can be made within these two. For instance, there is external experience or
experience with external objects (sensation) and internal experience that help “us to the
Ideas of the Operations of our own Minds” (16), which Locke calls reflection. These two,
external experience or sensation and internal experience or internal awareness, are
together “the common Stock of all our Knowledg; nor can we possibly have Ideas any
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other way without new Organs or Faculties” (16-17). In other words, all of our simple
and distinct ideas, the “common Stock” of our complex ideas that we have the ability to
perceive, come from sensation and reflection in our confrontation with external, complex
objects and a reflection on those experiences as discussed above.41
And just as the first means of information, experience, can be broken into two
sorts so is authority broken into two sorts: human and divine. By human authority,
Toland does not necessarily mean an expert in a certain field but rather either that or an
everyday witness or testifier to any alleged fact (17). By divine authority, he means
“divine revelation,” and makes no other associated distinctions or qualifications (18).
While this section, at this point, will still concentrate on the chapters, “Of the
Means of INFORMATION” and “Of the Grounds of PERSWASION,” it will be forced
to go beyond them. Toland has some important thoughts in these chapters still. For
instance, within these chapters he discusses the basis of our assent, which will be
explained shortly; he like Locke calls anything short of knowledge probability (15).
While our own experience speaks for itself, Toland does lay down rules regarding the
heeding of authority. He explores assent to propositions specifically from human
authority in these chapters as well. He introduces assent to propositions of divine
authority there too, but then refers the reader to Section II, chapter 2, for a more thorough
41
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192
treatment of the topic (18). There he also gives additional thought to assent regarding
issues involving human authority.
Regarding human authority, Toland offers a few basic principles that govern our
assent. Toland writes:
all possible Matters of Fact, duly attested by coevious Persons as known to them,
and successively related by others to different Times, Nations, or Interests, who
could neither be impos’d upon themselves, nor be justly suspected of combining
together to deceive others, ought to be receiv’d by us for as certain and
indubitable as if we had seen them with our own Eyes, or heard them with our
own Ears (17).
When all of these rules concur a matter of fact is to be taken for a demonstration, but if
not it is to be taken as uncertain or probable (17-18). Toland does not explicitly give
further degrees of surety of assent as Locke does, but does, like the latter, admit that in
matters of “common Practice” we must “sometimes admit Probability to supply the
Defect of Demonstration” (21).
There is another principle, however, that we must follow in governing our assent
in every situation involving testimonies: evidence. “This infallible Rule, or Ground of all
right Perswasion, is Evidence; and it consists in the exact Conformity of our Ideas or
Thoughts with their Objects, or the Things we think upon. For as we have only Ideas in
us, and not the Things themselves, ‘tis by those we must form a Judgment of these” (19).
Furthermore, “Ideas therefore being Representative Beings, their Evidence naturally
consists in the Property they have of truly representing their Objects” (19). What he
means in these passages, as is made clearer in CNM’s following paragraphs, is that we
must correctly comprehend that to which we are considering assenting. Correctly
comprehending something, such as the existence of a thing or other such proposition,
entails having a correct collection and combination of simple ideas that represent the
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thing involved. Thus, the complex idea does not contain an inherent contradiction; a
complex idea that contains a contradiction cannot be perceived. We would not believe
anyone who told us that a particular ball was at the same time a black ball and a white
ball (29), or that he saw a cane without two ends. In the latter case “I neither should nor
could believe him; because this Relation plainly contradicts the Idea of a cane.” A
wooden cane stuck into the ground that sprouts sprigs and branches is a proposition that
could be believed upon the veracity of the testifier, however (39). According to Toland,
“It is impossible for us to err as long as we take Evidence for our Guide; and we never
mistake, but when we wander from it by abusing our Liberty, in denying of any thing
which belongs to it, or attributing to it what we do not see in its Idea. This is the primary
and universal Origin of all our Errors” (21). In fact, Toland claims that while we have no
power to dissent from a self-evident proposition, we do have the power of “suspending
our Judgments about whatever is uncertain, and of never assenting but to clear
Perceptions” (22). Thus, we cannot rightly assent to something that we cannot
comprehend. So, if something about a complex idea is said to be true of the thing
represented and believed to exist, but that something about that thing is not able to be
perceived or is obscure at best, then we cannot rightly believe that that something belongs
to the thing that we believe exists. If this principle of requiring perceptibility of all
propositions to which we consider assenting is maintained, we will have much better
success than otherwise in precipitating our assent rightly in propositions pertaining to
human authority, according to Toland. When we err it is our own fault (23-24). In short,
the ground of persuasion is the evidence of a proposition, which is its capacity to be
correctly represented, including the ideas from which it is built, in our minds. Moreover,
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this requirement of evidence or Toland’s ground of persuasion includes Locke’s rule that
we cannot assent to anything contrary to knowledge.
After treating assent in matters concerning human authority, Toland turns to
divine authority. He notes that he calls revelation a means of information because one
must make sure it is such before assenting to the revealed proposition(s). Here Toland
applies the ground of persuasion to instances of alleged divine revelation: “For besides
the infallible Testimony of the Revelation from all requisite Circumstances, we must see
in its Subject the indisputable Characters of DIVINE WISDOM and SOUND REASON;
which are the only Marks we have to distinguish the Oracles and Will of God, form the
Impostures and Traditions of Men” (42). Again, that is, the thing proposed must not
involve a contradiction and must be comprehensible before it can be considered for
assent. “Whoever reveals any thing, that is, whoever tells us something we did not know
before, his Words must be intelligible, and the Matter possible” (42). It is possible and
intelligible that God formed man out of the earth and therefore believable (43), but it is
not possible that God can create a something called a round square because a
contradiction is nothing (39-40). We are, however, to also require a miracle for proof that
God is the one who reveals the proposition or propositions. So the ground of persuasion
is only part of accepting a revelation as such. In the Old Testament, if the prophet’s
prophecy did not come to pass he did not speak for God. In the New Testament, Mary did
not determine that the angel spoke for God until she visited her aged cousin Elizabeth
whom the angel told Mary was pregnant. Nevertheless, the miracle is not a guarantee
alone. If a prophet does miracles while trying to have you believe in multiple Gods, part
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of his message is contradictory and so one cannot assent to his propositions as directed in
Deuteronomy 13:1-3 (43-44).42 In short, evidence and miracles mark divine revelation.
Thus, when it comes to judgment and assent, CNM comports with the Essay. Both
relegate uncertain issues to the realm of probability. While Locke discusses in detail the
grounding of probabilities and the way in which they help develop varying degrees of
conviction, Toland does not; but he does delineate the minimum requirements we need to
assent to a proposition and the need of assenting in matters of common practice. It
appears as though Toland presumes the reader has a basic grasp on how probability is
grounded and how it guides our assent to varying degrees of surety. With regards to
propositions coming from human testimony and allegedly divine sources, for Toland, all
propositions must be perceivable and thus not inherently contradictory. This is Locke’s
rule that we cannot believe anything that is contrary to knowledge. And like Locke,
Toland requires a miracle as an external mark that a divinely revealed proposition is such.
Although this chapter is several sections away from fully outlining Toland’s treatment of
revelation and reason, so far in Toland, as was found in Locke, an external mark of
revelation has to do with miracles and an internal mark is that the proposition is not
contradictory or contrary to knowledge.
There are still more similarities between Locke and Toland on the issues of
knowledge and judgment. It appears that Toland, like Locke, considers knowledge and
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“precluded any discoveries” in religion. As demonstrated in chapter two of this dissertation and here in this
chapter there are no such criterion. One must simply be able to find the thing claimed intelligible and noncontradictory.
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judgment as distinct faculties and closely associates or identifies “faculties” and
“powers.” In an early section of CNM, Toland writes:
Every one experiences in himself a Power or Faculty of forming various Ideas or
Perceptions of Things: Of affirming or denying, according as he sees them to
agree or disagree: And so of loving and desiring what seems good unto him; and
of hating and avoiding what he thinks evil. The right Use of all these Faculties is
what we call Common Sense (9).
In this quotation it is clear that he is referring to knowledge as a faculty among other
faculties. And it is obvious that faculty and power are interchangeable for Toland. But,
one question is, where does his description of the faculty of knowledge end? Although
not completely clear, the “And so” after the second colon is likely to be taken as a
transition moving onto the operations of other faculties building on what knowledge
does. The other operations he speaks of—loving and desiring and hating and avoiding—
are two in which the ability to judge would play a part. Regardless, he does call
knowledge a faculty or power as does Locke.
Elsewhere it is clearer that Toland understands judgment to be a faculty as well.
In discussing propositions that are not self-evident he writes:
But God the wise Creator of all . . .who has enabl’d us to perceive Things, and
form Judgments of them, has also endu’d us with the Power of suspending our
Judgments about whatever is uncertain, and of never assenting but to clear
Perceptions. He is so far from putting us upon any Necessity of erring, that as he
has thus priveleg’d us on the one hand with a Faculty of guarding ourselves
against Prepossession, or Precipitation, by placing our Liberty only in what is
indifferent, or dubious and obscure (22).
As seen in this quote from CNM, as in the one preceding it, there is a close association or
identification of the terms power and faculty. In this instance, the power that makes
possible the suspension of judgment is also called a faculty. Again, this is precisely what
Locke does—he uses the terms “faculties” and “powers” interchangeably. Locke is wary
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of talking of faculties as agents because of the conceptual mischief it causes, even though
he himself does so from time to time (II.xxi.20). Apparently Toland follows Locke and,
therefore, any abilities we can speak of can be referred to as faculties or powers.
Therefore, the ability to “form Judgments” of the things we perceive is also a faculty as it
is in Locke and this power of judgment can be suspended as is also the case in Locke.
Toland even uses the same occasional personification that Locke does when he speaks of
judgment: “I am pretty sure he pretends in vain to convince the Judgment, who explains
not the Nature of the Thing” (36).
In summary, although CNM’s treatments of ideas, knowledge, and judgment are
less detailed than the Essay and both works occasionally use different terminology, they
comport conceptually with one another. Toland does not conceptually contradict the
Essay in any way. In fact, the lack of detail in explanation of concepts in CNM and the
abundant similarities of both works point to a heavy dependence of CNM on the Essay
regarding ideas, knowledge, and judgment. Toland’s veiled reference to Locke in
discussing adequate and inadequate ideas is further evidence that dependence is the case.

Part III: Reason
This section will be asking two primary questions: 1) What is Toland’s concept of
reason?; and 2) How similar is it to Locke’s concept? As might be expected, much of the
information on Toland’s understanding of reason comes from Section One entitled, “Of
Reason.” That section consists of the following chapters: “What REASON is not,”
“Wherein REASON consists,” “Of the Means of INFORMATION,” and “Of the Ground
of PERSWASION.” There are still aspects of reason, however, that can be learned from
the remaining two sections.
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Interestingly enough, Toland begins his treatment of reason as Locke does. Both
begin their respective treatments of reason acknowledging that there are multiple
considerations of the term circulating in the philosophical literature and conversations (89). In Toland’s introduction of the notion, he notes that the soul should not be identified
with reason, but he finds it harmless to understand reason as “the Soul acting in a certain
and peculiar Manner” (8-9).
More importantly, Toland’s own description of reason is very similar to Locke’s.
For one, Toland does not consider the mind’s passive reception of ideas from the basic
senses and from the awareness or conscious observation of the mental operations
(external and internal experience) as “strictly Reason” (10). He also, like Locke,
conceives of reason as a faculty or power. This is evident from the beginning of his
discourse on reason in the first chapter of Section One. There Toland calls reason “that
whereby they define and explain all things” (8). In other words, reason is an ability or
power. In Section One’s second chapter, “Wherein REASON consists,” a few similarities
between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of reason come to the fore as well. There, Toland,
like Locke, associates reason and demonstration. He writes that the method of knowledge
known as demonstration can be called reason (14). Thus he defines reason there as, “That
Faculty of the Soul which discovers the Certainty of any thing dubious or obscure, by
comparing it with something evidently known” (14). In this same chapter, the reader also
learns that the simple and distinct ideas are not technically reason even though they are
used by it, just as in Locke. And just like Locke, Toland does not relegate the power or
faculty of reason to demonstration alone. In CNM’s next chapter, “Of the Means of
INFORMATION,” he begins with the following: “BUT besides these Properties of
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Reason which we have explain’d we are yet most carefully to distinguish in it the Means
of Information, from the Ground of Perswasion: for the Neglect of this easily Distinction
has thrown Men into infinite Mistakes, as I shall prove before I have done” (16). It
appears as though his claim that the means of information and grounds of persuasion are
in reason means that reason has something to do with assent. This relationship is pushed
beyond any doubt when later Toland describes reason as “that Faculty every one has of
judging of his Ideas according to their Agreement or Disagreement, and so of loving
what seems good unto him, and hating what he thinks evil: Reason, I say, in this Sense is
whole and entire in every one whose Organs are not accidentally indispos’d” (56-57). In
the context of the this quote, Toland is considering reason’s consideration of divine truths
or revelation, which means that he is considering areas of probability where judgment is
required. Thus, reason must somehow take part in judging areas where certainty cannot
be had, similar to the Essay’s position. And without a doubt reason must involve the
weighing and considering of probabilities.43
What is even more interesting is that CNM and the Essay have similar answers as
to whether all the faculties are reason! Locke treats reason at least as a faculty or group of
faculties and he speaks of reason as being all the mental faculties when the mind is acting
reasonably—that is, the mind acts reasonably when it heeds reason’s advice based on its
disquisitions and reason is employed to the degree of investigative thoroughness required
by the circumstance (and thus importance of the issue at hand). In what follows, this
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example where Toland is simply assuming one understands some basic premises of the Essay.
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section of this chapter of the dissertation will show that Toland maintains the same
position.
Toland similarly thinks of reason at least as a faculty or faculties and calls the
right “Use” of all of the faculties “Reason in General.” It has already been made evident
that Toland conceives of reason as a faculty or group of faculties. That much can be
gleaned from our discussion of reason above. Toland refers to the right use of all of our
faculties in the following passage:
Every one experiences in himself a Power or Faculty of forming various Ideas or
Perceptions of Things: Of affirming or denying, according as he sees them to
agree or disagree: And so of loving and desiring what seems good unto him; and
of hating and avoiding what he thinks evil. The right Use of all these Faculties is
what we call Common Sense, or Reason in General (9).
This definition appears to be rather all-encompassing of the mind even though the list of
powers named is brief. That is, the quote includes a number of faculties by description,
like perception, knowledge, and judgment, and describes the ultimate ends toward which
the mind works, loving and desiring and hating and avoiding.
Later on in CNM, Toland, however, makes it quite clear that the right use of the
faculties is not constant and at those times we cannot be considered reasonable. He
writes, “But if by Reason be understood a constant right Use of these Faculties, viz. If a
Man never judges but according to clear Perceptions, desires nothing but what is truly
good for him, nor avoids but what is certainly evil: then, I confess it is extreamly
corrupt” (57). We are prone to wrong conceptions and erroneous judgments, and we
covet what “flatters our Senses, without distinguishing noxious from innocent Pleasures,”
and thoughtlessly give into inclinations and appetites (58). These proceedings are actually
contrary to reason (58). He even notes those that judge contrary to their knowledge as
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Locke does (26-27). But we are under no necessity of making intellectual, moral, and
spiritual errors because “There is no Defect in our Understandings but those of our own
Creation” (58-59). In short, we are not always reasonable and deserving of that attribute.
That Toland like Locke makes a distinction between the sum total of mental
faculties considered as reason and a particular faculty called reason is evident from other
pages within CNM. The above description of reason as it stands so far still leaves open
the possibility of reason being simply the sum-total of all the mental faculties and
deserving only of the name reason when operating correctly. There are a few reasons that
this is not the case. Most importantly, Toland calls the faculty of reason and our
associated liberty, which corresponds to our ability to suspend our judgment, perfect (60,
62). Thus, the perfect faculty or power does not make errors, something else does. So he
must be considering reason in a second and more limited sense. As further support for
this, Toland writes of people employing their reasoning faculties: “Were our reasoning
Faculties imperfect, or we not capable to employ them rightly, there could be no
Possibility of our understandings of one another in Millions of things, where the stock of
our Ideas should prove unavoidably equal, or our Capacities different” (59). Thus, for
Toland, like Locke, reason is a power among other powers and consists of some of them.
And as a mere power, it only does anything in so far as it is employed by the mind or
agent. So, in conclusion, Toland, like Locke, conceives of reason as a particular power or
faculty, but all of the natural faculties are considered reason when the mind follows the
disquisitions of that power or, in other words, acts reasonably.
What is more, that Toland, like Locke, believes not every issue deserves the same
attention is also evident in CNM. In other words, acting reasonably entails not only the
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mind following the conclusions wrought from the employment of reason, but also giving
the investigative thoroughness required by the circumstance and importance of the issue
at hand. Early in CNM it appears as though Toland disapproves of probability: “when I
have arriv’d at Knowledge, I enjoy all the Satisfaction that attends it; where I have only
Probability, there I suspend my Judgment, or, if it be worth the Pains, I search after
Certainty” (15). So Toland notes that some issues are worthy of the employment of our
powers and energies in search of certainty, while it appears every other issue where
probability is to be had ought to be suspended. Toland reasonably tempers this, however,
and shows the aforementioned quote to be an overstatement. For instance, he notes that
there are some important issues about which we cannot have certainty and some issues,
like day-to-day living, where requirements of certainty would prove impractical (21).
So in light of all of this evidence, it is apparent that Toland has closely read and
agreed with Locke’s treatment of reason. They both understand reason to be a power. But
they both also see that the mind can be called reason when it acts reasonably. And they
both have the same notion of acting reasonably: heeding the disquisitions of reason and
employing the power of reason to the investigative thoroughness required by the
circumstance and importance of the issue at hand.
There are still other aspects of Toland’s discussion of reason that are much like
Locke’s, some to which I have already alluded. First, Toland discusses our ability to
suspend judgment (21-22). Second, he also treats liberty and reason, among others, as
distinct powers. They are obviously related but there are no physical or metaphysical
discussions as to their connections. There are mere assertions. This points to a third
commonality between CNM and the Essay. Both are examples of experimental
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philosophy. This way of thinking is primarily descriptive of the way we find ourselves
working. Great attention is given to descriptions of mental operations at our best, and
thus in that way prescriptive. There is no attempt by either Locke or Toland to untangle
the metaphysical discussions of free will, but simply assert that liberty is one power we
have. In fact, Toland does not refer to his philosophy as a system of philosophy, or
equally a “Hypothesis” (4-5, 15, 122-123). Toland’s philosophy in CNM, like Locke’s, is
highly descriptive and generally avoids attempts to explain speculative things.
In summary, this section has shown a few very important points of commonality
Toland holds with Locke pertaining to reason. In both, reason is the faculty or power
employed to achieve demonstrative knowledge and probability when used by the mind.
And all of the natural faculties can be considered reason, for all intents and purposes,
when the mind acts reasonably—reasonably in the sense that the mind is dictated by its
employment of reason and in the sense that the degree of reason’s employment
corresponds to the appropriate thoroughness that the circumstance warrants. Toland is
also engaged in Locke’s brand of experimental philosophy. Moreover, Toland’s focused
treatment of reason in CNM is considerably shorter than that of the Essay.

Part IV: Reason and Faith
Having investigated Toland’s understanding of reason and shown it to comport
with Locke’s, this chapter will now look at Toland’s understanding of the relationship
between faith and reason. So this section will first assess what Toland says about faith
and then how it comports with Locke’s treatment of faith. Then it will also briefly discuss
the relationship of reason and faith in CNM and how that compares to the Essay.
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Toland’s treatment of faith clearly connects it to reason and makes the former
subordinate to the latter. CNM’s description of assent is reminiscent of Locke’s teaching
on proper faith or assent in general:
The word [Faith] imports Belief or Perswasion, as when we give Credit to any
thing which is told us by God or Man; when Faith is properly divided into Human
and Divine. Again, Divine Faith is either when God speaks to us immediately
himself, or when we acquiesce in the Words or Writings of those to whom we
believe he has spoken (127).
Thus Toland, like Locke, identifies all the words he uses for assent: persuasion, faith, and
belief. There is no shifting when it comes to divine faith. Faith in divine matters is still
faith. Again, this broad understanding of faith corresponds to Locke’s consideration of
faith that chapter three of this dissertation called proper faith. Furthermore, considering
the discussion of reason above and the fact that faith is just assent in general, Toland’s
faith is therefore rightly governed by the mind’s employment of reason to the uncertain
issues being proposed to the mind. Reason is to be used to sift through the matter and
guide the mind in its judgments. If the mind does not heed reason’s recommendation or
does not employ it thoroughly enough based on the circumstance and issue at hand, then
the mind’s assent or faith will be irrational or unreasonable in one or more senses.
So far this entire description of faith and its relationship to reason is indicative of
Locke’s understanding of the relationship between proper faith and proper reason. That
is, Toland is not conceiving of reason operating in two possible offices—one that
incorporates revelation, reason’s proper office, and one that does not, reason’s vulgar
office—and he is not conceiving of two corresponding understandings of the term faith.
In short, he is mirroring only Locke’s proper senses of reason and faith. Thus it seems
that John Toland is not desirous of conceding to common, erroneous ways of speaking to
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any degree. His final sentence of CNM speaks to this attitude: “I’m therefore for giving
no Quarter to ERROR under any pretence; and will by sure, where-ever I have Ability or
Opportunity, to expose it in its true Colours, without rendring my Labour ineffectual, by
weakly mincing or softning of any thing” (174).
As in the preceding chapter, the next two sections will continue to build on the
interaction of faith and reason by focusing on reason and revelation.
Part V: Propositions “Above Reason”
Toland is best known for his critique of those, Locke included, who accept
propositions “above reason.” This is consistently seen as Toland’s greatest point of
departure from Locke, whose epistemological principles Toland employs. But as shown
in the previous chapter, Locke allows the notions of vulgar reason and vulgar faith,
although improper, which allows him to write of propositions being above (vulgar)
reason. If propositions were to be categorized according to Locke’s proper scope of
reason employed throughout the Essay (up until IV.xviii), he would only categorize
propositions according to (proper) reason and contrary to (proper) reason. He does not
accept propositions above (proper) reason as a legitimate category. That is the reason that
Locke always uses intelligible and comprehensible examples when he mentions the
concessionary categorization of propositions, above (vulgar) reason. Since Toland does
not concede to making room for vulgar conceptions of reason and faith it should be no
surprise that he is likewise not too interested in making accommodations for an above
reason category. In what follows we will explore what Toland does say about
propositions above reason and the implications of his teaching.
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Toland is adamant that nothing in the Gospel is contrary to reason or above
reason. The thesis of CNM is, “that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason, nor
above it; and that no Christian doctrine can be properly call’d a Mystery” (6). In fact,
while the first of three sections of CNM is about reason, the next two sections are entitled
“That the Doctrines of the Gospel are not contrary to Reason” and “That there is nothing
Mysterious, or above Reason in the Gospel,” respectively (xxxii). Thus there is plenty
said explicitly about propositions in CNM that allows a thorough comparison on the topic
with the Essay and much that can be easily inferred from the comparison. In fact, CNM’s
discourse on the categorization of propositions is the only treatment of a major topic
longer than the corresponding treatment in the Essay.
So, after his treatment of what reason is, he goes on to explain that nothing in the
Gospel is contrary to reason. He gives the following definition of propositions contrary to
reason that is similar to Locke’s: “that what is evidently repugnant to clear and distinct
Ideas, or to our common Notions, is contrary to Reason” (25). Locke’s definition of
propositions contrary to reason is: “Contrary to Reason are such Propositions, as are
inconsistent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas” (IV.xvii.23). So, at
least in both Toland and Locke, the propositions that are categorized as contrary to reason
are propositions that assert claims that are contrary to knowledge. Or, in other words,
they cannot be the subject of further reasoning. The prominent difference between the
two definitions is that Toland includes the reference to “common Notions” in his
definition. While that is at least an obvious verbal difference it does not result in a
conceptual difference. It is clear that by “notions” he means ideas because he makes the
two terms interchangeable in a few locations (14-15, 81). And by “common notions” he
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means our knowledge of simple and distinct ideas. This is evident by Toland’s
sarcastically speaking of doctrines contrary to common notions as “supra-intellectual
Truths” and his seriously claiming that “we cannot in this World know any thing but by
our common Notions.” So both Locke and Toland agree that anything with a repugnancy
or inconsistency is to be rejected as being contrary to reason. And, because of the said
repugnancy or inconsistency, some proposition that is contrary to reason is unintelligible
or cannot be mentally represented or perceived.
This resultant principle that a proposition must be conceivable to be reasonable
has some relationship with the ground of persuasion that is woven throughout CNM and
explained in the “Preliminaries” section of this chapter. Just because one cannot quickly
conceive of a certain doctrine or proposition does not mean, however, that it is contrary
to reason. Rather, as mentioned earlier, Toland teaches that if any proposition cannot be
reconciled perceptually at present, but it is not definitively contrary to knowledge, one
must suspend one’s judgment about the proposition. He believes that God “has endu’d us
with the Power of suspending our Judgments about whatever is uncertain, and of never
assenting but to clear Perceptions” (22). Otherwise assent would be implicit and thus
insincere (36). But if a proposition is definitively unintelligible or impossible then the
proposition would be contrary to reason and if one assented to such a proposition one
would be offending the rule of the ground of persuasion. He writes: “Whoever reveals
any thing, that is, whoever tells us something we did not know before, his Words must be
intelligible, and the Matter possible. This RULE holds good, let God or Man be the
revealer” (42). What he means by this is that we are neither to assent to anything we
cannot so-far conceive nor that is contrary to reason or impossible.
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It is important to emphasize the point that “possible” in CNM, as used above, does
not refer to the property of comporting to our typical every day experiences and thus
credible upon natural considerations and therefore likely. Rather “possible” refers to
something being intelligible or comprehensible. Toland asserts this clearly in the
following passage:
And that every Contradiction, which is a Synonym for Impossibility, is pure
nothing, we have already sufficiently demonstrated. To say, for example, that a
thing is extended and not extended, is round and square at once, is to say nothing;
for these Ideas destroy one another, and cannot subsist together in the same
Subject. But when we clearly perceive a perfect Agreement and Connection
between the Terms of any Proposition, we then conclude it possible because
intelligible (40).
So while contradiction and impossibility are synonyms for Toland, so are conceivable,
perceivable, intelligible, and possible. Again, if this were missed one might conclude that
Toland would reject some or all of revelation because it asserts things we would not find
credible based on purely natural considerations. This is not what Toland is saying. If a
person said that he had seen a staff that had no ends, we could not believe him because
infinite length is contrary to the idea of a staff. However, if the same person said that he
had seen a staff that was in the ground in time sprout sprigs and branches, that is possible
(39). With regards to an all powerful God, it is possible and intelligible that God
immediately freezes a fluid, or created the world and thus such propositions are not
contrary to reason (40-41). But God cannot make a round square (40). In short, “When
we say then, that nothing is impossible with God, or that he can do all things, we mean
whatever is possible in it self, however far above the Power of Creatures to effect” (40).44
Hence, we are not responsible for believing things that are incomprehensible (49, 108,
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There is a difference between that which is by nature impossible—a round square—and that
which is naturally impossible—the rapid formation of man out of the earth.
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170-171). In short, for Toland, contrary to reason refers to propositions that one
definitively cannot conceive of or imagine in their mind, and that is to say that they are
impossible.
Toland also has a lengthy discourse denying that there are any propositions above
reason in the last section of CNM, which is entitled “That there is nothing MYSTERIOUS,
or ABOVE Reason in the GOSPEL” (66). He makes a very helpful distinction at the
outset defining for the reader what people typically mean when they say something is a
mystery or that it is above reason:
First, it notes a thing intelligible of it self, but so cover’d by figurative Words,
Types and Ceremonies, that Reason cannot penetrate the Vail, nor see what is
under it till it be remov’d. Secondly, It is made to signify a thing of its own
Nature inconceivable, and not to be judg’d of by our ordinary Faculties and Ideas,
tho it be never so clearly reveal’d. In both these Senses to be above Reason is the
same thing with MYSTERY; and, in effect, they are convertible Terms in Divinity
(66-67).
So above reason can refer to a thing that could be comprehended and represented in the
mind if the “Vail” obscuring it were removed. It also can refer to that which we cannot
apprehend with our mental faculties although the propositions of which it consists are
revealed.
Toland is convinced that neither sense of above reason apply to the New
Testament. With regards to the second sense, he says that many, who out of ignorance or
passion desire “to maintain what was first introduc’d by the Craft of Superstition of their
Fore-fathers, will have some Christian Doctrines to be still mysterious in the second
Sense of the Word, that is inconceivable in themselves, however clearly reveal’d” (72). In
fact, this sense of above reason amounts to Toland’s description of contrary to reason:
unintelligible. He goes on to use much ink in exposition of Scripture that supports his
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rejection of the claim that some New Testament doctrines are mysterious or above reason
in the first sense of the terms or the veiled sense. He writes:
But, slighting so mean Considerations [the claims regarding the other sense of
above reason] I can demonstrate that in the New Testament Mystery is always
us’d in the first sense of the Word, or that of the Gentiles, viz. for things naturally
very intelligible, but so cover’d by figurative Words or Rites, that Reason could
not discover them without special Revelation; and that the Vail is actually taken
away; then it will manifestly follow that the Doctrines so reveal’d cannot now be
properly call’d Mysteries” (73).
So, whenever the term mystery is used in the New Testament it refers to the very first
sense of above reason that he refers to: “a thing intelligible of it self, but so cover’d by
figurative Words, Types and Ceremonies, that Reason cannot penetrate the Vail, nor see
what is under it till it be remov’d” (66). But, although the New Testament mentions these
mysteries there are no doctrines now—in the New Testament—that could be called
mysteries.
The outline of his argument that there should be no sense of mystery or above
reason applied to the New Testament is worth repeating in part. In chapter 2 of Section
III, “That nothing ought to be call’d a MYSTERY, because we have not an adequate Idea
of all its Properties, nor any at all of its Essence,” he argues “That nothing can be said to
be a Mystery, because we have not an adequate Idea of it, or a distinct View of all its
Properties at once; for then every thing would be a Mystery” (74). That is, we have no
adequate idea of any substance; and if that were a criterion to call something a mystery,
practically everything would be a mystery. Also, something is not mysterious because we
do not know all of its properties. Rather “God has wisely provided we should understand
no more of these than are useful and necessary for us; which is all our present Condition
needs” (76). In fact we are not to trouble ourselves about what is useless to be known or
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impossible to know (78). These principles hold true when it comes to doctrines too. The
doctrine need not be adequate or complete to be understood. It simply must be
intelligible. For example, we don’t know God’s true essence but we are made aware of
his attributes that are necessary and useful for us (86). In Section III’s third chapter, “The
Signification of the Word MYSTERY in the New Testament, and the Writings of the
most antient Christians,” he attempts to show that every passage where the term
“Mystery” is used ought to be read in one of three ways:
First, Mystery is read for the Gospel or the Christian Religion in general, as it was
a future Dispensation totally hid from the Gentiles, and but very imperfectly
known to the Jews: Secondly, Some particular Doctrines occasionally reveal’d by
the Apostles are said to be manifested Mysteries, that is, unfolded Secrets. And,
Thirdly, Mystery is put for any thing vail’d under Parables or Enigmatical Forms
of Speech (95).
So, there is nothing unintelligible or inconceivable in itself (Cf. 108). Toland argues
throughout the chapter that all instances in the Bible that are of the above reason “vail’d”
sense are all explained there. Although a further detailed treatment of Toland’s
categorization of biblical propositions is possible, it will not occupy this chapter any
further.
A few things can be said about the comparison of Toland’s and Locke’s
categorization of propositions so far. Propositions that are contrary to reason are an exact
copy of Locke’s. Contrary to reason in both refers to things that are inconceivable or
incomprehensible or, equally, impossible. Again, possible does not refer to conforming to
our every day experience and thus naturally probable. In regards to the category of above
reason, Toland rejects it. Inadequate and incomplete ideas and everything now in the
Bible are not above reason (or contrary to reason) in any sense of the term. As discussed
earlier, Locke, if he had listed the category of propositions with proper reason in mind,
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which appears to be in agreement with Toland’s understanding of reason, would also
have rejected the above reason category regarding propositions or doctrines that are
clearly revealed yet inconceivable. I am not aware if Locke thinks that all veiled
mysteries in Scripture were unveiled, however, as Toland does. In short, religious
propositions that one might claim are above Locke’s proper reason, and thus
incomprehensible, would actually fall into Locke’s category of propositions contrary to
reason. They cannot be reasoned about. Moreover, although Toland does not explicitly
use the term according to reason (the closest he comes is: 8-9, 56-57), an explanation of
the term consistent with what he would conceive is easily inferable: it would include
revealed propositions and those derived from unassisted, natural reason and human
testimony that are all perceivable or possible. It would be, like the Lockean according to
proper reason category, the-simply-all-encompassing-opposite to the contrary to reason
category. In short, had Locke based his categorization of propositions based on his proper
reason, they would be the same as Toland’s categorization regarding perceptibility:
according to reason—propositions about which we can further reason because they are
conceivable—and contrary to reason—propositions about which we cannot reason any
further because they are inconceivable.
This defense of comprehensibility in doctrines and the attack on claims that
certain doctrines we ought to accept are not comprehensible prevails in the other Toland
works, namely those written by him in defense of CNM. This is important to show
because all think that Toland subordinates revelation to natural probability and many
claim that CNM is not indicative of Toland’s true thoughts. In An Apology for Mr.
Toland, Toland conveys that he is writing in defense of the Christian religion against the
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atheists and others who attack Christianity for being obscure or contradictory.45 He
explains that in his quote from CNM that “all the Doctrines and Precepts of the New
Testament (if it be indeed Divine) must consequently agree with Natural Reason, and our
own Ordinary Ideas,” he means that our God-given reason must be able to comprehend
what is being said.46 In A Defence of Mr. Toland in a Letter to Himself, when defending
his denial that any doctrines in the New Testament are mysterious, he notes that the
common opinion concerning mysteries is that they are things revealed that we should
know nothing of at all had they not been revealed, but we now know in part. Toland
thinks that this type of seeing “through the Glass darkly” Christianity of which Paul
writes is a “Vulgar Faith” not applicable to us who have the complete New Testament.
Rather, “we perfectly know, even as we are known.” He thus opposes the following
claims of mystery:
Some of them we look upon to be of such a Nature, that we are not able in the
present state of our Faculties, to conceive beyond such a degree, and which we
expect a further Comprehension of in another state of more perfection, such as are
the Doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, etc. others there are which are but in part
Reveal’d to us, and which we are capable of knowing further in this state, if God
had been pleased to give us a clearer and fuller discovery of them, such as are the
Prophecies contained in the Revelations, and other parts of Scripture.
In short, he opposes the notions that there are things revealed in the New Testament that
we will better comprehend in the afterlife with new faculties (and in that sense not yet
fully revealed or not able to be fully revealed) or are not yet fully revealed though
comprehensible if they were. To this erroneous thinking he responds, “That there is
nothing in Scripture but what is fully discovered to us, and what we fully comprehend.”
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Basically, he is asserting that something is comprehensible or it is not and it is revealed
and unveiled or it is not; and everything in the New Testament is revealed, unveiled, and
comprehensible.47 Finally, in Vindicius Liberius, he claims inconceivable doctrines or
mysteries and contradictions are “only two emphatical Ways of saying Nothing.”48 Thus,
he is consistent with the application of his rule of evidence or the ground of persuasion
throughout his defenses of CNM and he shows it to have nothing to do with natural
probability.
The pathway that Toland plows in arguing his case that there is nothing contrary
to reason and that there is nothing above reason or mysterious in the New Testament in
any sense of the word (the pathway that this section has followed to the above
conclusions), is where all scholars have misread him, past and present. It is likely that all
Toland scholars have approached CNM with the presupposition that Toland has adopted
Locke’s vulgar reason. Thus they know that Locke conceives of things above reason as
being comprehensible, at least in some cases (all of Locke’s examples of things above
reason are conceivable). Since they are unaware of Locke’s proper reason, that which
Toland has actually adopted, Toland’s dismissal of things above reason, for them, must
include what Locke included in things above reason—revealed propositions that we
would not have conceived on our own, but if we did we would have no basis to think
them true. However, some seem incorrectly to identify any divine revelation as being
above reason in Locke. Whatever the case is, it appears, from the readings of scholars,
that Toland has effectively nullified any authority from revelation. In the first case, where
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revelation is not exhausted by the above reason category, revelation is subordinated to
what amounts to a divinely unassisted, natural reason or Locke’s vulgar reason. This
comports with the erroneous reading that revealed “possible” propositions are
propositions that are credible upon natural considerations and not simply conceivable
propositions. Whether a scholar is put off course first by misunderstanding what
propositions above reason are in CNM or the full understanding of what possible
propositions are, the result is the same: revelation cannot offer us anything novel.
Of the few scholars that give what could be considered a detailed treatment of
Toland’s epistemology, they all fit into the description above. They all believe that
revelation cannot offer us anything novel.49 They were all treated in chapter two and
shown to have misunderstandings about Toland’s Lockean ideas and to have
misunderstood the relationship of faith and knowledge in CNM. It was also shown from
where the reading came that Toland subordinated revelation to natural, unassisted reason.
This chapter could show how these misunderstandings on ideas, knowledge, and faith
were influenced by this likely presupposed relationship of reason and revelation. That is,
this section of the chapter could go through the arduous process of explaining each
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scholar’s circular reasoning. Instead we will treat what these scholars say directly about
above reason propositions and revelation.
The first scholar we will investigate is Sullivan. Sullivan notes that although
Toland did not deny the possibility of revelation, his epistemological assumptions were
“irreconcilable with allowing divine inspiration a role in the creation of humanity’s
religious opinions.” Sullivan explains: “His conviction—that, should God use this means
of information, the intelligence He conveyed would have to conform to the canons of
human reason by presenting clear and distinct ideas, rather than mysteries—precluded
any discoveries.”50 From this quote it appears that Sullivan understands that revelation
must be intelligible. But he somehow, most likely by misunderstanding what Toland
means by “possible,” concludes that revelation informs us of that which comports to our
unassisted, natural reason. Thus in Sullivan’s eyes, in CNM revelation can only tell us
what we could conceive and assent to without the assistance of divine revelation—thus
“precluded any discoveries.” Sullivan bases or supports this idea that the New Testament
gives no new doctrines by mistakenly replacing “New Testament” in place of the book of
Revelation in an important quote in CNM. In the quote Toland is making a reference to
the book of Revelation and Sullivan apparently thinks he is making a reference to
revelation. Sullivan writes: “In light of his [Toland’s] conception of the New Testament
as a ‘Prophetical History of the External State of the Church’ containing ‘no new
Doctrines,’ its importance as a means of information seems doubtful.”51 What Toland
actually wrote, however, is:
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Having so particularly alledg’d all the Passages where there is mention made of
Mysteries in the New Testament, if any should wonder why I have omitted those
in the Revelation, to such I reply, that the Revelation cannot be properly look’d
upon as a Part of the Gospel; for there are no new Doctrines deliver’d in it. Far
from being a Rule of Faith or Manners, it is not as much as an Explanation of any
Point in our Religion. The true Subject of that Book or Vision is a Prophetical
History of the external State of the Church in its various and interchangeable
Periods of Prosperity and Adversity. But that I may not fall under the least
Suspicion of dealing unfairly, I shall subjoin the few Texts of the Revelation
wherein the word Mystery is contain’d (105-106).
That Toland is referring to the book of Revelation and not the New Testament is beyond
doubt from the quote. So Sullivan’s likely supports for understanding that revelation
cannot reveal anything improbable upon purely natural considerations are incorrect.
The second scholar, Ian Leask, misunderstands both what possible propositions
are and Toland’s discussion on things above reason. Regarding the first issue, Leask
reads the quote discussed above—“Whoever reveals any thing, that is, whoever tells us
something we did not know before, his Words must be intelligble, and the Matter
possible”—as pointing to the presence of novelty in an alleged revelation as actually
invalidating that revelation. In discussing the fact that Locke allows revelation to overrule
unassisted, natural probability, Leask mistakes Toland’s possibility for Locke’s natural
probability: “For Toland, this Lockean criterion of ‘probability’ is simply not good
enough: if revelation is not possible, it cannot be accepted in any way valid.”52 Among a
few misinterpretations that fuel his misreading, one pertains to a quote from Toland that
Leask rips out of context: “Now what is there in all this, but very strict Reasoning from
Experience, from the Possibility of the thing, and from the Power, Justice, and
Immutability of him that promis’d it” (132). Leask evidently thinks that reasoning from
experience and the possibility of the thing implies that the thing assented to must be
52
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probable upon natural considerations.53 But in context, Toland is discussing Abraham’s
arrival at the conclusion that God would revive Isaac after being sacrificed. There is little
reasoning in that biblical account that could be considered purely natural.
Leask reinforces his faulty reading of possible propositions with a faulty reading
of Toland’s above reason discussion, or vice-versa. Regarding Toland’s dismissal of the
category of propositions above reason, he claims that “Toland would go so far as to
collapse the distinction that Locke is so keen to maintain.”54 Undergirding this notion is
Leask’s belief that above reason propositions are allegedly revealed propositions with
novelty and incomprehensible doctrines, which is incorrect. As a result, for Leask, the
collapse of the distinction does not mean that Toland thinks that all revelation is
reasonable but rather he thinks that plenty of the so-called revelations are not divine.55
Leask builds upon this misunderstanding and ends up operating under the notion that
things above reason, unintelligible mysteries, and divine revelation with novelty are
synonyms or effectively so in Toland.56 What is more, Leask thinks that Toland’s
statements that essences are not above reason are leveled at Locke! He is unaware that
Locke accepts things above reason as a concessionary category and Leask wrongly
believes that this category would include essences which cannot be known, a position
held by others as shown in chapter 3.57 Recall that, with Locke, only a type of divinely
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revealed propositions can be considered “above reason.” That is, above reason
propositions in the Essay pertain to propositions regarding supernatural matters that we
would not likely come up with ourselves, but if we did, we would have no basis to assent
to them.
The third scholar is Frederick Beiser. He believes that Toland uses two arguments
to attack revelation that gives novelty or tells us things above reason. The first argument
he utilizes is that CNM advances a verifiability criterion with the result that one must
reject anything that could not be verified in principle. Leask also sees a verifiability
criterion in CNM. Chapter two argues against both thinkers. There it is shown that both
scholars mistakenly understand Toland’s use of knowledge (in the identity and diversity
sense of the term) in reference to matters of faith as a criterion that a thing must be
verifiable if one is to assent to it. The second argument, which Beiser thinks is put forth
more consistently by Toland, is that it is irrational to hold any beliefs of no use to us, and
this rules out anything in revelation not dealing with morality, what Beiser believes
Toland thinks is the means of salvation.58 Beiser finds support for the first part of his
conclusion in the following quote from Toland: “The most compendious Method
therefore to acquire sure and useful Knowledg, is not to trouble our selves nor others with
what is useless, were it known; or what is impossible to be known” (78).59 (Toland writes
this following a discussion that God has given us capabilities to only understand what is
useful and necessary for us). Beiser writes: “If we apply this argument to the belief in
religious mysteries, then Toland’s point is that it is irrational to hold such beliefs because

58

Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 255-256.

59

Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 255.

220
they are of no benefit to us.”60 If by religious mysteries Beiser means things
incomprehensible then his statement is correct; but if he means religious mysteries that
are novel and comprehensible but not observationally verifiable then his statement is not.
But it is possible that Beiser intends both to be labeled as mysteries.
Whatever the case is regarding what mysteries are in Beiser’s conclusion, the
bigger problem is what he thinks Toland deems useful and necessary. Beiser believes that
“Toland’s argument here clearly presupposes that there is a purpose behind religious
beliefs, and in particular that this purpose consists in moral conduct. But Toland defends
this very premise in some of his other religious writings.”61 In other words, Beiser is
acknowledging that there is no actual evidence in CNM that explicitly states that Toland
believes, “Morality should be not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition of
salvation. But, if this is so, then the basis for a pragmatic defense of the belief in
mysteries also disappears.”62 Contrary to Beiser, there is a wealth of evidence in CNM
against this view that CNM promulgates a natural religion of morality. In arguing against
our abilities to reason well despite the fall, Toland clearly states that not believing in
Christ, in the case that one is privy to Him, is liable to condemnation: “Supposing a
natural Impotency to reason well, we could no more be liabel to Condemnation for not
keeping the Commands of God, than those to whom the Gospel was never revealed for
not believing on Christ” (59). Similarly, in arguing that we must be able to understand
what is being said in the gospel, Toland writes: “It was reckon’d no Crime not to believe
in Christ before he was reveal’d; for how could they believe in him of whom they had not
60
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heard? But with what better Reason could any be condemn’d for not believing what he
said, if they might not understand it?” (129). Still in the same vein, Toland remarks, “My
next observation is, That the Subject of Faith must be intelligible to all, since the Belief
thereof is commanded under no less a Penalty than Damnation: He that believeth not
shall be damn’d” (134). Interestingly, these three quotes, although less detailed, are
similar, if not the same, to Locke’s position on the same matters in ROC.63 In yet another
part, Toland calls Christ and the gospel “gracious” and “wonderfully stupendous and
suprizing” and a mystery to those that preceded the New Testament era (99, Cf. 142143). And in A Defence of Mr. Toland, written by Toland in response to charges that he
is a “Deist” and at best a “narrow scanty Believe of Revelation,” he writes: “That ‘tis very
difficult for me to conceive how any Man, that owns the least tittle of Natural Religion,
can publickly and solemnly profess to the World that he is firmly perswaded of the Truth
of the Christian Religion, and the Scriptures, when at the same time he does not really
and sincerely believe any thing of them.”64 In other words, if he were simply an adherent
of natural religion he would believe it wrong to claim that he believed the Scriptures if it
were the case that he did not think them revealed. In short, Toland is definitely not an
adherent of natural religion but rather appears very Lockean.
It is clear that Toland is not professing or arguing for natural religion in CNM,
contrary to what Beiser, Leask, and Sullivan claim. What this section has unearthed here
runs counter to all those who think that CNM is professing a natural religion, which
comprises a very large and notable segment of the scholarship. This section’s findings
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also bear upon Berman’s and Fouke’s claims that Toland has a three-tiered intention with
CNM: 1) to appear that he defends revelation, 2) to lead unwary readers to make the
irreligious conclusions for themselves, and 3) to lead the intelligent to arrive at his true
beliefs. Regarding the first intention, Toland not only appears to defend revelation, but
he does defend it as Locke does. But with the great attention that Toland has evidently
paid to Locke, what are these irreligious conclusions that one would come to make that
would be different from Locke? Again, Fouke and Berman give their own bare assertions
or assertions made by others about CNM as evidence. If Toland was a theological liar, as
they claim, Locke would have to be a theological liar as well, unless they are willing to
claim that Locke was too obtuse to see where his own arguments led to irreligious
conclusions. Even the slight deviations we are about to encounter in the next section
regarding revelation and reason, which in no way help Berman’s or Fouke’s cause, are
still in a sense largely Lockean.

Part VI: Reason and Revelation
Toland does not carve out a section in his work devoted solely to the taxonomy of
divine special revelation as Locke does, but one can be pieced together and inferred.
Although he does not use the term traditional revelation, he obviously treats Scripture as
traditional revelation that was originally conveyed by God to humans and subsequently
written down. In CNM he claims that he takes the divinity of the New Testament for
granted (xxiv) and reiterates this presupposition in the Apology.65 It is also clear that he is
aware of the concepts of original revelation of the conveyable sort and unconveyable sort.
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He alludes to both concepts in one paragraph of CNM. There he notes that some try to
defend incomprehensible doctrines by claiming that they are contrary to common notions,
or incomprehensible, but “consistent with themselves” (30). Toland comments on these
allegedly incomprehensible doctrines further: “But supposing a little that the thing were
so; it still follows, that none can understand these Doctrines except their Perceptions be
communicated to him in an extraordinary manner, as by new Powers and Organs” (30).
In other words, even if some incomprehensible message were conveyed to one with new
powers and organs, others could not be edified by the revelation as they could not
comprehend it. Thus it is clear that he understands the distinction between the two types
of revelation, both of which Locke would label original revelation.
Toland even incorporates the various conceptions of revelation with reason in the
same way that Locke does, but with a few exceptions. This claim will be the topic of the
bulk of the remainder of this chapter. Recall that for Locke, divine (special) revelation—
original and traditional—must have the appropriate external and internal marks, which
reason must judge, to be affirmed as revelation. The appropriate external marks for
original revelation are a corresponding clear miracle or miracles and for traditional
revelation are accompanying fair testimonies of a clear miracle or miracles. The first
internal mark is that the interpretation of the revealed proposition is definitively not
contrary to knowledge. One would not expect it to be because if revelation could
contradict knowledge—the goal and highest achievement of reason and the foundation of
our further reasoning—it would be undercutting its source of validation that it is
revelation. The second internal mark is that the interpretation of the revealed proposition
is not definitively contradictory to assured revelation. Thus, Locke subordinates
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revelation to proper reason in a sense because the latter is used to affirm the external
marks and determine and judge the internal marks or interpretation of the former to
legitimize it. It is evident from the Essay that Locke thinks the Bible fits these criteria and
is the surest revelation available. In fact, all present day original revelation, which Locke
allows for in the Essay, must comport with vulgar reason or Scripture.66 Moreover,
Locke’s Essay allows for revelation of the unconveyable sort.
Treating the various aspects, Toland does acknowledge miracles as the
appropriate external marks. This chapter already noted this in the “Preliminaries” section.
Some scholars, however, believe that Toland categorically rejects miracles or he would
logically have to reject them in order to be consistent with his arguments in CNM.
Charles Taylor is an example of scholars who portray Toland as rejecting anything
“mysterious.” Taylor understands things to be mysterious, apparently, in a sense different
from that which Toland intended. Taylor thinks that Toland’s dismissal of mystery from
religion entails the dismissal of miracles.67 But there is no evidence that Taylor has gone
beyond a brief secondary account of CNM. He gives nothing from CNM that would lead
one to that conclusion. Frederick Beiser’s treatment of Toland, in contrast, is more in
depth and demonstrates more than a passing notice of Toland. Beiser believes that Toland
vacillates on the issue of whether or not miracles are supernatural events. Regarding
Beiser’s claims of Toland’s vacillation, he thinks this is so because, while Toland says
“that miracles though happening according to natural law, occur with ‘supernatural
assistance’” (150), he “retracts his position entirely by admitting that miracles would not
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be miracles at all if they were explicable according to natural laws.” Beiser thinks that
Toland, regardless of what he says, however, is obliged to dismiss so-called miracles as
supernatural events: “If miracles really are supernatural events, then there will be
mysteries in Christianity after all.” What Beiser is arguing is that miracles are mysteries
if supernatural and are according-to-natural-laws and non-mysterious if natural
phenomena.68
Beiser’s claims are, however, groundless; all of Toland’s descriptions of miracles
are contrary to them being simply natural phenomena. Toland’s definition of a miracle is
“some Action exceeding all humane Power, and which the Laws of Nature cannot
perform by their ordinary Operations” (144). Toland does clearly state that miracles are
not just “some Phenomenon that surpizes only by its Rarity” (150). Also, if “one could
tell how a Miracle was wrought . . . [that] is no Miracle at all” (150). God does not
perform miracles, and thus does not alter the order of nature, unless there is a weighty
reason and for some “special and Important End, which is either appointed by those for
whom the Miracles is made, or intended and declar’d by him that works it” (146-147). In
other words, God uses them as proof that He is communicating or He uses them to give
credit to His workers. In fact, no miracle in the New Testament was performed, “but what
serv’d to confirm the Authority of those who wrought it, to procure Attention to the
Doctrines of the Gospel, or for the like wise and reasonable Purposes” (147). Miracles
“are always wrought in favor of the Unbelieving” (149). What is more, we must reject
miracles of witches, conjurers, and all heathens because there is in them no end worthy of
God changing the course of nature and also “Diabolical Delusions would hereby receive
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equal Confirmation with Divine Revelation” (147-148).69 Furthermore, and this gets at
the root of Beiser’s confusion regarding Toland’s view of miracles, Toland states clearly
that miracles must be “intelligible and possible,” by which he means not contrary to
reason (145). Miracles must follow the rule of the ground of persuasion. Therefore,
claims of miracles such as a severed head speaking without a tongue or Jesus being born
but not through an opening in the virgin are contradictions because they are contrary to
the nature of the thing. That is, speaking cannot be done without a tongue and being born
means that a baby comes out of the mother through an opening (146).70 So when Toland
says that miracles are supernaturally assisted and that they are “produc’d according to the
Laws of Nature” (150), this is what he means: speaking is done with speaking organs and
a birth is when a baby exits through an opening in the mother’s body (146). In Toland’s
economy, miracles are intelligible and therefore are not an inconsistent allowance of
incomprehensibility or mystery in Christianity.
Furthermore, bound up with the external miracles is veracity of the testifier.
Toland notes that our faith is built on ratiocination. Ratiocination must consider three
things at least before it can assent to divine revelation as such: the book is written by
whom the book says it is, the person’s actions and state of the person comports with what
a divine agent would be, and the work is intelligible (127). The first two deal with the
veracity of the testifier who has supposedly received divine revelation and believes the
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message he or she brings to be divine revelation. And as said above, miracles would
provide the indication. The third corresponds to the principle that God communicates to
us such that the ground of persuasion is a sure and steadfast rule.
So, while miracles are the external mark for revelation, Toland also operates with
the same internal marks as Locke does. It is abundantly clear in what has been said before
that a revealed proposition, if it is to be even considered as such, must not be definitively
contrary to knowledge. Toland’s primary emphasis throughout the work is that anything
we believe must be comprehensible, whether it is from human or allegedly divine
authority. Furthermore, Toland, although not explicitly saying so, would have to follow
Locke in giving the likely interpretation of a revealed proposition priority over a
proposition that is deemed probable by unassisted, natural reason. If this were not the
case, Toland would have no argument for his claims that belief in Christ is necessary for
salvation, at least to those aware of Christ. That is, all are responsible for considering and
weighing the claims for themselves and are responsible for acknowledging Christ as
Savior regardless of what their unassisted, natural or vulgar reasons might think about
such claims. Thus the internal mark for revealed propositions is that they are not
definitively contrary to knowledge; they can be contrary to natural probability though.
Whether or not Toland believes a further internal mark of revelation is that the
alleged revelation must not be definitively contrary to assured revelation must be
considered. As said already, Toland takes the divinity of the New Testament for granted
(xxiv). And he thinks God’s revelation must be everywhere “uniform and self-consistent”
and cannot “cast down or destroy itself” (125). So, while this internal mark is operational
within CNM it is not explicit. Therefore the books that were added as part of the canon
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must have comported with the books already assumed as such. Interestingly, as already
stated, none of the books of the other religions in Toland’s view could ever make it past
the external mark criterion.
There are a few other questions that still must be answered. First, while it is
obvious that Toland believes that there was original revelation in the time of the writing
of Scripture, does he believe original revelation of the conveyable sort still exists today?
Second, does unconveyable original revelation exist today or has it ever existed
according to CNM? Third, does Toland believe that the Old Testament is divine
revelation as well?
While Locke does not officially rule out modern-day original revelation of the
conveyable sort, Toland’s CNM does. When Toland originally alludes to the concepts of
conveyable and unconveyable original revelation, he does not say whether he thinks
unconveyable original revelation ever existed or if either currently exist (30-31). As just
noted above, he obviously thinks that original revelation of the conveyable sort existed at
one time, at least, since we have Scripture (135-137). In chapter IV of Section III,
entitled, “Objections brought from particular Texts of Scripture and from the Nature of
FAITH, answer’d,” he focuses on the nature of propositions delivered in Scripture. There
he categorically denies present-day original revelation of the conveyable sort. He writes:
“Again, Divine Faith is either when God speaks to us immediately himself, or when we
acquiesce in the Words or Writings of those to whom we believe he has spoken. All Faith
now in the World is of this last sort, and by consequence entirely built upon
Ratiocination” (127). He apparently finds support for his view that faith is based on
ratiocination or reasoning in Hebrews 11:1-3:
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The Author of the Epistle of the Hebrews do’s not define FAITH a Prejudice,
Opinion, or Conjecture but Conviction or Demonstration: Faith says he, is the
confident Expectation of things hop’d for, and the Demonstration of things not
seen. These last Words, things not seen, signify not (as some would have it)
things incomprehensible or unintelligible, but past or future Matters of Fact . . .
Besides, there can be properly no Faith of things seen or present, for then ‘tis
Self-evidence, and not Ratiocination (129-130).
Thus faith cannot be implicit and regard things incomprehensible and it cannot regard
things one is witnessing or has witnessed as that is obtained by the senses, and thus, as
discussed in the “Preliminaries” section, essentially certain. Furthermore, faith now must
be based on reasoning without God immediately revealing to us what he wants us to
believe. He uses another portion of Hebrews 11 to give an example of the nature of this
latter aspect of modern-day faith. In attempting to sacrifice his son, Abraham was trusting
God, amidst what to many would appear a contradiction between God’s present
command of sacrifice and his former promises, by reasoning that God would raise Isaac
from the dead (131-132).
The bulk of chapter IV of Section III defends the idea that religious faith is now
always based on reasoning with previously given divine revelation, the real point of
interest currently at hand, and that the doctrines and propositions of divine revelation are
always intelligible. Using verses from 1 Corinthians and Hebrews he claims that if faith
were not from reasoning we would have no degrees of understanding (133-134). He
writes, “if Faith were not a Perswasion resulting from previous Knowledge and
Comprehension of the thing believ’d, there could be no Degrees nor Differences in it”
(133). And, in 1 Peter 3:15, “Faith signifies an intelligible Persuasion” (136).
The denial of present-day original revelation has two obvious and one possible
implication. The first obvious implication is that there can be no more traditional
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revelation added to Scripture. In Vindicius Liberius, he even alludes to the “dreadful
Curse which the Author of the Revelation pronounces against such as shall add or take
away from the Book” as pertaining to the entire Bible and not just the book of
Revelation.71 The other implication is that he leaves no room for so-called enthusiasts or
those like the Reformed who base their persuasion or conviction of different faith claims
solely on the operation of the Holy Spirit. For Toland, revelation is purely a means of
information (Cf. 45). The possible implication is that miracles have ceased. Toland
connects them with confirmation of revelation. If they are only for the confirmation of
original revelation then there are no more miracles. Toland, however, never explicitly
says this. He does claim that miracles are “to procure Attention to the Doctrines of the
Gospel, or for the like wise and reasonable Purposes” (147). But that statement does not
tell the reader what he thinks might be a reasonable purpose. And when he refers later to
the fact that they are wrought to confirm doctrines he mentions no other viable occasions
(150).72 Whatever the case is, the modern-day miracles he explicitly rejects are those that
are claimed by heathens, whose views are contrary to our idea of God, and those of the
Roman Catholics, whose miracles of transubstantiation are not for the benefit of the
unbelieving (147-149). Anyone who approaches Toland thinking that he holds the view
that God does not interact with the created order could, if not exceedingly careful, read
him as rejecting modern-day miracles without much thought. Many presume him to be a
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Toland, Vindicius Liberius, 22.

One might claim CNM could allow that a miracle might occur in front of a church one Sunday
morning for giving attention and confirmation to the gospel that will be preached or read there that day. But
that would likely make the reading of the text that day or the sermon given that day a candidate for modernday original revelation.
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thorough-going deist. Nonetheless, it would not be at all surprising, considering the
above, that he does reject modern-day miracles.
While it is clear that Toland rejects present-day original revelation, it is not
completely clear whether or not he rejects original revelation of the unconveyable sort in
the time of the writing of the Bible and before. In the same chapter referenced directly
above—chapter IV of Section III—he remarks: “Now since by Revelation Men are not
endu’d with any new Faculties, it follows that God should lose his end in speaking to
them, if what he said did not agree with their common Notions” (128). At face value the
text appears to be saying that God does not endow us with new faculties for the purposes
of revelation and it would therefore be useless for Him to communicate to anyone with
revelation of the unconveyable sort. One could argue, however, that he means Scripture
instead of all revelation by the term “Revelation,” since the focus of the chapter is that
there is nothing in Scripture that is incomprehensible. That is a possible reading but it
seems forced, especially in light of a few other reasons to the contrary, all of which are
intertwined. First, revelation for Toland is, again, simply a means of information and
does not include anything like the operation of the Holy Spirit where He is the cause of
our conviction. He writes:
I am not ignorant how some boast they are strongly perswaded by the illuminating
and efficacious Operation of the Holy Spirit, and that they neither have nor
approve other Reasons of their FAITH . . . So far of REVELATION; only in
making it a Mean of Information, I follow Paul himself, who tells the
Corinthians, that he cannot profit them except he speaks to them by Revelation, or
by Knowledg, or by Prophesying, or by Doctrine (45).
Thus there appears to be no allowance, according to CNM, of a supernaturally bestowed
faculty for the purposes of understanding original revelation that to others would be
gibberish. Revelation is only a means of information. This citation pertains to now as
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well as the time of Paul, which is in the midst of the era of the writing of the New
Testament. Second, Toland is a type of materialist and thinks that there is no immaterial
soul. In defending his claims that we do not have to know the essence of a thing to know
the thing, he writes: “The Idea of the Soul then is every whit as clear and distinct as that
of the Body; and had there been (as there is not) any Difference, the Soul must have
carri’d the Advantage, because its Properties are more immediately known to us, and are
the Light whereby we discover all things besides” (85-86). So, it appears the bestowal of
a new faculty would be a material transaction, which would require a miracle. It is hard to
square a miracle in such an instance with the requirement that the miracle is for the
benefit of the unbelieving. Third, unconveyable original revelation is not profitable to
others (30, 45). Toland writes, “God has wisely provided we should understand no more
of these than are useful and necessary for us; which is all our present Condition needs”
(76). So, while Locke is not deterred by his own principle of utility in his allowance of
unconveyable original revelation, perhaps Toland is. Thus, it is possible that Toland
would reject any revelation of the unconveyable sort because it would require a physical
change to one’s material soul and thus a miracle and the information revealed would be
unedifying to others. But perhaps his denial that there is anything above reason in any
sense in the Christian religion would be better evidence for excluding the unconveyable
sort of revelation. In the end, while not certain, it seems very likely that Toland would
categorically deny original revelation of the unconveyable sort.
Moreover, it appears that Toland believes the Old Testament to be traditional
revelation as Locke does. While Toland only explicitly states that he takes the New
Testament’s divinity for granted, the context explains why. Toland writes, “In the
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following Discourse, which is the first of three, and wherein I prove my Subject in
general, the Divinity of the New Testament is taken for granted; so that it regards only
Christians immediately, and others but remotely” (xxiv). So perhaps this is just an odd
way of saying that the focus of the book is predominantly on the doctrines from the New
Testament. Recall, the thesis of CNM: “there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to
Reason, nor above it; and that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d a Mystery”
(6). Furthermore, he treats the Old Testament as he does the New, quoting from both and
using examples from both throughout CNM. He also acknowledges miracles connected to
the Old Testament books. For all we know, he might follow the reasoning that since the
New Testament presupposes the truth of the Old Testament then the books with or
without miracles associated to them are considered Scripture. In short, it seems
conclusive that Toland would accept the Old Testament as divine revelation. If that is so,
the entire Bible is not only a paradigm for revelation, at least for the most part, but it is
the written product of all the divine revelation given to humans.
Taking stock of the conclusions so far, there appear to be a few differences
between CNM and the Essay. CNM denies modern-day original revelation of the
conveyable sort and the Essay does not. Likewise, Toland apparently rejects original
revelation of the unconveyable sort and Locke does not. And, while CNM probably
denies miracles today, Toland also has the rule that miracles were always done for the
benefit of the unbeliever. Locke allows miracles for today and does not state Toland’s
additional rule. Furthermore, CNM promulgates materialism while the Essay does not.
And, because Toland apparently rules out modern-day revelation of any sort, whenever
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he uses the term revelation it indicates that which pertains to Scripture. For Locke, in the
Essay, Scripture does not necessarily exhaust traditional revelation.
Interestingly, some of these differences disappear when combining the theological
opinions of John Locke, given in ROC, with his official experimental philosophy
pertinent to revelation, given in the Essay. CNM and ROC are more theological and
include far more interpretation of biblical passages in their arguments than does the
Essay, which is more of a philosophical work. While Locke’s official stance in the Essay
is that an immaterial human soul is a possibility (IV.iii.6), his personal belief conveyed in
ROC is that the likely stance from Scripture is that there is no consciousness without a
material body.73 If there is a connection between materialism and the rejection of
unconveyable original revelation, perhaps Locke would agree with Toland’s assessment
from a biblical vantage point, except for Paul’s receiving of unconveyable revelation in
the third heaven, which Locke upholds (1 Cor. 2:9) (Essay IV.xviii.3).
Another possible difference between CNM and the Essay is worth mentioning and
it pertains to the logical priority of certain major elements regarding revelation. This
logical priority is not, however, necessarily the order in which these elements are
presented. CNM states up front that the divinity of Scripture is taken for granted. It also
presupposes the existence of God and our epistemological endowment from Him of
everything we need for our own good. This last notion rules out the need of assenting to
anything incomprehensible. That is CNM’s starting point. It is thus from Scripture that
the external and internal marks are extracted. It is then argued that there is no other
revelation by virtue of the fact that all alleged revelation will fail in one way or another
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when it comes to the marks. The Essay, namely book IV, begins with presuppositions of
the existence of God and our epistemological endowment of all powers needed for our
own good. From there it moves to the marks of revelation. Then it moves to presenting
the Bible as conforming to the marks.74 After that it entertains and makes allowances for
alleged revelation beyond Scripture. The Essay is thus more objective in its approach to
Scripture.
In the end, Toland’s treatment of revelation and reason is very much akin to
Locke’s. Revelation is considered as such by virtue of its external marks, miracles, and
its internal marks, its not being definitively contrary to knowledge and assured revelation.
Both see the Bible as the paradigm of traditional revelation. But, while Locke makes
allowances for present-day original revelation and extra-biblical traditional revelation,
Toland rules both out. The alleged revelation of other faiths would not be allowed
corresponding miracles by God and thus could not even be considered as revelation; and
Scripture likewise, in Toland’s mind, rules out the potential of any further revelation to
Christians. And while Locke conceives of and allows for immediate revelation of the
unconveyable sort in the Essay, it would be surprising if Toland finds it a legitimate
category of revelation based on God’s exhibited parameters for working miracles, the
inability to convey the associated propositions, and possibly Toland’s stated materialism.

Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the differences between Locke and Toland with
respect to their understandings and treatments of reason, its related faculties, faith, and
74

Locke does clearly presume Scripture to be traditional revelation without proving it, however, in
such passages like Essay III.ix.23. There he says that the Old and New Testaments are infallible without
proving it. Book IV is, nonetheless, the focus at present.

236
revelation are not based upon or evidenced by their respective categorizations of
propositions, but on Toland’s attempt at working out the implications of Locke’s
epistemological principles in conjunction with Toland’s interpretations of certain biblical
passages and certain theological preferences and presuppositions. Had Locke ordered
propositions according to his preferred consideration of reason, his categorization of
propositions would be the same as Toland’s. The resultant, substantial differences
between Locke and Toland in their understandings and treatments of epistemology are
connected with Toland’s definite or likely rejections of theological and philosophical
positions that Locke does not dismiss: non-materialism of the soul, post-New Testament
original revelation and miracles, and prior-to-the-close-of-the-New-Testament divine
revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed faculty and private miracles for
believers.75
There are a few possible connections amidst these five differences. It is likely that
the rejections of past divine revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed faculty (i.e.,
original revelation of the unconveyable sort), non-materialism of the soul, and private
miracles for believers are connected. Perhaps Toland has scriptural reasons for these but
they are not stated. Locke, however, is a materialist based on biblical considerations in
ROC, which Toland may have read. Furthermore, Toland’s likely rejection of modernday miracles is based upon his rejection of modern-day original revelation. And Toland’s
rejection of that is apparently based upon his reading of certain passages from Scripture,
which he presupposes to be writings of God’s revelation.
75

Toland would reject any claim of a private miracle that occurred in the presence of a biblical
unbeliever that was not to have been done by God and for the purpose of helping the unbeliever with her
unbelief (CNM 151). John Locke does not specifically discuss the claims of believers in non-biblical
religions regarding miracles done in favor of their religion.
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Some final words can be mentioned regarding the three common assertions often
made regarding the juxtaposition of Locke and Toland: 1) Toland appropriates the
foundational principles of Locke’s Essay to a significant degree, 2) Locke accepts
propositions above reason, while Toland does not, and 3) Locke accepts divine revelation
and Toland rejects, or essentially rejects, divine revelation. As to comment one, it is clear
that Toland has appropriated the foundational principles of the Essay with very little
deviation. Regarding comment two, Locke rejects definitively unintelligible propositions
just as Toland does. So, comment two is greatly misleading as discussed. Comment three
is false. Both Locke and Toland clearly accept the existence of divine revelation. They
do, however, differ on some minor details.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction
Any history of philosophy that includes John Toland will inevitably connect him
with John Locke. The two are forever tethered to one another in the annals thanks to
Edward Stillingfleet. The bishop claims that the heretical conclusions of Toland’s
Christianity Not Mysterious (CNM) are the logical outworking of Locke’s foundational
epistemological principles laid in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay),
to which Locke only loosely adheres. While little detailed comparative work has been
done in comparison of the two thinkers, Locke and Toland, a common synopsis prevails:
Toland founded his epistemology of CNM largely on that of Locke’s Essay, but in the
end rejects Locke’s category of propositions above reason and subordinates revelation to
reason. In light of all these claims, this dissertation set out to compare the epistemologies
of John Locke’s Essay and John Toland’s CNM.1
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Edward Stillingfleet, A Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity with an Answer to the Late
Socinian Objections Against It from Scripture, Antiquity and Reason, 2nd ed. (London: printed by J.H. for
Henry Mortlock, 1697). The 1st edition has the same bibliographic information. There are no pertinent
differences between the editions that concern this chapter. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane
Understanding, 3rd ed. (London: printed for Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship, 1695).
According to G.A.J. Rogers, Stillingfleet only owned the 1694 2nd edition of the Essay. G.A.J. Rogers,
“Introduction,” The Philosophy of Edward Stillingfleet, vol. 1, ed. by G.A.J. Rogers (Bristol: Thoemmes
Press, 2000), vii-x. But the 1695 edition is essentially a page for page reprint of the 1694 edition (London:
printed for Awnsham and John Churchil and Samuel Manship). Both have been consulted and there are no
important differences that are of concern here. Also, the 1695 edition is the latest edition that John Toland
would have been able to consult prior to the publication of Christianity Not Mysterious. Also consulted is
the critical edition of the Essay: John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). From here onward, the Essay (3rd Edition) will be referenced
parenthetically, indicating the book, chapter, and section. John Toland, Christianity not Mysterious: OR, A
TREATISE Shewing, That there is nothing in the GOSPEL Contrary to REASON, Nor ABOVE it: And that
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This conclusion will summarize the argument of this dissertation and discuss
implications. The summary of the argument will combine the conclusions of the three
main chapters. The implications from the dissertation are several. This chapter will
discuss the implications for the history of philosophy, namely in the specific area of the
rise of natural religion in England. A new, corresponding categorization scheme for
organizing thinkers during this rise and for orienting students of this period will be
suggested. This will be followed by a brief discussion on the implications of Locke’s and
Toland’s teaching that revealed propositions are not made more credible by support from
natural philosophy or what is commonly referred to today as science. This chapter then
will comment on scholarship that have argued that CNM is not indicative of Toland’s true
thoughts. Within the brief discussions mentioned above there will be explicit suggestions
for further areas of study. This chapter will end with a section describing a very important
study that this dissertation begins. A comparative study of Locke’s and Toland’s
prolegomena, namely regarding the attributes of Scripture and hermeneutics, could nicely
build upon the epistemological foundations laid in this dissertation.
Part I: Re-visioning Reason, Revelation, and Rejection in John Locke’s An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding and John Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious
Chapter 2 of this dissertation serves as a brief historical positioning of the
connection between the Essay and CNM, a demonstration of the need for further
comparative analysis of the epistemologies of the two works, and the beginning of that
comparative analysis. Chapter 2 argues that Stillingfleet is correct in asserting agreement

no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d A MYSTERY, 2nd ed. (London: printed for Sam Buckley,
1696). This is a slightly enlarged version of the original and anonymously published 1 st edition (London:
1696). From here onward, CNM (2nd ed.) will be referenced parenthetically, indicating the page.
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between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of ideas and certainty but misinterprets what both
thinkers are conveying about these notions when he treats them in the Discourse. While
Locke’s clarifications on ideas and certainty made in the course of the debate are helpful,
the controversy as a whole and its reception leaves little resolved regarding a comparison
of Locke’s and Toland’s respective epistemologies.
Chapter 3, while building on the exploration of Locke’s Essay regarding ideas and
certainty in the previous chapter, focuses solely on Locke’s epistemology, namely in the
areas of the relationships of reason and faith and reason and revelation. These interrelated
areas are hotly contested in the scholarship and required in-depth treatment. That chapter
argues that to understand Locke’s description of reason, and thus the relationships
between reason and faith and reason and revelation, one must acknowledge that in the
Essay Locke primarily conceives of the mind employing the faculty of reason working in
reason’s proper office or scope, which entails the considerations of natural as well as
supernatural sources of information (the propositions of the latter trumping the probable
propositions of the former) and a corresponding proper faith that pertains to probable
(uncertain) propositions from the same sources. In Essay IV.xviii, however, he conceives
of the mind employing reason in a diminished office, or concerning only natural sources,
and a corresponding vulgar faith, concerned with only supernatural sources; but he does
this partly, at least, to show that such an antithetical framing of the two fails to maintain
definitive boundaries. As a result, faith in or assent to a proposition from any source and
the determination of divine revelation as such morally ought to be the result of the mind
employing its power of reason in its full scope or office.
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Chapter 4 continues the epistemological treatment of Toland begun in chapter 2,
but focuses on the relationships of reason and faith and reason and revelation. It also
offers a point-for-point comparison with the Essay made possible by chapter 3. Chapter 4
argues that the differences between Locke and Toland with respect to their
understandings of reason, its related faculties, faith, and revelation are not based upon or
evidenced by their respective categorizations of propositions, but are based upon
Toland’s attempt at working out the implications of Locke’s epistemological principles in
conjunction with Toland’s interpretations of certain biblical passages and certain
theological preferences and presuppositions. Had Locke ordered propositions according
to his preferred consideration of reason, his categorization of propositions would be the
same as Toland’s. The resultant, substantial differences between Locke and Toland in
their understandings of epistemology are connected with Toland’s definite or likely
rejections of theological and philosophical positions that Locke does not dismiss: nonmaterialism of the soul, post-New Testament original revelation and miracles, and priorto-the-close-of-the-New-Testament divine revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed
faculty and private miracles for believers.2
Combining the comparative analyses of each chapter, the thesis for this entire
dissertation is the same as chapter four but with a minor change. While chapter 4 focuses
on a point-for-point comparison with Locke and Toland on reason, its related faculties,
faith, and revelation, chapter 2 aims at a point-for-point comparison of the Essay and
CNM on ideas and certainty. Combining the conclusions of chapter 2 and chapter 4 then
2

Toland would reject any claim of a private miracle that occurred in the presence of a biblical
unbeliever that was not to have been done by God and for the purpose of helping the unbeliever with her
unbelief (CNM 151). John Locke does not specifically discuss the claims of believers in non-biblical
religions regarding miracles done in favor of their religion.
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leaves us with a description of the differences between Locke’s and Toland’s
epistemologies as a whole. So the theological and philosophical differences between
Locke and Toland noted in the thesis statement of chapter four regarding reason, its
related faculties, faith, and revelation are the differences between Locke’s and Toland’s
epistemologies as a whole.

Part II: Historical Implications for the Narrative of the Rise of Natural Religion in
England, Corresponding Thinkers, and the Biddle Hypothesis
Historians of philosophy have labored hard to categorize the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century English philosophical theologians into various groups in order to
economically convey to their readers the movement of thought that gave rise to natural
religion in England. These categories often cannot be pressed too far and have limited
utility. At times the criteria used to define a group are too loose or vague and the groups
overlap leaving a thinker or thinkers in two groups or the criteria are too rigid, leaving
some notable thinkers outside of all of the groups. The former situation is far more
common than the latter. In what follows, this section will discuss briefly the figures
typically incorporated in the narrative of the rise of natural religion in England, a couple
of examples of the attempted groupings of these thinkers by more recent literature, and
these specific groupings’ respective shortcomings. This section will then note the
implications of the findings of this dissertation on the rise of natural religion, namely a
suggestion of new criteria by which to group some of these thinkers, a related need for
the further study of particular figures, and a rebuttal to John Higgins-Biddle’s tentative
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hypothesis regarding one of Locke’s reasons for writing The Reasonableness of
Christianity (ROC) related to CNM.3
A few names commonly appear in the narrative of the rise of natural religion in
England. They are all considered to be outside of the pale of Protestant scholasticism.
Lord Herbert of Cherbury is often the first or one of the first named. In his De Veritate
(1624) he puts forth the common axioms or precepts of universal natural religion and for
this reason is sometimes fashioned as the father of deism. Chronologically he is followed
by John Locke and sometimes by Archbishop John Tillotson. Locke’s and Tillotson’s
epistemologies and defenses of religion have numerous affinities and are thus discussed
together. The subsequent group treated is the next generation of thinkers, some of which
were writing at the same time as Locke. It includes such thinkers as John Toland,
Anthony Collins, and Matthew Tindal, to name a few. Most, if not all, placed in this next
generation are considered Lockean in one sense or another. And each thinker’s major
defining work, except for Toland’s CNM, appears after Locke’s death.4 All of these
thinkers are often portrayed as de-emphasizing the role of the supernatural in our lives
and religion compared to the previous generation. But the shorter a particular treatment of
the rise of natural religion in England is, the fewer there are who will be named from this
post-Locke generation. Toland is almost always mentioned because of the much-touted
deviation from Locke made popular by Stillingfleet. Tindal is also almost always
3

John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, As delivered in the Scriptures, 2nd ed. (London:
Awnsham and John Churchil, 1696).
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Most would agree that the works for which Toland and Tindal are best known today are
Christianity Not Mysterious and Christianity as Old as the Creation, respectively. Toland’s career began
with CNM and Tindal’s ended with Christianity as Old as the Creation. Matthew Tindal, Christianity as
Old as the Creation: Or, the Gospel, a Republication of the Religion of Nature (London: 1730). Anthony
Collins has several works for which he is noted that span throughout his writing career. Thus, there does
not seem to be significant agreement in scholarship regarding what Collins’s most influential work is.
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mentioned because his Christianity as Old as the Creation, published in 1730, is the
clearest articulation of Christianity as merely natural religion.5 It marks the height of the
natural religion narrative before its decline in prominence, helped along by such minds as
David Hume.
James Livingston attempts the difficult task of dividing the thinkers above into
separate groups in one of his recent works. After mentioning Herbert of Cherbury and De
Veritate, he groups John Locke and John Tillotson as “rational supernaturalists” and John
Toland and Matthew Tindal as “deists.” He writes the following:
By the end of the seventeenth century most of the ablest thinkers were divided
into two camps. The orthodox or rational supernaturalists insisted on the unique
role of revelation and on the distinction between what could and what could not
be known by the exercise of reason alone. The more radical thinkers, who came to
be known as the Deists, rejected the necessity of revelation and insisted on the
sufficiency of unaided natural reason in religion.6
One of the first problems is that the two groups are based on different criteria or the
answers to different questions. That is, the rational supernaturalists are said to affirm “the
unique role of revelation,” a vague claim, and a distinction between what reason can and
cannot conclude for itself, while the deists, in the passage above, are said to reject the
necessity of revelation and apparently thought natural reason was capable of determining
the way of salvation for itself. If they were intended to be the same criteria, it seems the
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Tindal has appropriated the epistemological thought of Locke regarding ideas and knowledge.
Cf. Tindal, Christianity as Old, 159-160. It is beyond doubt as well that he deviates from him. Anthony
Collins was a student and close personal friend of Locke. His works have many similarities to Locke.
Anthony Collins, An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions, The Evidence whereof Depends
upon Human Testimony, 2nd ed. corrected (London: 1709); Anthony Collins, A Philosophical Inquiry
Concerning Human Liberty, 2nd ed. corrected (London: 1717).
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James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth
Century, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 16. Livingston’s supernaturalist and deist categories
are likely based to some degree on John Herman Randall, Jr.’s categories with the same name. It is unclear
to me into which group Randall intends to place John Toland. John Herman Randall, Jr., The Making of the
Modern Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926; reprinted with a forward, 1976), 285-289.
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best interpretation of these two groups would be that the supernatural rationalists believed
that revelation was necessary for salvation and the deists did not. The problem stemming
from that is that the paradigm of the supernatural rationalists, John Locke, did believe
that humans had the potential to be saved by responding to the natural light they had.
While it was not likely, it was possible.7
Another commendable categorization scheme comes from Claude Welch in
Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume I. After naming Lord Herbert of
Cherbury as being a significant first articulator of the precepts of natural religion, he goes
on to categorize key figures into three chronologically overlapping but progressing stages
of natural religion. The first stage, where John Locke is the paradigm, includes those who
assert that “Essential Christianity, though its content transcends what alone reason is able
to discover, is harmonious with natural religion.”8 “The second stage was characterized
by the assertion that Christianity (insofar as it is acceptable) does not transcend natural
religion but is an instance of it. At no point may Christianity go beyond it.”9 Toland and
Tindal are placed in this stage. The third and final stage is marked by those who think
revelation is “wholly unnecessary, or even opposed to the true religion of reason.”10
The problems with Welch’s scheme are few but important. First, stage one
encompasses, in reality, those like Locke who do not accept anything inconceivable into
religion but also those who do. That is a rather significant difference to allow in the same

7

Locke, ROC, 254-293.

8

Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1972), 35.
9

Welch, Protestant Thought, vol. 1, 36.

10

Welch, Protestant Thought, vol. 1, 38.
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stage. Secondly, moving from the first to the second stage, an important common point,
Christianity, is necessarily defined differently in the different stages; and it is not even
present in the description of the third stage. Thirdly, the appropriateness of putting those
who see revelation as wholly unnecessary and those who think it opposed to true religion
is doubtful. On a related point, it would seem that those who think revelation is wholly
unnecessary (but not opposed to true religion) might fit better into the second stage.
While both of these models of thinking through the rise of natural religion could
possibly be improved, this section suggests another and simpler categorization scheme
that is inherent within this dissertation. There are a series of sifting questions regarding
traditional revelation that one asks of and answers for a certain thinker. By virtue of these
questions a thinker’s approach to traditional revelation in principle is used to group him
or her with similarly principled individuals. The first question is: Does this thinker claim
that assent to traditional revelation as being such can be legitimate? If no, the thinker
denies traditional revelation. If yes, the next question is asked: Does this thinker claim
assent to traditionally revealed doctrines or propositions not comporting with natural
probability can be legitimate?11 If no, then the thinker teaches that traditional divine

11

A proposition that does not comport with natural probability is one that runs counter to natural
probability based upon purely natural considerations or a proposition asserted that could not rightly be
affirmed upon purely natural considerations.
The following are some helpful reminders regarding natural probability. Natural probability
includes the testimony of humans that does not originate in divine sources. The King of Siam hearing about
particulars regarding Holland from a Dutch Ambassador may believe him about many things but stop short
of assenting to the claim that an elephant could walk on a lake made hard by the bitter cold. The
proposition, while not touching on the experience of the king can be verified or could rationally be believed
upon the veracity of the ambassador. All that is to say, natural probability is not necessarily the simple
results of mental calculations based on the collections of the experiences and observations of an isolated
individual (Cf. Locke, Essay IV.xv.5). Also, one might through analogy and observation assent to
propositions regarding the supernatural realm through divinely unassisted reasoning. For instance, it is
possible some have reasoned that it is likely that there are ranks of intelligent beings, some of which are
immaterial, that reach up to the infinite perfection of God (Essay IV.xvi.12). While this is a proposition
focused on supernatural things it could come about from reasoning from natural sources. Locke’s above
(vulgar) reason category transcends divinely unassisted or natural probability. Locke’s above (vulgar)

247
revelation and doctrines must comport with natural probability to be legitimate; in other
words, legitimate revelation and doctrines are according to or subordinate to the dictates
of natural or vulgar reason.12 But if the answer is yes, another question is asked: Does the
thinker claim assent to traditional revealed doctrines or propositions that are
inconceivable but not logically contradictory can be legitimate? If the answer is no, the
thinker denies traditionally revealed inconceivable doctrines but not conceivable ones
that transcend natural probability; in other words, legitimate revelation and doctrines are
according to or subordinate to Locke’s proper reason and its rules and thus can be above
vulgar reason. If the answer is yes, revealed inconceivable doctrines or propositions that
are not logically contradictory are acceptable; in other words legitimate doctrines are not
logically contradictory but can be above proper reason. Thus, based upon the questions
reason propositions must be divinely revealed and they always pertain to supernatural things that we could
not otherwise rationally assent to even in the unlikely scenario that we happened to imagine them (Essay
IV.xvii.23; IV.xviii.7-8).
These things are important to understand in considering the second group—those that admit of
traditional revelation but deny that it can go beyond natural or vulgar probability or run counter to it. For
instance, if divine revelation seems to suggest that the universe contains powerful, immaterial beings
subordinate to God, a thinker in the second group could affirm that, while he or she might not affirm that
one-third of them rebelled against God; the person might not be able, even with others, to come up with
good reasons from purely natural considerations why this might be so. In addition, if one was convinced
that the Bible teaches that God made humans in one day but is convinced that science says otherwise,
science is to be followed. Thus the second group operates with the presupposition that God does not
communicate propositions that we are unable to derive ourselves and assent to in principle or to observe
ourselves and verify without divine assistance. In other words, they believe that God does not communicate
to us that which is above (vulgar) reason or counter to or beyond natural probability. Traditional revelation
for the second group can still be helpful in reminding us of or teaching us our moral duties. It is possible
that there are some who subordinate revelation to natural probability in only salvific matters—so as to give
no geographical people group more of an advantage in being saved—and thus would claim assent to the
proposition that one-third of the angels fell as being legitimate. But these would fall into the third group
that this section will treat shortly.
12

I say that they subordinate revelation to natural or vulgar reason because according to these
thinkers revelation cannot run counter to natural probability or be above vulgar or natural reason to be
considered as such. Nonetheless, these thinkers claim traditional revelation exists so they are technically
operating with proper reason. The difference, however, is in the nature of revelation. According to them, it
will never assert something or present an argument, if it is truly divine, that natural or vulgar reason would
dismiss if the claim were merely based on human testimony or other natural sources without any admixture
of divine assistance. This counters Locke’s stance that revelation can trump natural probability and even
convey propositions beyond our natural or vulgar reasoning abilities.
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being asked in the order they are, concrete groups are formed: 1) those that categorically
reject traditional revelation and divine doctrines as such; 2) those that categorically reject
traditional revelation and divine doctrines as such that do not comport with natural
probability; 3) those that categorically reject traditional revelation and divine doctrines as
such that go beyond natural conceivability even if not definitively, logically
contradictory; and 4) those that can accept inconceivable, albeit logically noncontradictory, revelation or doctrines.13
The advantages of this scheme are a few. For one, this concentrates on the nature
of reason, faith, and traditional revelation. While other types of revelation are discussed
during this period in history, most of these English thinkers are predominantly concerned
with the Bible, the accepted traditional revelation of Christianity. While modern-day
original revelation was also an important topic, allowances for it or categorical rejections
of it could be based upon Scriptural considerations. I believe most would agree that a
thinker’s stance on the question of modern-day revelation is less important than their
stance on traditional revelation from past original revelation. Also, concentrating on the
nature of traditional revelation from the standpoints of thinkers is more orderly than
grouping thinkers based upon what they think is necessary for salvation, or some other
complicated issue. Furthermore, this scheme is based upon Lockean categories. This is
important because the epistemologies of thinkers typically found in the narrative are
variations of the epistemology laid out in the Essay. Locke looms large into the
eighteenth-century and his Essay undoubtedly helped guide the conversations about
13

The first question asked in the series of questions groups thinkers into one of two groups, the
first being group one, the second containing groups two, three, and four. The second question divides this
second group into two groups, the first being group two, and the second being comprised of groups three
and four. The third question then further divides the combined grouping of groups three and four into group
three and group four.
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revelation. Asking the above questions for thinkers such as Anthony Collins or John
Tillotson, who himself was likely formative to the Essay, are areas of further study, while
a cursory read of Tindal, at least toward the end of his life, would seem to place him in
the second group, those who subordinate revelation to natural probability.14 What is
more, from this dissertation it is apparent that Locke and Toland fit into the third group
together.
Moreover, the fact that Toland is placed in the same group as Locke and not the
group that subordinates revelation to natural or vulgar reason or the group that denies
revelation would tend to overturn John Higgins-Biddle’s hypothesis regarding the writing
of ROC, now taken as a matter of fact by some. He thinks it is possible that Locke had a
copy of CNM prior to its publication. If so, he wonders if Locke’s noting of its
epistemological connections to his Essay and its deistic conclusions might have caused
him to write ROC, in part, to show his Essay does not end up in deism, but on the
contrary is against it.15 Higgins-Biddle’s account appears to be a tacit affirmation of
Stillingfleet’s reading of CNM. Nonetheless, the conjectured motivations for Locke’s

14

Tindal, Christianity as Old. He is quite explicit that his desire is to “advance the Honour of
External Revelation; by shewing the perfect Agreement between That and Internal Revelation” (8). He also
remarks that external revelation and natural religion may not differ in one aspect (51). He also gets rid of
Locke’s rule that revelation can trump natural probability (158). While Tindal is operating with a version of
Locke’s proper reason (he is claiming traditional revelation is such), his expunging of the rule effectively
subordinates revelation to natural probability or, in our terms, vulgar or natural reason. It is possible,
however, that Tindal means that the way of salvation as explained in revelation cannot differ from natural
religion (Cf. 59). Thus Tindal might claim beliefs in above natural or vulgar reason propositions not
regarding the message of salvation, such as one-third of the angels rebelled, could be reasonably accepted.
While this latter explanation is doubtful, more investigation and closer readings of Tindal would be needed.
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writing of ROC lose their force when it is seen that the gulf between the Essay and CNM
is not as wide as once thought.
Moreover, there is some warrant for the frequent grouping of Toland together
with Tindal as opposed to Locke, but scholarship has not properly identified these
connections. Again, first and foremost the grouping occurs in scholarship because Toland
is thought to have subordinated revelation to natural reason as does Tindal. While this is
incorrect, there are still important affinities between the two thinkers. In the end, Toland
seems to strip Christianity of God’s original revelation of the unconveyable sort, modernday miracles, and modern-day revelation. Tindal also seems to attack inconceivable
original revelation, modern-day original revelation, and miracles, albeit from different
angles.16 Thus Toland and Tindal both limit God’s interaction. So, when only considering
their conclusions as stated, Tindal and Toland appear to be more alike than Locke and
Toland. A further study juxtaposing Toland and Tindal more thoroughly than done here,
however, is needed and would likely prove a helpful and fruitful project.
Part III: Locke’s and Toland’s Hermeneutics amidst the Influences of Biblical
Criticism and the Natural Sciences
Locke and Toland operate with a certain epistemological and hermeneutical
principle that guards against the Bible’s authority being usurped by extra-biblical sources.
Locke is adamant in his debate with Stillingfleet that a particular doctrine derived from
Scripture is not to be thought more or less credible depending on the probability for or
against it supplied by vulgar or natural reason.17 What can be inferred from this is that,
16
17

Tindal, Christianity as Old, 162, 170, 199.

John Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to
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while vulgar reason may provide us with a possible interpretation, one should not be
compelled in any sense to use or favor such an interpretation. So, an interpretation of a
passage that is supported by a prevailing theory of natural science, for instance, is not,
because of that support, to be given more weight than an interpretation that does not seem
as probable under only natural considerations. When it comes to multiple, possible
interpretations, the only advice Locke has is that one proposition of Scripture cannot
contradict another. If that cannot be done with two propositions, for instance, after “fair
endeavours,” one must suspend one’s judgment.18
Now this rule clearly affects passages that might be or are commenting on
metaphysics, miracles, or divine agency. But that is not all. This rule even applies for
passages where one might claim that archaeological findings “support” Scripture’s
historical claims. Again, Locke and Toland would counter that Scripture is not made
more credible by finding support in archaeological findings but rather the Bible confirms
the probable interpretations of the unearthed data that conform to it. For Locke and
Toland there is comparatively little knowledge for us in this world. We are immersed in
probability.
How well they employed this principle is another question. Both men have works
in other areas beyond theology where Scripture is employed. How much biblical support
did they find, for instance, for their political views? Does it appear they are guilty of
eisegesis? If so, might this offer some insight to the next generations of political writers
who eschew the Bible?

18

Locke, ROC, 304.
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Part IV: The Question of Stylistic Camouflage and Hidden Pantheism versus Deism
Forthrightly Stated
In the 1980’s a rift in Toland scholarship was created. Toland’s CNM had been
fashioned as a “deistic” work and the progenitor of Tindal’s deist bible. Robert E.
Sullivan advanced his notion that Toland was truly a pantheistic materialist at the time of
writing CNM.19 Sullivan thinks that Toland argued for revelation because the Bible
supports civil order and morals, but concurrently argued that Christianity is simply an
instance of natural religion.20 In truth, however, Toland did not believe in the possibility
of divine revelation.21 This was received into scholarship by some with slight alteration
and by others with significant alterations. That latter scholarship hypothesized that CNM
had a three-tiered intention as follows: first, Toland wants CNM at face value to read like
a Christian work—for instance, defending revelation; second, Toland wants to lead
unwary readers to make for themselves the irreligious conclusions against which Toland
pretends to be writing; and third, Toland wants to convey to the intelligent, irreligious
readers his true beliefs.22 So while the older line of Toland scholarship and much of the
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recent Toland scholarship still label Toland as a deist, some since Sullivan have
understood CNM to be a cover of sorts, masking Toland’s true beliefs.
There are problems with all of these views. First, as already discussed,
epistemologically Toland is closer to Locke than he is to Tindal. Regarding Sullivan’s
claims, CNM does not subordinate revelation to natural reason and Christianity requires
faith in Christ for those who have heard the gospel. So it cannot simply be an instance of
natural religion. His argument that Toland was a pantheist all of his life is based on
circular reasoning as discussed in chapter 4.23 Those with the complicated three-tiered
notion of CNM have just as many problems. What are these irreligious conclusions that
Toland intended his reader to make and that his irreligious counterparts understood?
These authors simply make assertions amidst scant exegetical work and depend on the
claims of Toland’s adversaries that he had underhanded intentions. Toland is shown in
this dissertation to echo Locke in so many respects to the degree that they are left with
one of two conclusions if they want to persist with their hypothesis: 1) Locke was
oblivious to his mistakes that Toland mischievously replicated and there were plenty of
people on a higher mental level than Locke that recognized them; or 2) Locke was doing
the same thing that they claim Toland to be doing. Assuming they would choose the latter
option, they still must be pressed to deliver precisely how Toland and Locke intend to
undercut Christianity with hidden snares. This will also require that they enter the lists
with some very formidable Locke scholars, few of which doubt that Locke earnestly
thought himself a believing Christian under the authority of Scripture.
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If there is any charge of knowing misconduct, it is unlikely in either thinker’s
epistemology. Some have charged Locke with the abuse of Scripture intentionally or
unintentionally, but that question could be investigated regarding Locke and Toland in
the suggested study below.

Part V: A Comparison of Locke and Toland Regarding the Nature of Scripture and
Hermeneutics
A final area of study involving Locke and Toland that could build on this
dissertation is a comparative look at Locke’s and Toland’s bibliologies in this time
period. This would involve exploring both thinkers regarding their views of the nature of
Scripture, namely the attributes of Scripture. The thinkers’ respective views on
hermeneutics in principle and in practice could also be explicitly incorporated. Such a
study would go beyond the subsections involving reason and revelation in this
dissertation. While CNM is a combination of a theological work and an exploration of
experimental philosophy, the Essay is predominantly an exploration of experimental
philosophy. Thus, to get a better grasp on Locke’s hermeneutics and his positions on
several aspects of Scripture, ROC and its vindications, which are primarily theological,
would be necessary to study.
This proposed study of Locke’s and Toland’s views of the nature of Scripture and
hermeneutics is, in fact, the logical next step to this dissertation. While in recent decades
scholarship has become increasingly focused on Locke’s theology, little has been done
specifically with Locke’s bibliology. It is possible that Locke’s views on the nature of
Scripture have received so little attention because treatments of biblical authority are
impossible to separate from Locke’s epistemology regarding faith, revelation, and reason,
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all challenging interrelated topics. In other words, what has made an exploration of
Locke’s bibliology formidable is that Locke’s epistemology has proved to be interpreted
very differently by the many scholars involved in the on-going conversation. Thus, there
is no consensus view of Locke’s epistemology from which to build. Moreover, there has
been some scholarly treatment of Toland regarding Scripture, and those are typically on
his hermeneutics. But these have approached Toland as one who thinks the Bible does
not or cannot give humans anything that transcends natural probability.24
There are several sources that would likely prove helpful for such a study. As
already stated, the primary sources investigated would be the ones used in this
dissertation, the Essay, ROC, and CNM (and their respective published defenses). Francis
Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology or another fairly popular theological text that
precedes the theological writings of Locke and Toland could provide a structure or order
for the study. Turretin, for instance, treats the following major heads with associated
questions: The Necessity of Scripture, The Authority of Holy Scriptures, The Canon, The
Apocryphal Books, The Purity of the Sources, The Authentic Version, Versions, The
Septuagint, The Vulgate, The Perfection of Scriptures, The Perspicuity of Scriptures, The
24
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Reading of Scriptures, the Sense of Scriptures, The Supreme Judge of Controversies and
Interpreter of the Scriptures, and The Authority of the Fathers.25 Both Locke and Toland
write on many of these topics and what they would say about others could possibly be
inferred.
Such a study that investigates Locke’s and Toland’s views on Scripture and
interpretation would nicely compliment this dissertation. The two studies would no doubt
overlap to some degree, but the dissertation, as said above, lays the groundwork required
for the proposed study. I hope this present work opens new vistas for the prolegomena
and hermeneutics of John Locke and John Toland.
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APPENDIX A: THESES

Theses Related to the Dissertation
1. Stillingfleet is correct in asserting agreement between Locke’s and Toland’s notions of
ideas and certainty but misinterprets what both thinkers are conveying about these
notions when he treats them in the Discourse. While Locke’s clarifications on ideas and
certainty made in the course of the debate are helpful, the controversy as a whole and its
reception leaves little resolved regarding a comparison of Locke’s and Toland’s
respective epistemologies.
2. To understand Locke’s description of reason, and thus the relationships between reason
and faith and reason and revelation, one must acknowledge that in the Essay Locke
primarily conceives of the mind employing the faculty of reason working in reason’s
proper office or scope, which entails the considerations of natural as well as supernatural
sources of information (the propositions of the latter trumping the probable propositions
of the former) and a corresponding proper faith that pertains to probable (uncertain)
propositions from the same sources.
3. In Locke’s Essay, faith in or assent to a proposition from any source and the
determination of divine revelation as such morally ought to be the result of the mind
employing its power of reason in its full scope or office.
4. Had Locke ordered propositions according to his preferred consideration of reason in
the Essay, his categorization of propositions would be the same as Toland’s in CNM.
5. The resultant, substantial differences between Locke and Toland in their
understandings of epistemology are connected with Toland’s definite or likely rejections
of theological and philosophical positions that Locke does not dismiss: non-materialism
of the soul, post-New Testament original revelation and miracles, and prior-to-the-closeof-the-New-Testament divine revelation requiring a supernaturally bestowed faculty and
private miracles for believers.

Theses Related to Course Work
6. It is correct to attribute the 1729 pamphlet entitled A Dissertation on Liberty and
Necessity, etc. to Anthony Collins.
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7. John Calvin, although denying free choice regarding regeneration, teaches that human
beings, Christian and non-Christian, have freedom to act morally. Similar to many
ethicists and philosophers today, Calvin presupposes that unless there is actual
contingency in our choices and we have moral beliefs in our deliberation we cannot be
considered responsible agents and therefore cannot be considered to have freedom to act
morally.
8. In A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
David Hume adopts what is sometimes referred to in analytic philosophy as the classic
source compatibilist view of human freedom, where a human agent is “free” (and
therefore morally responsible) because she is the mediated source of her actions.
9. Klaas Schilder’s Christ and Culture is built around the general orthodox Reformed
framework. When he does deviate from it slightly—in unifying the covenants and adding
the cultural mandate to the covenant of works—his alterations correct a potential
soteriological, “other-worldly” fixation of those approaching Reformed orthodoxy.
10. Zacharias Ursinus’s two covenant structure in his Catechesis Maior is an attentive
combination of elements of thought with substantial precedence in other Reformed
scholars that is useful in simplifying or clarifying their thoughts. It is therefore not to be
understood as a break from earlier Reformed thought or created for the purpose of
working toward a Reformed theodicy.

Theses Related to Personal Interest
11. John Locke’s presentation of justification and the soteriological framework in which
it is placed in The Reasonableness of Christianity (ROC) is broad enough to encompass
all “Christian” views on the topics except antinomian ones. In other words, the focus of
ROC is not Locke’s personal views of justification and salvation but an ecumenical
statement of them.
12. John Locke’s apologetic strategy, taken into consideration with the larger context of
The Reasonableness of Christianity where it is predominantly employed, points away
from recent claims that Locke is one of the many alleged exoteric-esoteric writers of the
day.
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